It has been a month since Israel launched its war against Lebanon and Hezbollah in response to the latter's "support and harassment" in backing Hamas in Gaza since October 8, 2023. Following the lethal blows dealt to the party, most notably the assassination of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and a substantial number of its leaders and cadres, Lebanon faces a new turning point. The most prominent indication of this new phase is that Iran has taken direct control of Hezbollah and is overseeing operations alongside third-tier officials of the party.
Iran did not begin intervening in Lebanon recently. However, the overt nature of its intervention this time around has completely effaced the plausible deniability it had enjoyed up to this point. Today, purely Iranian decisions shape the Lebanese policy, which has undermined the role of parliament Speaker Berri and other Hezbollah allies, as well as what remains of the party’s previous leadership.
The new version of Iranian intervention is evident from deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s rejection of any compromise before a ceasefire. His stance means that Hezbollah will not accept any proposal for a solution, whichever party makes it. It undermines the government's efforts, the work of Berri, Prime Minister Najib Mikati, and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and the summit of Lebanon’s religious leaders in Bkirki.
Directly overseeing Hezbollah operations reflects the duality of Iranian policy and its domestic and international tracks. Domestically, Iran aims to appease regime hardliners, who are calling for confrontation and want to see the war continue on its various fronts. Internationally, Iran continues to seek de-escalation and pursue indirect negotiations with the US, positioning itself as a mediator in Lebanon by leveraging its influence on allies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen to strengthen its negotiating position and safeguard its interventionist policies in the region.
Amid the escalation of brutal killings, destruction, and the expansion of the war to areas that had previously been considered safe, along with the aggravating economic, social, and security risks after the number of displaced people reached over a million scattered across different Lebanese regions, the opposition forces that stand against the party's project and the war it initiated remain fragmented, disorganized, and divided.
They continue to quarrel over details and marginal issues, squandering opportunities to rebuild the state, restore sovereignty, and unite the Lebanese people. These forces remain preoccupied with narrow internal disputes and personal and partisan interests, even as Lebanon faces threats to existence as a political entity that make these maneuvers - the traditionally sly Lebanese approach to managing political affairs - untenable.
After these developments that have turned Lebanon into an alternative battleground for Iran and Israel, with Lebanese officials and citizens alike becoming mere spectators of their demise, what comes next?
What is preventing the political parties opposed to Iran’s project, resistance, and the unity of arenas from agreeing on foundational principles on how to restore the state, irrespective of their differences and disagreements? What is stopping them from forming a national salvation front aimed at rescuing the country that includes every party seeking to build back the state, so that it can make visits to capitals in the Arab region and across the world, especially those of countries that are eager to help Lebanon find a way out of this crisis?
This national salvation front could transcend contentions and divergences, presenting an agenda underpinned by five fundamental principles regarding a prospective settlement:
- Taking back the state, its sovereignty, decision-making, and extending its authority across the countries, whereby only legitimate bodies and apparatuses have the right to bear arms.
- Reviving the 1949 Armistice Agreement, and the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701.
- Committing to the full implementation of the constitution and the 1989 Taif Accord.
- Affirming Lebanon's Arab role and its fraternal relations with Arab states, without implying hostility towards other regional countries.
- Emphasizing the role of capable Lebanese citizens in reviving Lebanon's economy, centering commerce, banking, tourism, healthcare, and education.
None of these principles are likely to be a matter of disagreement among the Lebanese genuinely seeking to take Lebanon back and prevent its demise. These principles could lay the foundation for rebuilding the state and allow, through a democratic and constitutional framework, for amendments, changes, and reforms that align with the aspirations of the Lebanese for the future, which are similar to those of other Arab countries in the region.
After Lebanon had been torn between various axes for over fifty years, it has become evident that siding with one axis over another creates civil wars, armed conflicts, and occupation by Palestinians, Syrians, Israelis, and Iranians. Lebanon returning to the embrace of the Arabs does mean shifting its alignment from one axis to another, but reinstating the natural order of things. It means joining the ranks of the stable Arab countries that have not been torn apart by inter-Arab and civil wars, and are looking to the future, modernity, peace, and prosperity.
