A broad consensus around a conspicuous fact has emerged following the American midterm elections: supporting Israel, be it in the wrong or the right, which used to be a prerequisite for political success, has now become a burden that can end a politician's career. The most frequently cited example was the victory of Abdul El-Sayed in the Michigan Senate race.
This development's significance renders how it is read significant as well. Indeed, our traditional reading is built on shoddy underlying assumptions: a broad swath of mainstream Arab political discourse has long oscillated between two contradictory myths that have sometimes been merged into a single ragged myth. The first is that Israel controls the US; the second, that the US Israel.
Reading the latest development demands that we leave behind the accumulated myths that do nothing but worsen our reading. We recall how, with Israel's war on Gaza in response to Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, we were flooded with analyses categorically concluding that democracy is a sham, and even that Western civilization is a lie on its last legs. Shortly afterward, however, we were surprised by elections in the US, and others in Israel, that could allow for major achievements for the Palestinians. Instead of an acknowledgment of our own inertia, twisted obstinacy has reared its head again, in yet another perverse formula: boasting that Iran brought down the American regime instead of the US bringing down Iran's.
The achievements these elections yielded remain hostage to shoddy interpretations, mostly offered by the very voices that had declared democracy a lie and the West finished. While a few have spoken of conspiracies, many more have cast the elections and their results as military battles in which "the enemy's nose was rubbed in the mud." Some have presented these achievements as the first step toward America's exit from the region, or toward an open, absolute rupture between the US and the Jewish state. And, of course, those who glorify the catastrophe of October 7 have loudly credited it with these achievements.
As more than one observer has noted, sympathy for the Palestinians grew out of Israel's savage response to the catastrophe, not out of the catastrophe itself, which many of those who later became sympathizers had previously denounced. Broader and more forceful Palestinian and Arab condemnation of the "Flood" would probably have earned even greater solidarity.
Understanding where the opposition to Israel and the revulsion at its war come from requires making a few basic distinctions. Outside narrow circles, attitudes toward Netanyahu, his genocidal bent, and settler terrorism in the West Bank remain a far cry from attitudes toward Israel and its self-defense. The same applies to the distinction between a war waged with no political offer to the Palestinians, which is what Netanyahu did, and a war paired with a political offer, which is what he did not do; or between a swift, decisive, and cheap war on Iran and a war that is waged reluctantly and punctuated by truces driven by illusions of deal-making, engendering economic costs that are hard to bear.
Trump's announcement that aid to Israel would be halted falls within the same frame: a theatrical gesture, meant to boost the Republicans at the polls, that backfired. The aid, after all, is estimated at $4 billion, while the Jewish state's annual budget exceeds 700 billion. Moreover, all such talk comes with a distinction between offensive and defensive aid, amid widely circulated estimates from many sources regarding cooperation programs in intelligence, artificial intelligence, weapons development, and more.
The caveats that keep our reading of the situation in check must therefore be taken into account. While there have been major shifts that go against Israel, especially among the young, its base of support remains active and influential for many reasons. Likewise, opposition to the war on Iran, to how it was waged and what it cost, does not mean that the US has room for sympathy with Iran's rulers, their doctrines, their expansionism, or their partisans in the region.
Moreover, while the "progressives" swept into Congress by the "blue wave" have gained undeniable weight, the Democratic Party's "moderates" remain the majority. One of them, Hakeem Jeffries, is all but certain to be elected Speaker of the House, and Chuck Schumer, another "moderate," may well stay on as their leader in the Senate. The need to legislate in ways that allow the party to win Republican and swing states will likely safeguard the "moderate" line and ensure that it prevails.
Nor is the "progressive" bloc a monolith. It is split between those who focus on the economy and a fairer distribution of wealth, Bernie Sanders foremost among them, and the latest crop of newcomers, who are fixated on identities and infatuated with NGOs. Even on Israel, the most radical position does not speak for everyone opposed to Netanyahu and his wars, Senator Jon Ossoff among them.
And who knows: the decline of Israel's standing in America, and with it the decline of the Likud-settler camp in Israel, could create conditions that help open the bolted doors of politics. Were that to happen, it would weaken Iran and its followers more than wars can.
This is what defines the nature of the achievements and their potential trajectories, certainly not ludicrous hyperbole that does as much harm to the achievements as they do to efforts to develop and consolidate them. When things are blown out of proportion in this way, all we can do is wake up mid-nightmare, chant "We won, we won," and sink back into a deep sleep.
