Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sudan are bound by long-standing historical ties, by virtue of geographic proximity across the Red Sea, as well as by fraternal political relations dating from the dawn of Sudan's independence, by shared religious and Arab bonds and shared interests, and by common membership in the system of collective Arab security, the Red Sea security system, and African security. Sudan's stability has therefore been, and remains, among the Kingdom's foremost priorities.
Saudi Arabia has stood with Sudan since it began to pass through its present crisis, with its suffocating political and military dimensions, which led to the outbreak of a wide-ranging civil war extending to nearly all of Sudan's regions and states. This has left 34 million Sudanese in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, according to United Nations estimates, as the war has made Sudan the site of one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world, with the killing, displacement, flight, refuge, and emigration it has witnessed, and the intervention of many external parties. The war has come to be called the forgotten war, coinciding as it has with a belt of major conflicts around the world: the Russian-Ukrainian war, then the American-Israeli war on Iran, and the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian territories as a whole.
The importance of the Saudi role in Sudan stems from the sincerity of Saudi initiatives toward Sudan's crises, which is evident in the present Sudanese crisis. Jeddah hosted earlier negotiations between the parties to the current conflict, and the importance of the Saudi role takes shape through a set of factors that make the Kingdom capable of connecting the separated links of a peace process. Sudan today is in urgent need of rebuilding trust and establishing a new relationship among the state, the army, the politicians, society, and the regions, alongside its need for an initiative for a ceasefire between the commander of the armed forces, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Hemedti.
It is well known that Saudi Arabia has never at any time been a party to any Sudanese conflict, and that it neither adopts nor supports any factional project within Sudan at another's expense. It has rather put its wide regional and international relations to use in whatever may help resolve the Sudanese crisis, by facilitating coordination among the various initiatives and by putting forward many of those initiatives itself. This makes it capable of bringing the various estranged parties together and seating them at a table of constructive dialogue, in order to restore trust among the different components and warring parties and to begin a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue through which the parties may discuss the various questions that trouble Sudanese and that turn this far-flung and richly endowed Arab-African country into an arena of unending conflict.
Among those questions: the form of the state and a political composition suitable for all; how the political transition is to proceed; the reform of institutions; the future of the armed forces and their relationship with their own components and with Sudan's many neighboring states; and the securing of its borders with its neighbors.
Hence the prominence of the Saudi role at present, which aims not merely at mediation to end the fighting but at establishing an inclusive diplomacy that produces Sudanese consensus, by re-engineering the existing tracks and linking them to the Jeddah platform and the 2023 Jeddah Declaration. This accords with the direction that emerged on September 23, 2026, when the Quad- the United States, Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates- met for the first time in New York with the Quintet, comprising the African Union, IGAD, the United Nations, the European Union, and the League of Arab States. They agreed to activate coordination, prepare a joint road map, and link the humanitarian track, the cessation of hostilities, political dialogue, and the protection of civilians; to prepare mechanisms for monitoring and verifying any agreement; to support an inclusive Sudanese political dialogue; and to reject the fragmentation of Sudan or the creation of arrangements leading to its partition.
In light of the foregoing, the Saudi role in Sudan represents one of the most important tracks for finding common ground between the political forces and the social components, particularly if that role moves from crisis management to building a sustainable Sudanese consensus. Through its precedence, in partnership with the United States, in hosting the dialogue between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces on May 6, 2023 in Jeddah, with the aim of reaching a ceasefire and securing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and through the Kingdom's weight and its important relations with the various parties connected to the Sudanese crisis, Saudi Arabia can establish a platform suitable to, and trusted by, all the Sudanese political and military parties.
It should be noted that the two sides' signing, on May 11, 2023, of the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan produced important outcomes: the two parties' commitment to protecting civilians and respecting international humanitarian law, allowing civilians to leave combat areas safely, protecting hospitals and public facilities, refraining from using civilian facilities for military purposes, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and protecting humanitarian workers, among other provisions that the parties regrettably did not fully observe. This led to the continuation of the fighting between them, which greatly aggravated Sudan's crisis and produced humanitarian catastrophes with grievous consequences.
Even so, the Jeddah platform declaration remains a principal platform that can be built upon to restore the track of political dialogue among the Sudanese parties, with a view to any coming agreement, especially since the declaration affirmed the protection of civilians, the facilitation of aid, and commitment to the provisions of international humanitarian law- and before and after all of that, a halt to the fighting. This makes it a foundation for advancing toward an integrated platform for Sudanese peace, rather than settling for a ceasefire.
Proceeding from this, we believe the military and political parties, the social, regional, and tribal components, the leadership of the Sudanese state, and the various civilian forces associated with the democratic transition can gather again around a round table in Jeddah to discuss the frameworks of the transitional period, the constitutional form of the state, the questions of the regions and the marginalization afflicting some of them, and the rest of Sudan's principal problems. This should take place in the presence of a number of guarantor regional states, such as the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the African Union, IGAD, and the League of Arab States, as well as the United States and the European Union. All of these can contribute to halting the flow of weapons, funding assistance, and reconstruction- and, most importantly, to keeping Sudan out of range of external interventions driven by ambition and by the aim of widening the war and prolonging it.
A diplomacy of building Sudanese consensus rests on rebuilding the trust that would allow the creation of a coordination group for Sudanese peace efforts, and the establishment of a Sudanese-Sudanese track made up of representatives of the military forces, the parties, the civilian forces, and the forces of civil society, with the aim of a ceasefire, the opening of humanitarian corridors, and agreement on the shape of the transitional period, leading to the approval of elections under agreed constitutional arrangements. This would be followed by a comprehensive vision for Sudan's future, to be drawn up by Sudanese themselves, away from the influence of polarization and dependency.
Finally, it is important that the Sudanese parties understand that Saudi Arabia is a sponsor of the peace process in Sudan and has no agendas, hidden or declared. All that concerns it is the stability of this important country, the safety and unity of its territory, and keeping it clear of dependency and polarization. They should also understand that the dangers capable of obstructing any constructive political dialogue that would help restore civil peace to Sudanese society are great, and that they are surrounded by watchful parties with interests of their own. They must therefore grasp the gravity of the present stage, what the conflict has done in fragmenting Sudanese society, and the divisions and damage of every kind it has suffered. They must grasp the danger of continued external interventions, of the flow of weapons, and of the funding and support of one party over another, as well as the risks of social division given the scale of the harm the Sudanese people have lived through. All of this must be recognized and confronted with discernment, determination, and responsibility, so as to bring Sudan, its people and its institutions, out of the impasse of wandering and onto safe ground.
Should the people of Sudan grasp the dangers surrounding them and resolve to rally around one homeland and one future, they will find the Kingdom, a state that loves peace, behind them and with them in pursuit of a single goal: one Sudan, owned and governed by all its people.
