Years of Tensions between Lebanon’s Aoun and Berri Culminate in Constitutional Dispute

Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)
Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)
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Years of Tensions between Lebanon’s Aoun and Berri Culminate in Constitutional Dispute

Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)
Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)

The dispute between Lebanese President Michel Aoun and parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has gone beyond the promotion of military academy officers to enter the realm of constitutional and sectarian differences that are a culmination of years of tensions between the two leaders.

The two officials see themselves as the respective leaders of their sect, Aoun of Maronite Christians and Berri of Shi’ites. They have however been separated by a “lack of chemistry” that dates back to at least 2009 and this dispute will likely cast its shadow on the government, May 6 parliamentary elections and beyond.

The current dispute reopens old wounds among Shi’ites over the return of the Maronite-Sunni equation (despite its imbalance) that was prevalent before the signing of the Taif Accord in 1989. This has therefore led Berri to express his commitment to the agreement that ended Lebanon’s 15-year civil war. It enforced the role of Shi’ites in power through the executive authority and represented in the signature of the finance minister.

Shi’ites have assumed the Finance Ministry portfolio in two consecutive governments in the post-Taif period before it was held by Sunni figures in the cabinets of late former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. It again fell in Shi’ite hands in the governments formed in 2014 and 2016.

The Aoun-Berri dispute erupted in December when the president and Prime Minister Saad Hariri signed a decree, without the signature of the finance minister, to give priority in promotion to military academy officers who graduated in 1994.

These officers joined the academy when Aoun was head of a “transition government”, which comprised three Christian military figures, before he was forced out of power by the Syrian regime in 1990. The military stipulates that officers must spend three years of training before graduating. Those officers however were forced to spend a year at home due to the Lebanese war. They did however rejoin the academy at the end of the war, graduating in 1994.

Berri deemed December’s decree a violation of legal norms because it incurs financial burdens on the state, which requires the signature of Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil, one of the speaker’s most prominent representatives in government.

Aoun declared on December 25 that granting the 1994 officers priority was “justified” and due to “certain political spite at the time, they were sent home and summoned two years later. We therefore tried to give back to them half of what they are owed.”

They were “sent home” at the time when Aoun was ousted from power in 1990.

The president declared that anyone objecting to the decree he signed with the premier should plead his case before the judiciary.

Responding to his declaration, Berri stated: “Only the weak go to the judiciary.”

He also warned that Aoun’s actions violate the Taif Accord and constitution, throwing the ball in the president’s court.

Missing chemistry

The truth of the matter is that ties between Aoun and Berri had never witnessed positive development since the former returned to Lebanon from exile in Paris in 2005. The differences between them took a turn for the worse when Hariri reached a settlement with Aoun that saw him elected president in 2016, knowing that the speaker was one of the most ardent objectors of his candidacy.

Observers are not shy in pointing out the “lack of chemistry” between the president and speaker, saying that had they enjoyed good ties, the current dispute between them would not have reached such a complicated phase.

The lack of meetings between Aoun and Berri has only exacerbated the problem. Members of the president’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) have said that a meeting between them will help resolve the issue, especially in wake of media escalation between the camps of either official.

“Hezbollah”, an ally to both Aoun and Berri, has tried to mediate a solution between them. Hariri meanwhile announced that he is not concerned with such efforts, therefore opening a debate on the role of Shi’ites in the executive authority.

Shi’ite concerns of elimination

The Shi’ites’ concern of the elimination of their role in the executive authority has come to the forefront in the Aoun-Berri dispute because Hassan Khalil’s signature was excluded from the promotion decree. The president and speaker’s camps have however denied that such sectarian and constitutional concerns are at play.

Former deputy Speaker Elie Firzli told Asharq Al-Awsat: “There are often points in the Lebanese constitution that end up being contentious issues between the president, speaker and prime minister due to their multiple interpretations.”

“We have always stressed the need to implement and commit to the Taif Accord. We have also spoken of the need for a constitutional authority that can serve as arbiter in interpreting its disputed articles,” he added.

He said the current dispute between Aoun and Berri does not revolve around the “Shi’ite voice” because the same problem would have arisen had a finance minister from another sect been present in cabinet.

He therefore reiterated the demand for the establishment of an authority that could act as arbiter in constitutional disputes.

“The new parliament should resolve this predicament,” stressed Firzli.

He did not deny however that Shi’ites may be concerned about being shut out of the executive authority given the current Christian-Sunni agreement.

“This does not mean that the Christian-Sunni relationship should be abandoned. It should instead grow and develop because it is in the country’s high national interest,” he added, while emphasizing that the Sunni-Shi’ite relationship must also be given the opportunity to grow.

Other sources said that these concerns were unfounded because “political agreements are part of the democratic process in Lebanon and in politics there are alliances and rivalries. This is normal.”

“All sides are in agreement over the constitution and Taif that should not be violated,” they told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The current dispute is not sectarian, they stressed.

Taif Accord

The Taif transformed the Lebanese system of rule from the presidential to the collective whereby the executive authority is now represented by the government when previously it was limited to the president, who was aided by the ministers. The accord therefore ensured that powers are distributed in a manner that offers fair representation for all sects.

The pre-Taif period saw “bilateralism in rule” where the decrees needed the signature of the Maronite president and Sunni prime minister, knowing that the president had the authority to appoint and sack the premier.

In the post-Taif period, the government now controls rule and its decrees need the signature of the concerned minister, as well as that of the president. The signature of the finance minister is needed for any decree that incurs financial burdens.

Post-elections battle

Political researcher George Alam told Asharq Al-Awsat that talk of the marginalization of Shi’ites is valid at this point, referring to what Berri once said: “The Lebanese paid 150,000 lives in the civil war for the Taif so that the decision-making power of the state does not lie in the hands of one person, but in a cabinet that represents consensus in Lebanon.”

Given that Lebanon will witness parliamentary elections in May, Alam said that the problem will be resolved if Aoun and Berri met and reached an agreement that would see the latter remain as speaker in the post-elections phase. Observers however remain skeptical that the dispute could be resolved in this way.

Alam added that the Aoun-Hariri understanding did arouse concerns among Shi’ites and led Berri to question his fate as speaker of parliament if elections are held. He has been holding that position since 1992.

Given the current political scene however, there appear to be no alternatives to the speaker at this point, he noted. The post-elections phase may have other options in store, “especially since Lebanon is not an isolated island from regional changes,” he remarked.

The changes in the regions may bring about new equations, similar to the ones that led to the Aoun-Hariri agreement, he said without elaborating.

Alam did not rule out the possibility that the Aoun-Berri dispute could affect government work, while also highlighting “Hezbollah’s” neutral stance on the problem involving its ally, describing it as “negative.”

Aoun-Berri disputes

Differences between Aoun and Berri had emerged from as far back as 2005 when the former returned to Lebanon. Soon after his return, Aoun signed an understanding with “Hezbollah”, Berri’s most prominent ally, to form a Shi’ite-Maronite balance. This did not help in adding warmth to ties between the two leaders. The speaker at one point described his rival as “the ally of my ally.”

Tensions between them exacerbated during the 2009 parliamentary elections when Aoun’s FPM fielded candidates in the southern Christian-majority Jezzine region against Berri’s candidate. In the end, the speaker’s candidate was defeated in a battle that Aoun dubbed “restoring Jezzine’s voice.”

Even though the two sides were part of five governments since 2008, differences between them came to the forefront and soured when Aoun refused the extension of parliament’s term in 2013 and again in 2017. He even went so far as to describe the parliament as “illegal”. Tensions boiled even further when Berri nominated MP Suleiman Franjieh, instead of Aoun, for president.



Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.


The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

As the bodies of two dozen Palestinians killed in Israeli strikes arrived at hospitals in Gaza on Wednesday, the director of one asked a question that has echoed across the war-ravaged territory for months.

“Where is the ceasefire? Where are the mediators?” Shifa Hospital's Mohamed Abu Selmiya wrote on Facebook.

At least 556 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli strikes since a US-brokered truce came into effect in October, including 24 on Wednesday and 30 on Saturday, according to Gaza's Health Ministry. Four Israeli soldiers have been killed in Gaza in the same period, with more injured, including a soldier whom the military said was severely wounded when militants opened fire near the ceasefire line in northern Gaza overnight.

Other aspects of the agreement have stalled, including the deployment of an international security force, Hamas' disarmament and the start of Gaza's reconstruction. The opening of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt raised hope of further progress, but fewer than 50 people were allowed to cross on Monday, The Associated Press said.

Hostages freed as other issues languish In October, after months of stalled negotiations, Israel and Hamas accepted a 20-point plan proposed by US President Donald Trump aimed at ending the war unleashed by Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack into Israel.

At the time, Trump said it would lead to a “Strong, Durable, and Everlasting Peace."

Hamas freed all the living hostages it still held at the outset of the deal in exchange for thousands of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and the remains of others.

But the larger issues the agreement sought to address, including the future governance of the strip, were met with reservations, and the US offered no firm timeline.

The return of the remains of hostages meanwhile stretched far beyond the 72-hour timeline outlined in the agreement. Israel recovered the body of the last hostage only last week, after accusing Hamas and other militant groups of violating the ceasefire by failing to return all of the bodies. The militants said they were unable to immediately locate all the remains because of the massive destruction caused by the war — a claim Israel rejected.

The ceasefire also called for an immediate influx of humanitarian aid, including equipment to clear rubble and rehabilitate infrastructure. The United Nations and humanitarian groups say aid deliveries to Gaza's 2 million Palestinians have fallen short due to customs clearance problems and other delays. COGAT, the Israeli military body overseeing aid to Gaza, has called the UN's claims “simply a lie.”

Ceasefire holds despite accusations

Violence has sharply declined since the ceasefire paused a war in which more than 71,800 Palestinians have been killed, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. The ministry is part of the Hamas-led government and maintains detailed records seen as generally reliable by UN agencies and independent experts.

Hamas-led militants killed some 1,200 people in the initial October 2023 attack and took around 250 hostage.

Both sides say the agreement is still in effect and use the word “ceasefire” in their communications. But Israel accuses Hamas fighters of operating beyond the truce line splitting Gaza in half, threatening its troops and occasionally opening fire, while Hamas accuses Israeli forces of gunfire and strikes on residential areas far from the line.

Palestinians have called on US and Arab mediators to get Israel to stop carrying out deadly strikes, which often kill civilians. Among those killed on Wednesday were five children, including two babies. Hamas, which accuses Israel of hundreds of violations, called it a “grave circumvention of the ceasefire agreement.”

In a joint statement on Sunday, eight Arab and Muslim countries condemned Israel’s actions since the agreement took effect and urged restraint from all sides “to preserve and sustain the ceasefire.”

Israel says it is responding to daily violations committed by Hamas and acting to protect its troops. “While Hamas’ actions undermine the ceasefire, Israel remains fully committed to upholding it,” the military said in a statement on Wednesday.

“One of the scenarios the (military) has to be ready for is Hamas is using a deception tactic like they did before October 7 and rearming and preparing for an attack when it’s comfortable for them,” said Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, a military spokesperson.

Some signs of progress

The return of the remains of the last hostage, the limited opening of the Rafah crossing, and the naming of a Palestinian committee to govern Gaza and oversee its reconstruction showed a willingness to advance the agreement despite the violence.

Last month, US envoy Steve Witkoff, who played a key role in brokering the truce, said it was time for “transitioning from ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.”

That will require Israel and Hamas to grapple with major issues on which they have been sharply divided, including whether Israel will fully withdraw from Gaza and Hamas will lay down its arms.

Though political leaders are holding onto the term “ceasefire” and have yet to withdraw from the process, there is growing despair in Gaza.

On Saturday, Atallah Abu Hadaiyed heard explosions in Gaza City during his morning prayers and ran outside to find his cousins lying on the ground as flames curled around them.

“We don’t know if we’re at war or at peace,” he said from a displacement camp, as tarpaulin strips blew off the tent behind him.


What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
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What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER

Iran and the United States will hold talks Friday in Oman, their latest over Tehran's nuclear program after Israel launched a 12-day war on the country in June and Iran launched a bloody crackdown on nationwide protests.

US President Donald Trump has kept up pressure on Iran, suggesting America could attack Iran over the killing of peaceful demonstrators or if Tehran launches mass executions over the protests. Meanwhile, Trump has pushed Iran's nuclear program back into the frame as well after the June war disrupted five rounds of talks held in Rome and Muscat, Oman, last year.

Trump began the diplomacy initially by writing a letter last year to Iran’s 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to jump start these talks. Khamenei has warned Iran would respond to any attack with an attack of its own, particularly as the theocracy he commands reels following the protests.

Here’s what to know about Iran’s nuclear program and the tensions that have stalked relations between Tehran and Washington since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Trump writes letter to Khamenei Trump dispatched the letter to Khamenei on March 5, 2025, then gave a television interview the next day in which he acknowledged sending it. He said: “I’ve written them a letter saying, ‘I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.’”

Since returning to the White House, the president has been pushing for talks while ratcheting up sanctions and suggesting a military strike by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites.

A previous letter from Trump during his first term drew an angry retort from the supreme leader.

But Trump’s letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his first term led to face-to-face meetings, though no deals to limit Pyongyang’s atomic bombs and a missile program capable of reaching the continental US.

Oman mediated previous talks

Oman, a sultanate on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, has mediated talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff. The two men have met face to face after indirect talks, a rare occurrence due to the decades of tensions between the countries.

It hasn't been all smooth, however. Witkoff at one point made a television appearance in which he suggested 3.67% enrichment for Iran could be something the countries could agree on. But that’s exactly the terms set by the 2015 nuclear deal struck under former President Barack Obama, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew America. Witkoff, Trump and other American officials in the time since have maintained Iran can have no enrichment under any deal, something to which Tehran insists it won't agree.

Those negotiations ended, however, with Israel launching the war in June on Iran.

The 12-day war and nationwide protests Israel launched what became a 12-day war on Iran in June that included the US bombing Iranian nuclear sites. Iran later acknowledged in November that the attacks saw it halt all uranium enrichment in the country, though inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been unable to visit the bombed sites.

Iran soon experienced protests that began in late December over the collapse of the country's rial currency. Those demonstrations soon became nationwide, sparking Tehran to launch a bloody crackdown that killed thousands and saw tens of thousands detained by authorities.

Iran’s nuclear program worries the West Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials increasingly threaten to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran now enriches uranium to near weapons-grade levels of 60%, the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Under the original 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity and to maintain a uranium stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds). The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s program put its stockpile at some 9,870 kilograms (21,760 pounds), with a fraction of it enriched to 60%.

US intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.” Iranian officials have threatened to pursue the bomb.

Decades of tense relations between Iran and the US Iran was once one of the US’s top allies in the Mideast under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA had fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah, fatally ill with cancer, fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. The Iranian Revolution followed, led by Grand Khomeini, and created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed.

The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s saw the US back Saddam Hussein. The “Tanker War” during that conflict saw the US launch a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea, while the US later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the US military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have seesawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since, with relations peaking when Tehran made the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Mideast that persist today.