The EU has joined the game of sending envoys to the Middle East, dispatching Austrian diplomat Christian Berger after naming him as its envoy to Syria. It seems, by sending him, that Europe is saying: "Why shouldn’t I have an envoy like the US and others?"
Our region has received many international envoys, and the last one to end his mission without achieving anything was Abdoulaye Bathily, the United Nations Envoy to Libya. As for the United States Envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello, he is still trying to end the war there. Meanwhile, the US Envoy to Lebanon and Israel, Amos Hochstein, found Israel’s war on Lebanon intensifying after every visit. Most recently, he went to Tel Aviv hoping to go to Beirut from there, but he went straight back to the US. It was then announced that this would be his last tour before submitting his resignation.
Our experience with envoys suggests that their missions often seem to be an end in themselves, rather than a genuine means for resolving the issues they had been sent there to address- or, at the very least- that is the impression we have. If we were to go over the countries in the region that have received envoys, one by one, and try to find one whose mission yielded a positive outcome, I doubt we would. Indeed, these envoys are sent to serve the political interests of the parties that sent them, not the countries they are visiting.
This fact is clearly reflected in the landscape of our region. Take Libya, for example, which has received nearly ten envoys. And then there's Sudan, whose war began almost a year ago amid a flurry of visits by Perriello.
I do not blame the envoys themselves; rather, I blame those who believe that an envoy can achieve results the country's own people and politicians cannot. An envoy comes with the intention of “bringing good," as we say, but time after time, it becomes increasingly apparent that they cannot help those who do not help themselves.
Ibrahim Shihata, the renowned Egyptian economist, wrote a book titled "My Will to My Country" towards the end of his life. Although the title suggests it is about Egypt, you will find, in the dedication on the first page, that the book's principles on state-building apply to any country that seeks to build on strong and sound foundations.
In a corner of the book, it is noted that neither European, US, or UN envoys have the magical staff of Moses. Rather, they try to help those they are sent to as envoys- if their intentions are genuine and they carry out their task in good faith. Moreover, the responsibility lies, first and foremost, with the people of the country themselves and their determination to prioritize the national interest above all else.
The Austrian diplomat, Berger, has just begun his mission, and his task seems ambiguous and unclear. We will have to wait and see what he accomplishes in Syria, a country whose relations with Europe cut off. When Europe realized, late on, that Syria shares the ruins of the Mediterranean with it, it began to reconsider and recalibrate its stance towards Damascus. Europe then decided that sending an envoy might be the first of several steps, potentially serving as a bridge connecting the two shores in the future.
I don't think anyone among us seeks to undermine Berger's mission before he departs for Syria. There is certainly hope for him to have better luck in Syria than Hochstein has had in Israel and Lebanon, Perriello has in Sudan, or any of the others. Nonetheless, we are talking about hope first and foremost, but we should always keep Shihata's preface in mind.
