The question of reviving the "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" (JCPOA) or the P6+1 Agreement (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, as well as the European Union) and Iran, has returned to the fore. Concluded on July 14, 2015, after years of negotiations, the primary objective of the agreement was to find a diplomatic solution, the only realistically feasible path to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. We should recall that former US President Donald Trump, who might be reelected, announced in 2018 that the US was withdrawing from the agreement, which has been clinically deceased since.
Western parties also very loosely linked the agreement to Iran suspending its development of ballistic missiles and changing its role in the region in a manner that serves Western powers in particular, of course. The issue is negotiable piecemeal, as they say, and a high flexibility approach was adopted in addressing each contentious issue.
It is notable that President Biden's administration has not revived the agreement since he took office in January 2021. Rather, it has stuck to Trump’s policy, asserting that Iran continues to fail to meet its commitments (under the now frozen agreement, enrichment is not to exceed 3.67 percent, but in the years since the deal was suspended, it has risen to 60 percent, and some reports indicate uranium has reached around 83.7 percent in one facility). That is, Iran has nearly reached the threshold (90 percent), meaning that it could join the club of countries with nuclear weapons relatively quickly. Iran has taken what is known as the Japanese option, having the capability to produce nuclear weapons without necessarily doing so.
The issue has returned to the spotlight for several reasons. First, disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its inspection duties in Iran have resurfaced. Iran insists on limiting inspection to its commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), not the frozen nuclear deal.
The Director General of the IAEA has warned that it could reach a dead end in negotiations with Iran, despite what he describes as constructive and open communication with Iranian officials. The escalation of the diplomatic clash on this issue is also evident in the statements of the four Western parties to the deal, which have warned Iran against maintaining its current nuclear policy, which cannot be isolated from the current developments in the region and Iran's active role in them.
On the other hand, Iran's foreign minister has shown flexibility, as reflected by his recent statements on this matter. He has indicated that Iran is ready to make concessions in return for an easing of sanctions. Recent reports suggest that Iran fears a Trump victory and wants to push for a revival of the nuclear deal or to pave the path to its revival by engaging in direct and indirect negotiations with Western parties. In my opinion, this is a preemptive effort to prevent Trump - in the event that he returns to the White House - from capitalizing on the current stalemate that has for years engendered tensions around this issue, which Trump could easily build on to escalate against Iran.
An opposing interpretation of this state of affairs suggests that Iran is trying to buy time by signaling diplomatic flexibility through statements and the temporary adoption of measured positions as it vies to reach the nuclear threshold. That would allow Iran to join the club of nuclear powers, fundamentally altering the balance of power in its favor and gaining "security immunity."
It is worth noting, here, that Iran obtaining nuclear weapons would open the door to a nuclear arms race in the region. It is also important to recall that the nuclear strategy Israel, which possesses nuclear weapons approved by the West, has adopted aims to prevent any other country in the region from joining the nuclear powers club. That objective is pursued through the armed forces, of course, but this strategy will not necessarily succeed regionally.
Despite the normalization of relations between major regional powers, the Middle East, which is witnessing intertwined and overlapping conflicts that are leveraged in the "game" of building and enhancing international and regional influence, faces two choices in dealing with this matter. The first is the continued aggravation of tensions regarding the "Iranian nuclear program," which has very much returned to the forefront for an array of reasons that, of course, are not all tied to this issue in particular, even with its strategic significance to the world and the parties involved.
The second is moving further along the path of de-escalation and containment, which entails addressing matters "piecemeal" to avert the first outcome, by containing its repercussions to the parties directly concerned and putting an end to the spike in tensions across the region.
