The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, preceded and followed by Israeli airstrikes and targeted killings, marks a rare turning point for Lebanon and the entire Middle East. For nearly three decades, Nasrallah embodied Hezbollah’s rise and its transformation into a massive military, security, and political force acting as Iran’s proxy in the region. Now, the group finds itself in an unprecedented state of chaos, presenting a strategic opportunity for Arab countries to re-engage with Lebanon and reshape the region’s geopolitical landscape.
For many years, influential Arab nations viewed Lebanon as a lost cause due to the complexities of sectarian conflict, the absence of inspiring leadership comparable to the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and, most importantly, Hezbollah and Iran’s dominance over the country’s political system and institutions. This is where the strategic significance of Hezbollah’s inevitable defeat lies, coupled with the growing exhaustion among the Lebanese people from the hollow rhetoric of resistance, repeated conflicts, and the ongoing economic and financial collapse.
Hezbollah has been the crown jewel of Iran’s regional project, which has fueled much of the turmoil over recent decades. Iran has relied on the rise of militias and its investments in weakening, or taking advantage of, central governments in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, and beyond. The brilliance of Qassem Soleimani transformed these militias into pillars of Iran’s regional influence, but now this project faces a strategic black hole threatening to undo everything the Iranian Revolution has built since 1979.
There is now an urgent need and an available opportunity for a proactive Arab strategy aimed at restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty and neutralizing the remaining influence of Hezbollah, in a way that reduces Iran’s role in Lebanese politics. Lebanon is no longer a problem to be managed, with all the headaches, wasted time, and effort that entails, but rather an opportunity to be seized for the benefit of both Lebanon and the region.
It is no exaggeration to say that Lebanon’s fate—whether it plunges into an even more difficult chapter of chaos and decay or begins a path of recovery—depends on whether Arab nations are ready to invest the necessary political, economic, and diplomatic capital to reclaim the country and, in turn, reshape the balance of power in the region.
Everyone is defeated in Lebanon now. While the wound of the Shiite community is the freshest and most painful, the wounds of others are still raw as well. All the Lebanese are at their weakest point, and all are overwhelmed.
This moment calls for a shift in Arab diplomacy, led by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), toward direct engagement with what remains of the pillars of Lebanon’s political system, abandoning past reservations and overcoming bad experiences with these figures and forces. This is not the time, for example, to hold Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri accountable for his past, as he is one of the last remnants of Lebanon’s political structure. Additionally, the Lebanese Army, the Maronite Church, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, and other forces can serve as a base for a project to reclaim Lebanon. All these forces, with Hezbollah, are one thing; without it, they are something entirely different. This is the true meaning of the period following September 27, 2024.
It is no longer productive to leave Lebanon to face its crises alone, especially since those who urged reconciliation with Hezbollah—both Arabs and foreigners—bear responsibility today for what Lebanon is enduring.
To bring Lebanon back into the Arab fold, a diplomatic offensive is needed that compels the Lebanese to halt hostilities, even unilaterally at first, elect a true president, and form a government of the most trusted and elite Lebanese figures to implement an agreed-upon economic and social rescue plan. This plan would be discussed in a regional-Lebanese dialogue led by the Arabs, with a clear commitment to ending Lebanon’s status as a battleground for proxy conflicts and making it an integral part of regional stability.
Additionally, Arab countries must seize this moment to reshape the narrative surrounding “resistance” in the region. For decades, Hezbollah built its legitimacy on the concept of “resistance against Israel,” a narrative that resonated deeply within Lebanon and beyond. However, the price of this resistance has been exorbitant for the Lebanese people, as they are now acutely aware and suffering today. The death of Nasrallah represents an opportunity to shift the focus from “resistance” to “reconstruction,” from militarization to diplomacy. This can be achieved by leveraging Arab relations with Israel and Syria to finalize the demarcation of land borders, address the issue of the Shebaa Farms, and remove all “resistance” agendas permanently.
If we fail, the void left by Hezbollah’s collapse could be filled by more extreme elements, plunging Lebanon into deeper chaos and further destabilizing the region. While it is true that Iran will not stand idly by, even after Nasrallah’s murder, it is also under significant pressure, along with its proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, which makes confronting it more feasible.
The assassination of Nasrallah could mark the potential end of an era in which militias held a significant grip over the region’s decisions, starting from Lebanon. Now, the opportunity to turn the page is within reach—will we seize it?
