Years of Tensions between Lebanon’s Aoun and Berri Culminate in Constitutional Dispute

Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)
Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)
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Years of Tensions between Lebanon’s Aoun and Berri Culminate in Constitutional Dispute

Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)
Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)

The dispute between Lebanese President Michel Aoun and parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has gone beyond the promotion of military academy officers to enter the realm of constitutional and sectarian differences that are a culmination of years of tensions between the two leaders.

The two officials see themselves as the respective leaders of their sect, Aoun of Maronite Christians and Berri of Shi’ites. They have however been separated by a “lack of chemistry” that dates back to at least 2009 and this dispute will likely cast its shadow on the government, May 6 parliamentary elections and beyond.

The current dispute reopens old wounds among Shi’ites over the return of the Maronite-Sunni equation (despite its imbalance) that was prevalent before the signing of the Taif Accord in 1989. This has therefore led Berri to express his commitment to the agreement that ended Lebanon’s 15-year civil war. It enforced the role of Shi’ites in power through the executive authority and represented in the signature of the finance minister.

Shi’ites have assumed the Finance Ministry portfolio in two consecutive governments in the post-Taif period before it was held by Sunni figures in the cabinets of late former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. It again fell in Shi’ite hands in the governments formed in 2014 and 2016.

The Aoun-Berri dispute erupted in December when the president and Prime Minister Saad Hariri signed a decree, without the signature of the finance minister, to give priority in promotion to military academy officers who graduated in 1994.

These officers joined the academy when Aoun was head of a “transition government”, which comprised three Christian military figures, before he was forced out of power by the Syrian regime in 1990. The military stipulates that officers must spend three years of training before graduating. Those officers however were forced to spend a year at home due to the Lebanese war. They did however rejoin the academy at the end of the war, graduating in 1994.

Berri deemed December’s decree a violation of legal norms because it incurs financial burdens on the state, which requires the signature of Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil, one of the speaker’s most prominent representatives in government.

Aoun declared on December 25 that granting the 1994 officers priority was “justified” and due to “certain political spite at the time, they were sent home and summoned two years later. We therefore tried to give back to them half of what they are owed.”

They were “sent home” at the time when Aoun was ousted from power in 1990.

The president declared that anyone objecting to the decree he signed with the premier should plead his case before the judiciary.

Responding to his declaration, Berri stated: “Only the weak go to the judiciary.”

He also warned that Aoun’s actions violate the Taif Accord and constitution, throwing the ball in the president’s court.

Missing chemistry

The truth of the matter is that ties between Aoun and Berri had never witnessed positive development since the former returned to Lebanon from exile in Paris in 2005. The differences between them took a turn for the worse when Hariri reached a settlement with Aoun that saw him elected president in 2016, knowing that the speaker was one of the most ardent objectors of his candidacy.

Observers are not shy in pointing out the “lack of chemistry” between the president and speaker, saying that had they enjoyed good ties, the current dispute between them would not have reached such a complicated phase.

The lack of meetings between Aoun and Berri has only exacerbated the problem. Members of the president’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) have said that a meeting between them will help resolve the issue, especially in wake of media escalation between the camps of either official.

“Hezbollah”, an ally to both Aoun and Berri, has tried to mediate a solution between them. Hariri meanwhile announced that he is not concerned with such efforts, therefore opening a debate on the role of Shi’ites in the executive authority.

Shi’ite concerns of elimination

The Shi’ites’ concern of the elimination of their role in the executive authority has come to the forefront in the Aoun-Berri dispute because Hassan Khalil’s signature was excluded from the promotion decree. The president and speaker’s camps have however denied that such sectarian and constitutional concerns are at play.

Former deputy Speaker Elie Firzli told Asharq Al-Awsat: “There are often points in the Lebanese constitution that end up being contentious issues between the president, speaker and prime minister due to their multiple interpretations.”

“We have always stressed the need to implement and commit to the Taif Accord. We have also spoken of the need for a constitutional authority that can serve as arbiter in interpreting its disputed articles,” he added.

He said the current dispute between Aoun and Berri does not revolve around the “Shi’ite voice” because the same problem would have arisen had a finance minister from another sect been present in cabinet.

He therefore reiterated the demand for the establishment of an authority that could act as arbiter in constitutional disputes.

“The new parliament should resolve this predicament,” stressed Firzli.

He did not deny however that Shi’ites may be concerned about being shut out of the executive authority given the current Christian-Sunni agreement.

“This does not mean that the Christian-Sunni relationship should be abandoned. It should instead grow and develop because it is in the country’s high national interest,” he added, while emphasizing that the Sunni-Shi’ite relationship must also be given the opportunity to grow.

Other sources said that these concerns were unfounded because “political agreements are part of the democratic process in Lebanon and in politics there are alliances and rivalries. This is normal.”

“All sides are in agreement over the constitution and Taif that should not be violated,” they told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The current dispute is not sectarian, they stressed.

Taif Accord

The Taif transformed the Lebanese system of rule from the presidential to the collective whereby the executive authority is now represented by the government when previously it was limited to the president, who was aided by the ministers. The accord therefore ensured that powers are distributed in a manner that offers fair representation for all sects.

The pre-Taif period saw “bilateralism in rule” where the decrees needed the signature of the Maronite president and Sunni prime minister, knowing that the president had the authority to appoint and sack the premier.

In the post-Taif period, the government now controls rule and its decrees need the signature of the concerned minister, as well as that of the president. The signature of the finance minister is needed for any decree that incurs financial burdens.

Post-elections battle

Political researcher George Alam told Asharq Al-Awsat that talk of the marginalization of Shi’ites is valid at this point, referring to what Berri once said: “The Lebanese paid 150,000 lives in the civil war for the Taif so that the decision-making power of the state does not lie in the hands of one person, but in a cabinet that represents consensus in Lebanon.”

Given that Lebanon will witness parliamentary elections in May, Alam said that the problem will be resolved if Aoun and Berri met and reached an agreement that would see the latter remain as speaker in the post-elections phase. Observers however remain skeptical that the dispute could be resolved in this way.

Alam added that the Aoun-Hariri understanding did arouse concerns among Shi’ites and led Berri to question his fate as speaker of parliament if elections are held. He has been holding that position since 1992.

Given the current political scene however, there appear to be no alternatives to the speaker at this point, he noted. The post-elections phase may have other options in store, “especially since Lebanon is not an isolated island from regional changes,” he remarked.

The changes in the regions may bring about new equations, similar to the ones that led to the Aoun-Hariri agreement, he said without elaborating.

Alam did not rule out the possibility that the Aoun-Berri dispute could affect government work, while also highlighting “Hezbollah’s” neutral stance on the problem involving its ally, describing it as “negative.”

Aoun-Berri disputes

Differences between Aoun and Berri had emerged from as far back as 2005 when the former returned to Lebanon. Soon after his return, Aoun signed an understanding with “Hezbollah”, Berri’s most prominent ally, to form a Shi’ite-Maronite balance. This did not help in adding warmth to ties between the two leaders. The speaker at one point described his rival as “the ally of my ally.”

Tensions between them exacerbated during the 2009 parliamentary elections when Aoun’s FPM fielded candidates in the southern Christian-majority Jezzine region against Berri’s candidate. In the end, the speaker’s candidate was defeated in a battle that Aoun dubbed “restoring Jezzine’s voice.”

Even though the two sides were part of five governments since 2008, differences between them came to the forefront and soured when Aoun refused the extension of parliament’s term in 2013 and again in 2017. He even went so far as to describe the parliament as “illegal”. Tensions boiled even further when Berri nominated MP Suleiman Franjieh, instead of Aoun, for president.



Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.


Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.