Iraq has been dealing with the repercussions of the 2010 parliamentary elections since its political process took a perilous turning point. To understand why, one must revisit the events and developments that preceded those elections.
After 2003, Iraq witnessed a wave of sectarianism, violence, and terrorism that claimed the lives of innocent people and deepened divisions among its citizens. Iraqis therefore looked to the 2010 elections as a pivotal moment that could open the door to genuine change toward a state of citizenship and institutions, free from narrow alignments.
The Iraqiya List emerged as a unifying national project that brought together figures from across Iraq’s diverse social and political spectrum. It presented a cross-sectarian program aimed at building a state founded on genuine partnership and the rule of law. At the time, the Iraqiya List represented hope for broad segments of Iraqi society seeking to move beyond the logic of sectarian power-sharing and division.
The road to the elections, however, was not easy. The Iraqiya List faced politicized de-Baathification measures, smear campaigns, killings, intimidation, and arrests targeting some of its leaders. Despite all of this, Iraqi voters insisted on expressing their will. The results gave the Iraqiya List 91 seats, making it the bloc that won the highest number of seats in the Council of Representatives.
Democratic logic dictated that the bloc winning the largest number of seats should form the government, in accordance with the will of voters and Article 76 of the Constitution. There was hope that a national civilian government could be formed to bring years of division to an end.
However, a dispute emerged over the interpretation of the concept of the “largest bloc.” It was argued at the time that the largest bloc referred to the one formed inside parliament after the elections through alliances, not the electoral list that had won the most seats. This shifted the center of gravity from the ballot boxes to the corridors of political understandings.
Before this interpretation was settled, the political arena witnessed negotiations and attempts to rearrange the landscape. The Iraqiya List was offered major positions, including the presidency of the republic and several ministries, in exchange for relinquishing its right to nominate the prime minister. The list rejected trading this entitlement for any other position, insisting on its constitutional right, its commitment to the national project, and its respect for the will of voters.
Negotiations continued from February to October 2010. During this period, clear regional and international interventions emerged. The interests of influential parties converged, and the US administration at the time, led by President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden, aligned with Iran in supporting a political course that did not lead to enabling the winning bloc to exercise its constitutional right to form the government.
This took place in the context of an understanding reached during the Obama administration with Tehran regarding its nuclear file and the lifting of sanctions, in return for supporting actors inside Iraq close to Iran in ways that came at the expense of the electoral entitlement. This contributed to circumventing the will of voters and depriving the winning bloc of its right to form the government.
The crises and wars the region is paying for today confirm that building stability on temporary deals and circumstantial understandings leads to recurring crises and continuous escalation. Such arrangements cannot produce lasting peace; rather, they leave deferred crises that soon return in more complex forms.
In a phone call with President Obama at the time, I discussed the reason the Iraqiya List was being prevented from forming the government. I reaffirmed our firm position and commitment to our electoral and constitutional right. The US ambassador also attended one of the meetings to clarify the matter, but the position did not change, and support continued for a course that obstructed enabling the winning bloc to form the government.
In the same context, during my meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2010, and in response to his question about why I had not visited Iran, I affirmed that the position of prime minister is granted as the right of a winning bloc and through the will of the people expressed in elections, not through visits to other countries.
Finally, I recall a phone call with Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad, the Amir of Kuwait. We discussed developments in Iraq’s political scene, and he raised the question of visiting Iran as part of exploring ways out of the crisis. My position was clear: I could not visit any country in pursuit of a position that was already a constitutional entitlement derived from the will of voters.
Thus, the Iraqiya List, which had been granted the confidence of the electorate, was not allowed to form the government despite its clear victory. What occurred in 2010 was not merely a disagreement over the interpretation of a constitutional text. It was a turning point that disrupted the path of democratic transition. From that moment on, citizens began to feel that their votes could be reinterpreted or circumvented, and that election results do not necessarily determine the shape of the executive authority.
The period after 2010 established a trajectory characterized by the concentration of power, rising political and sectarian polarization, and the weakening of a unified state of citizenship. This created a fragile environment that extremist groups exploited, benefiting from internal divisions and regional conflicts and their impact on the Iraqi arena.
This was later reflected in declining confidence in the political process and rising abstention from participation in elections. That interpretation also set a precedent that opened the door to successive crises, deepening division, weakening government performance, and allowing corruption to grow. Iraq witnessed security collapses, most notably the fall of cities to ISIS, along with grave humanitarian and security disasters.
Events cannot be reduced to a single cause. However, the ambiguous interpretation of a fundamental constitutional text contributed to weakening the emerging democratic system, which is based on respecting election results, safeguarding the will of voters, and adhering to both the letter and the spirit of the constitution.
Today, in light of what the President of the Supreme Judicial Council, Judge Faiq Zidan, has raised regarding the constitutional meaning of the largest bloc, it is clear that revisiting that trajectory has become necessary. Returning the debate to its constitutional foundations represents an important step toward correcting the errors that accompanied the political experience of that period.
Restoring Iraqis’ confidence in the political process requires a frank review of the past and recognition that circumventing the will of voters threatens democracy. It also requires clear constitutional reform that removes any ambiguity in interpreting the provisions related to assigning the largest bloc to form the government, in order to prevent the experience from being repeated.
The time has come to restore the value of the citizen’s voice and to reaffirm the principle that the winning bloc holds the primary right to form the government, and that any interpretation contrary to this meaning weakens confidence and deepens division.
Iraq deserves a political system that genuinely reflects the will of its people, protects its constitution from political reinterpretations, and lays the foundation for a new phase of stability, sovereignty, and genuine democracy.
