For decades, the same basic question has haunted the Middle East: what is the greatest obstacle to the consolidation of stability and sovereignty? To me, the answer is clear. The “statization of militias:” non-state armed groups and revolutionary movements’ transformation from temporary entities born of grim circumstances into quasi-institutions embedded in the state, undercutting its authority and maintaining their ideologies, symbolism, and transnational loyalties. When the state tolerates a parallel power, legitimacy is not underpinned by the law but by arms.
This phenomenon is not confined to a single country. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has become a state within the state, monopolizing decisions of war and peace. In Palestine, Hamas’s control of Gaza gave rise to parallel authorities that entrenched division and froze progress toward a unified state. In Yemen, the Houthis have established de facto authorities cloaked in sectarian and religious rhetoric, plunging the country into perpetual conflict. Since the collapse of Assad’s dark regime, there have been attempts to rebuild a state in Syria, but the biggest challenge remains factionalism and a mindset of domination that shuns inclusion. It is Iraq, however, that now presents the clearest picture of this dilemma through the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
The PMF first arose in 2014 as an auxiliary to the army that joined the fight against terrorism. Yet it did not dissolve once this mission ended, though. Instead, it continued to expand, eventually recruiting a total of 200,000 fighters and obtaining an annual budget exceeding $3 billion. It has become an umbrella for dozens of factions, some of which are designated terrorist organizations by Washington. The latest (and most dangerous) step along this path was legislative.
Two draft laws were presented to parliament: the first would transform the PMF into a permanent institution with an independent annual budget, following the structure of a ministry; the second would grant its fighters the full range of services and retirement benefits that come with public sector employment, establish a dedicated military academy for the PMF, and promote its commander, Faleh al-Fayyad, to a minister and full member of the National Security Council.
Behind this trajectory stands a well-oiled machine that oversaw an intimidation campaign launched by Iran-backed “resistance factions.” On July 23, Abu Ali al-Askari, who is affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah, issued a statement tying the fate of US forces to the status of the PMF, threatening that failure to fully withdraw “would be met with a different kind of response.”
Days later, a member of the Al-Sadiqoun bloc (Asaib Ahl al-Haq) accused Sunni and Kurdish MPs of obstructing the law because of American pressure, as well as insinuating that US forces’ presence in Iraq had expanded and must be resisted. Leaks from the closed-door meetings of Iraq’s parliamentary defense and security committees speak to the extent of coordination between the Badr, Asaib, and Kataib Hezbollah militias. Official PMF representatives and figures accused of attacking and killing protesters and journalists were in attendance. Even Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani was in Baghdad on the eve of the attempted vote, a clear signal of the regional dimension of this issue.
This effort coincided with incidents underscoring the gravity of the predicament and its complicity: repeated attacks on the US embassy and bases, drone strikes on the Kurdistan region, threats against non-Muslim minorities, assassination attempts on politicians and journalists, and moves to broaden its economic networks. As a result, the PMF is no longer viewed as a faction within the state, but as an independent institution akin to Iran’s IRGC- it is funded by the state but operates independently of it, with Tehran calling the shots.
Washington has issued warnings. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio directly addressed Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. He stressed that passing these laws “entrench Iranian influence and armed militias, undermining Iraq's sovereignty." He stressed that this step would change the trajectory of their bilateral relations and potentially lead to the imposition of harsh sanctions, particularly on its energy exports.
The US chargé d’affaires in Baghdad echoed the message to senior politicians, urging Kurdish and Sunni blocs to ensure that the quorum is not met. Behind the scenes, Washington is weighing its options: from accelerating the withdrawal of its troops to publicizing intelligence that would embarrass the Iraqi government, warning US companies against investment, and imposing broad sanctions on the PMF’s economic arms. Despite all this pressure, the roots of the crisis cannot be addressed from outside Iraq.
In my view, the dilemma runs deeper than the American approach, which is ultimately driven by US interests, not a vision for a sustainable solution that relieves this region burdened with crises. The real problem is that no state can coexist with a militia that refuses to dissolve into itself and insists on making dictates.
The Lebanese model has shown how the state becomes hostage to such a militia. Yemen has been stripped of its Arab identity and driven into chaos and destruction. Gaza has consolidated the division of Palestinian authorities, making it impossible to envision a “day after,” even if the international community pressures Israel into accepting a two-state solution. Syria risks cracking into fragments. And today, Iraq itself faces the threat of officially becoming a militia state if the PMF law is passed.
Whatever the stance of the great powers, above all the United States, which tends to retreat from the region only to return, driven by its geopolitical weight and crises, the predicament of the “statization of militias” is not an American problem. It is a regional challenge that concerns the states of the region. These states are paying the price for the expansion of these entities, and they live with the consequences for their security, economy, and stability.
This is where the need for a unified Arab vision among the moderate Arab states comes in. The task is not merely to manage symptoms or accept militias as an inevitable fact of life. This coalition must reject their legitimization as parallel entities and insist on the need for states to monopolize the use of force.
Otherwise, there can be no sovereignty, and the basic building block of statehood will remain elusive. In this context, Saudi Arabia’s position stands out. It is the clearest and firmest: there can be no stability without states that monopolize arms and decision-making; militia projects have no future, no matter how hard they try to cloak themselves in the rhetoric of resistance or sectarian narrative. Saudi Arabia’s role, which is founded on reinforcing statehood and values stability above all else, now amounts to a realistic framework around which moderate states build common ground and unite against militias. The Saudi message to the Arab world and the international community is clear: the region can only be built through statehood and sovereignty, and it can only rise through stability.
