Yesterday, in Jeddah, Syrian and Lebanese defense ministers Murhaf Abu Qusra and Michel Menassa signed a promising agreement to end lingering border issues between Lebanon and Syria. In truth, neither the new Syrian government nor the current Lebanese authorities contributed to these issues, which were inherited from the birth of the current Syrian and Lebanese territories during the French Mandate period and on the ruins of former Ottoman provinces and states.
The decades that followed brought tensions and understandings between the rulers of Damascus and Beirut, until Assad succeeded - with regional and international approval - in imposing Damascus' “hegemony” over Lebanese decision-making. Indeed, the Syrian security apparatus controlled Lebanon from the late 1970s until the departure of Syrian forces in 2005, following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Hariri's assassination created new facts on the ground, including Bashar al-Assad accepting that Damascus would exchange ambassadors with Beirut and recognize Lebanon's independence. However, the border issue remained complex and thorny in the north, center, and south. Keeping the issue “complex and thorny” became even more important as Iran, through Hezbollah, inherited Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon. In the south, the identity of the Shebaa Farms and Kfarshuba hills became a “pretext” to justify Hezbollah's “resistance” and ensure it could retain its weapons. In the north, some border villages inside the Syrian province of Homs became the initial justification for Hezbollah's participation in suppressing the Syrian uprising in 2011.
Today, the Syrian and Lebanese entities, which in the past shared similar existential challenges, are now sharing (and will continue to share) similar existential dangers. In an era where Israel plays a hegemonic role in international decision-making capitals regarding the politics of the Middle East, the prospect of a disastrous “Israeli peace” looms large for the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean.
“Israeli peace” appears to many as a powerful storm - too overwhelming to confront - especially given the current US administration’s total alignment with Benjamin Netanyahu’s government and the hardline Israeli right.
This right-wing faction has succeeded in dragging Iran into a war larger than it can handle and is now reaping the benefits of its “response” to the October 7, 2023 operation. Having managed, through unprecedented American support, to diminish Iran’s regional stature, it is now accelerating the imposition of its dominance - whether direct or indirect - over the Eastern Mediterranean region and its four Arab entities.
The major headlines here include the forced “transfer” of Palestinians and the implementation of an old plan to divide and fragment the region’s remaining entities along religious, sectarian, and ethnic lines.
Israeli penetration of the region has been underway for some time across various components, but it is now nearly overt. The blow dealt to Hezbollah has “liberated” voices that were previously concealed or had dual allegiances (particularly within Syria and Lebanon) who are now openly calling for an “Israeli solution” to the issues of coexistence between majorities and minorities.
In Syria, one can recall Rami Makhlouf’s warning to Israel - at the onset of the uprising - that the fall of the Syrian regime would not be in its interest. Some of the violent incidents involving the killing of civilians on Syria’s coast during the new government’s pursuit of remnants of the former regime ended up serving those who sought to add fuel to the fire.
There’s also the matter of reckless statements made by certain separatist Kurdish leaders, which they quickly backed away from, especially after the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, proceeded to sign an understanding with the new Syrian leadership.
In southern Syria, Israeli penetration is now taking on dangerous dimensions, particularly through Israel’s deliberate investment in the Druze community via arming, funding, and courting certain figures within the religious establishment. Simultaneously, a fierce media and social media campaign is currently underway targeting any Druze voices that oppose the “replication” of the Israeli model and its attempt to re-engineer the national and religious identity of Druze communities.
The situation in Lebanon is not much different. Much of the alluring rhetoric that was once cloaked in the language of “change,” at times in “federalism,” and even “fighting corruption”, has since shed its cautious facade, revealing its true agenda of division and suspicious foreign alignment.
The Eastern Mediterranean has long been part of what was known as the "Eastern Question" - a landscape marked by seismic fault lines between religions, sects, ethnicities, and fragile statelets. This is a historical reality. However, the only consistent and constructive way to deal with it has always rested on alleviating the fears of minorities and addressing the sense of injustice felt by majorities.
As long as fear and resentment persist within fragmented, diminished entities whose decision-making lies elsewhere, the region will find no rest. It will continue to swing from one episode of exploitation to another, from one conflict to the next.
In more advanced parts of the world, political actors have managed to arrive at tailored arrangements that reflect the needs of each context, ranging from “federalism” to “administrative decentralization.”
Some in our region reject federalism, arguing that it will lead to partition.
Perhaps so!
That may be true in certain tribal societies. But federalism has succeeded in most countries where it has been implemented—from Switzerland and Belgium to India and Brazil.
But what about administrative decentralization?
In the case of the Eastern Mediterranean, administrative decentralization is precisely the model outlined in the 1989 Taif Agreement in Lebanon. Yet the Damascus regime resisted its implementation—perhaps out of fear that it might actually work.
In my view, there can be no political solution to the crises facing any of the Eastern Mediterranean states unless it is based on administrative decentralization within a unified, sovereign, and independent state—one in which all citizens enjoy the same rights, responsibilities, and foundations of citizenship.
When people feel justice and safety, their sense of belonging will grow. The cycle of oppression and counter-oppression will never be broken through reliance on foreign powers.
