US Vice President JD Vance has become the most outspoken administration official regarding the Republicans’ defeat in the midterm elections. In a lengthy statement on Tuesday, he predicted that there would be a lot of debate and internal fighting over what happened and why, but argued that the main reason is obvious to everyone: the war. He said the government, by insisting on a military solution, ignored the economic damage and the suffering of ordinary citizens while drawing even closer to Israel.
However, while Vance appears ready to pursue a diplomatic solution, Iran has hardened its demands and has openly expressed satisfaction over Trump’s electoral setback, making a resumption of the conflict seem almost certain unless mediators intensify their efforts to prevent it. Vance has long preferred diplomacy, a position shaped by his experience in the Iraq War, which he has strongly criticized, pledging to avoid similar wars in the future.
Notably, after the conflict with Iran began, Vance did not support it as enthusiastically as other administration officials. When he did offer support, it was qualified, stating: “If the war succeeds in producing beneficial changes in the Middle East, then it will have been a justified effort.” Such caution is unusual because Vance is otherwise known for his unwavering support of Trump’s policies.
For the same reason, Vance, unlike Trump, refrained from endorsing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the elections and publicly criticized Israel for opposing diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes with Iran. Because of these positions, Vance was often dismissed as a lightweight and criticized for failing to support Trump’s Iran policy.
However, his political standing appears to have improved after voters delivered a sharp rebuke to Republicans over the war. As a result, Vance is now eager to highlight the extent of his disagreement with his colleagues in the administration on this issue.
On October 29, Vance reportedly proposed in a message to Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary-General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, a return to diplomacy to avoid renewed conflict. He asked Iran to present its commitments regarding its nuclear program at the outset of negotiations and to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days of talks beginning. In return, Washington would be prepared to ease some sanctions.
However, Iran’s chief negotiator, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, responded the same day that Iran’s seven conditions, previously conveyed to mediators, remained unchanged. He argued that the “carrot and stick” approach would not persuade Tehran to abandon those demands and that there would be no progress until they were met, including sanctions relief, the release of frozen assets, and an end to the war “on all fronts.”
Iran in particular refuses to make nuclear commitments, such as transferring enriched uranium to another country, before seeing tangible American concessions. For this reason, during meetings held in New York last September, Tehran proposed that nuclear talks begin only seven days after sanctions on its exports were lifted.
For similar reasons, Iran has resisted the return of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, claiming that they could reveal sensitive information regarding the location and enrichment level of its uranium before negotiations begin. Yet despite the hardline rhetoric, negotiations have largely revolved around timelines and guarantees rather than the substance of the concessions themselves. This is why the involvement of “guarantors” for any future agreement has become increasingly important.
These negotiations have unfolded against the backdrop of US preparations for what Democratic Senator Christopher Murphy, a vocal opponent of the war, described as a major military campaign. Writing on October 29, Murphy warned that Trump was preparing to resume military action after the elections, calling the plan “crazy” and describing it as another round of escalation that would harm American interests and conflict with US obligations under international law.
Iran, of course, appears to have its own “crazy” plans. Iranian leaders have publicly threatened not only to target American interests in the region but also objectives outside it, as well as internet cables, power grids, and other civilian infrastructure in Gulf countries. Faced with these serious threats, Vance’s message emphasized diplomacy even before American voters endorsed that approach on Election Day.
Vance was not acting alone; Trump largely approved the message. The ball is now in Tehran’s court. Yet Iran’s response appears to have grown even more rigid after the US elections. In a post on X last Wednesday, Ghalibaf mocked Vance’s comments about the election and advised him to confront President Trump directly instead of giving lectures.
It would be dangerous for Iran to conclude that the Republican defeat means Trump will abandon the military option. It is true that Democrats now hold majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives and will have a greater opportunity to advance their domestic agenda. Trump will lose the nearly automatic approval he often enjoyed from Congress. However, these changes will mainly affect domestic policy, where a Democratic Congress will wield greater influence. They are unlikely to significantly alter US policy toward Iran.
Indeed, Trump may become even more determined to secure foreign policy achievements, an area where American presidents traditionally enjoy broader authority than Congress. For this reason, Trump will remain the primary driver of US foreign policy.
Democrats may try to stop the war, but Trump could use his presidential veto, and his opponents would likely lack sufficient votes to override it. Congress might also attempt to cut off funding for the conflict, but there is little precedent in American history for doing so while US troops are actively engaged in the field.
As a result, the elections are likely to have only a limited impact on foreign policy in the short term. The effect could even be the opposite. Historically, presidents who lose supportive congressional majorities often shift their focus from domestic affairs to foreign policy in pursuit of achievements that will define their historical legacy.
In any case, the current Republican-controlled Congress will remain in office until January 3. During that period, Trump will still be able to push through many decisions, agreements, and arms sales with little opposition.
What does all this mean for the Gulf crisis?
Mediation efforts by Qatar, the Makkah Alliance, China, and others will continue in an attempt to prevent what appears to be an almost inevitable resumption of hostilities. At the same time, the Gulf Cooperation Council states will continue strengthening their defensive capabilities to prepare for any potential attack.
