Lebanese Army Walks Political Tightrope to Disarm Hezbollah

Lebanese army soldiers stand next to the wreckage of a vehicle targeted by an Israeli drone in the village of Harouf in the Nabatieh Governorate, southern Lebanon, 25 October 2025. EPA/STRINGER
Lebanese army soldiers stand next to the wreckage of a vehicle targeted by an Israeli drone in the village of Harouf in the Nabatieh Governorate, southern Lebanon, 25 October 2025. EPA/STRINGER
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Lebanese Army Walks Political Tightrope to Disarm Hezbollah

Lebanese army soldiers stand next to the wreckage of a vehicle targeted by an Israeli drone in the village of Harouf in the Nabatieh Governorate, southern Lebanon, 25 October 2025. EPA/STRINGER
Lebanese army soldiers stand next to the wreckage of a vehicle targeted by an Israeli drone in the village of Harouf in the Nabatieh Governorate, southern Lebanon, 25 October 2025. EPA/STRINGER

Lebanon's army has blown up so many Hezbollah arms caches that it has run out of explosives, as it races to meet a year-end deadline to disarm the Shi'ite militia in the south of the country under a ceasefire agreed with Israel, two sources told Reuters.

The explosives shortage, which has not been previously reported, has not stopped the army quickening the pace of inspection missions to search for hidden weapons in the south, near Israel, the two said, one of whom is a security source and the other a Lebanese official.

It would have been unimaginable for Lebanon's military to embark on such a task at the zenith of Iran-backed Hezbollah's power just a few years ago, and many observers were skeptical even after the ceasefire agreement.

But Hezbollah was hit hard by Israel's war last year, which killed thousands of fighters and the upper echelons of both the military and political wings, including leader Hassan Nasrallah. The war also killed more than 1,100 women and children and destroyed swathes of Lebanon's south and east.

The US has kept up pressure on Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah, which is designated a terrorist group by Washington. President Donald Trump's deputy Middle East envoy Morgan Ortagus is in Beirut this week to discuss momentum on disarmament with Lebanese officials.

As they wait for US deliveries of explosives charges and other military equipment, Lebanese troops are now sealing off sites they find instead of destroying them, said one of the sources and two other people briefed on the army's recent activities.

Their searches yielded nine new arms caches in September, the two other briefed officials said. The security source said dozens of tunnels used by Hezbollah had also been sealed and more soldiers were being steadily recruited to deploy to the south.

Reuters spoke to 10 people including Lebanese officials, security sources, diplomats and a Hezbollah official, all of whom said the army expects to complete its sweep of the south by the year's end.

Meeting the deadline would be a considerable feat for an institution once unable or unwilling to stop Hezbollah rebuilding a military presence near Israel after a previous war in 2006 - and for a country in which Hezbollah was once the dominant political force.

ARMY STEPS CAUTIOUSLY ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON

Progress in the rest of the country looks far less certain.

Despite its advances, the army wants to avoid inflaming tensions and to buy time for Lebanon's politicians to reach a consensus about the group's arsenal in other parts of the country, a second Lebanese official who is close to Hezbollah and two security sources said.

It has not published images of the work destroying weapons caches, or even said the weapons belong to Hezbollah.

Under the November 2024 ceasefire that ended more than a year of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon agreed that only state security forces should bear arms in the country. That would mean fully disarming Hezbollah.

Hezbollah has publicly committed to the ceasefire but is not a formal signatory. It insists the disarmament as mentioned in the text only applies only to the south of Lebanon.

On September 5, the cabinet adopted a more detailed five-phase plan for imposing the state monopoly on arms - starting in the south and gradually moving north and east, the security sources and the second Lebanese official said.

The army said it would clear the south by December, without committing to a timeline for the rest of the country. The government has said the plan is contingent on Israel halting air strikes that have continued despite the ceasefire. All the sources said the army would have to navigate treacherous political terrain to achieve full disarmament.

Ed Gabriel, who heads Washington-based non-profit the American Task Force Lebanon and met with Lebanon's military and political leaders in October, said the army's cautious approach reflected the possibility of civilian strife if it moved too fast outside of the south.

"It's a Lebanese answer to disarmament," he said.

Hezbollah has not opposed the seizures of unmanned weapons caches in the south and has not fired on Israel since the November truce. However, it has publicly refused to relinquish its weapons elsewhere, hinting conflict was possible if the state moved against the group.

Moving north and east without a political consensus risks confrontation with Hezbollah fighters or street protests by Lebanon's Shi'ite community, among whom Hezbollah remains popular, the two security sources and the second Lebanese official said.

In a written statement to Reuters, Hezbollah's media office said the ceasefire meant Lebanon's army was fully responsible for the zone south of the Litani River, referring to the water body that crosses southern Lebanon near Israel.

But any disarmament efforts north of the river would require political consensus, it said.

"The rest - that depends on a political settlement, which we don't yet have. The army is betting on time," said a Lebanese official close to the group.

The army still fears a stand-off with Hezbollah's constituency could again fracture the army, which split during Lebanon's 15-year civil war, one Lebanese official told Reuters.

In a speech on Sunday, Hezbollah secretary general Naim Qassem described the army's approach as good and balanced but also issued a warning, saying he hoped the army was not considering clashing with the Shi’ite community.

The media offices of the Lebanese army, cabinet and presidency did not respond to questions from Reuters for this story. The Israeli military did not respond to requests for comment.

MULTIPLE WEAPONS CACHES FOUND AND DESTROYED

The army does not possess its own information on where Hezbollah's stockpiles are located, two security sources told Reuters. It has relied on intelligence supplied by Israel to "the Mechanism," the sources said, referring to a committee established by the truce deal, chaired by the US and including France, Israel, Lebanon and UN peacekeepers.

In late May, the army was receiving so many reports from the Mechanism that it could not keep pace with the requests for inspections, the two sources said.

If troops found a depot, they kept any ammunition or new equipment compatible with their own arms and destroyed rockets, launchers and other material, the two sources said.

Operations in the south by the UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL yielded tunnels dozens of meters long and unexploded ordnance, according to UNIFIL statements.

The army depleted its explosives stocks by June. In August, six army troops were killed trying to dismantle an arms depot. Reuters could not determine additional details of the circumstances of the accident.

The US is keen to help: in September, it announced $14 million in demolition charges and other aid to help Lebanese troops "degrade Hezbollah" and approved $192 million aid to the army the day before the US government shutdown.

US Senator Jeanne Shaheen advocated for the aid after a visit to south Lebanon in August left her impressed with the army's efforts and convinced it needed more support, an aide in her office told Reuters.

It could still take months for the detonation charges to be delivered Lebanon, a source familiar with the process said.

WILL THEY, WON'T THEY

In recent months, Hezbollah's position about the future of its weapons has appeared fluid. In public statements, the group warned the state against trying to seize its arsenal - but also said it would be willing to discuss the fate of its arms if Israel commits to a real ceasefire.

In private, some representatives of the group have floated the possibility that progress could be made elsewhere if reconstruction allowed Shi'ite constituents to return to villages and towns destroyed in the war, the Lebanese official close to the group said. Others have flatly rejected decommissioning its weapons under any circumstances.

The group is still conducting internal discussions on the future of its arsenal and is also playing for time, the Lebanese official close to Hezbollah and a Lebanese political source said.

In its written statement, Hezbollah said the status of its weapons depended on an end to the Israeli aggression, its withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories, the return of prisoners, and ensuring reconstruction.

NEXT STEPS POSE CHALLENGE

The security sources say that a lack of information makes it difficult for the army to estimate what exactly Hezbollah has stored, and where, including in the eastern Bekaa - a vast plain where Hezbollah is thought to store the bulk of its long-range missiles and other strategic arms.

Israel provided some reports of weapons in areas north of the Litani but the army deemed them too sensitive to act on without a consensus on whether and how to disarm Hezbollah there, one of the security sources and one of the diplomats based in Lebanon said

Despite providing intelligence on weapons locations, Israel is proving another obstacle in the south, the officials briefed on the cabinet meeting said.

Several soldiers have been wounded by Israeli fire while on inspection missions, the two security sources said. Israeli drones have dropped grenades near soldiers and UN peacekeepers in the south, UNIFIL has said.

The army has also warned that Israel's occupation of five hilltops within Lebanon near the border with Israel could delay a full sweep of the area, the two security sources said.

And when Lebanese troops tried to erect a rudimentary watch-tower to monitor the border, Israel objected, the two security sources said. The tower remains unmanned.

The Israeli military did not respond to questions about the wounded Lebanese troops and the abandoned watchtower.

Washington is keen to see Lebanon expedite disarmament in the rest of the country after meeting the year-end deadline for the south, the congressional aide said. US envoy Tom Barrack has warned of possible Israeli action if that deadline is not met.

"The US sees that Lebanon needs to do more, and faster," Gabriel said.

The United States fully supports Lebanon's "courageous and historic decision to disarm Hezbollah," a US State Department spokesperson said in response to Reuters questions.

"The region and the world are watching carefully," the spokesperson said.



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.