The visit by the delegation of the “Makkah Alliance” to Tehran was not merely another diplomatic initiative aimed at containing the Iranian crisis. It came at a time when fears of a renewed full-scale war against Iran are growing, and questions about the future of security and stability in a region that can no longer afford more wars are becoming increasingly urgent. The region does not want to find itself drawn into conflicts that would disrupt its development projects and squander opportunities for prosperity.
Perhaps the question worth asking is not simply, Why did the delegation go to Tehran? but rather, Why was this specific timing chosen? And what can the three countries involved, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, offer to prevent another war after two previous conflicts erupted while US-Iran negotiations were still underway?
This suggests that the continuation of negotiations alone does not guarantee the prevention of war, and that the success of any new diplomatic effort requires more than merely bringing the parties back to the negotiating table. The timing can be explained by several factors: the election seasons in both Israel and the United States, the expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum signed by Washington and Tehran last June without a final agreement, the return of maritime restrictions that are again suffocating Iran’s economy, and the increasing talk of another military strike.
Against this backdrop, the visit derives its importance not simply as another mediation effort added to previous attempts, but as a collective move by nations with significant strategic and security interests. These countries understand that if war resumes, its consequences will not be confined to Iran. They would extend across the region, affecting maritime routes, economic infrastructure, and potentially far beyond.
Riyadh stated that the purpose of the visit was to reduce tensions, encourage dialogue and diplomatic solutions, and support mediation efforts by Qatar and Pakistan. However, the significance of the initiative extends beyond its stated objectives to the framework through which it was conducted: the Makkah Alliance for Collective Defense. Notably, the alliance’s action was diplomatic rather than military, underscoring concerns that go beyond addressing a temporary military threat.
Defensive alliances should not be judged solely by their ability to wage wars but also by their ability to prevent them without compromising security and deterrence. The composition of the delegation itself supports this interpretation. From this perspective, the Tehran visit may signal the alliance’s potential evolution into a broader framework for political and security coordination, and perhaps even future participation in regional arrangements that address the root causes of conflicts rather than merely their consequences.
The success of these efforts, however, remains tied to the calculations of the parties involved, foremost among them the Iranian regime. The regime faces choices whose outcomes may not be equally beneficial for the Iranian state and the government that rules it.
Economically, Iran stands to gain significantly from a settlement that ends the confrontation, eases sanctions, reopens markets, and allows the country to leverage its resources and strategic geographic location. Conversely, another war could mean further destruction, military and economic exhaustion, and deeper social crises for the Iranian people.
Yet the calculations of political regimes do not always align with the interests of the states they govern. Here an interesting hypothesis emerges: the Iranian regime may fear the implications of peace more than it fears war.
War allows the authorities to invoke an external threat and justify domestic crises. Peace, coupled with openness, could revive economic and political demands that were already visible during the protests of winter 2026.
Still, this hypothesis alone is insufficient. The obstacles to a settlement are numerous. Tehran signed the Islamabad Memorandum and insists on returning to it, while remembering that two wars began while it was already at the negotiating table. It also faces an adversary that openly declares regime change as its objective.
This is where the two dilemmas converge: a regime that fears the domestic consequences of peace and does not trust that a settlement will not become a prelude to weakening it externally. What Washington may be unable to provide in terms of guarantees, regional states may be able to contribute, because they are permanent neighbors, not actors that come and go.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia and other regional countries have come to view stability not merely as the absence of war but as a fundamental prerequisite for achieving their development visions and economic ambitions.
Saudi Arabia, which is pressing ahead with Vision 2030, investing in economic diversification, city-building, industrial development, and advanced technologies, does not want to redirect its resources and attention from future-oriented projects toward dealing with conflicts that drain the region. The same logic applies, to varying degrees, to other countries that have made development and the improvement of citizens’ living standards national priorities.
These ambitions are no longer confined within national borders. They have become part of larger economic initiatives and projects that are reshaping global trade routes and transforming geography from a theater of conflict into a bridge for commerce and economic integration.
Ironically, Iran itself, given its geographic position, could benefit from these transformations. Yet it could also lose a great deal if it continues down the path of wars, isolation, disruption of trade routes, and the deterrence of investment.
This highlights the importance of Türkiye’s and Pakistan’s participation in the Tehran visit. Both countries share land borders with Iran and possess direct security and economic interests. They understand that any major instability within Iran or along its borders will not remain confined within Iranian territory.
Türkiye, due to its strategic location and international relations, and Pakistan, with its military capabilities, close ties with Riyadh, and communication channels with both Washington and Tehran, can contribute to narrowing differences and creating avenues for understanding.
As for Saudi Arabia, its political and economic weight, combined with its position in the Arab and Islamic worlds, gives its participation special significance, especially given its direct interests in Gulf security, stable energy markets, and freedom of international navigation.
The fact that these three countries came together within a collective defense framework and then moved jointly toward Tehran reflects a growing recognition that regional security cannot remain entirely dependent on the calculations of outside powers. This does not mean, as Tehran may prefer to interpret it, excluding international partners. Rather, it means that regional states should be partners in shaping their own security and play a larger role in designing arrangements that protect their interests and future.
These ambitions, however, do not diminish the difficulty of the task. Achieving a sustainable settlement requires addressing nuclear and security issues, providing guarantees against future attacks, respecting state sovereignty, and ensuring that countries’ territories and economic interests are not used as leverage in international disputes.
The Makkah Alliance went to Tehran to prevent the resumption of war. Its initiative is consistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and does not contradict its defensive nature. Rather, it extends the diplomatic path pursued by Riyadh since March 2023.
The significance of the visit may ultimately go beyond its immediate results. It may help establish a regional security framework that combines deterrence with dialogue, while protecting sovereignty and shared interests.
The challenge is not merely convincing Tehran of the costs of war, but convincing it that peace is a guarantee for the Iranian state rather than a threat to the regime.
As for the states party to the agreement, which have chosen to invest in the future, they do not want war. Nor will they accept their territories and vital facilities becoming targets in a conflict to which they are not a party, under the pretext of striking American interests.
Tehran must recognize that the security of these countries is a shared responsibility, not a matter for each state to handle alone.
