After the failure of negotiations in Islamabad, the next move is Washington's to make. It now faces a different set of challenges. The first is deciphering Iranian code: not every "yes" is an affirmation, and not every "no" is a definitive rejection.
Any time Iran replies in the negative, it could be a ploy, with the refusal followed by signals of a willingness to grant partial concessions. At the same time, Iran's rhetoric and the image it projects to its supporters weigh on its decision-making, and this had played a role in sparking Iran to the previous war.
There remains a bloc of regime supporters in the country that it depends on, though they are no longer the majority. This base has been narrowed by economic sanctions and perpetual military engagement in the region. Then we have Iran's broader audience in its sphere of influence. These Iran-backed factions mirror the regime, and they are taught to believe that it is victorious and has the upper hand in negotiations - propaganda is a tool of Iran’s control. It is not new for Tehran to deliberately refuse terms and disrupt negotiations.
Then there is the cunning method of Iran's Foreign Ministry. His poker face makes it impossible to tell whether he wants to move forward, retreat, or walk away for good. The traditional tactic of Iranian negotiators is to complicate talks and pursue brinksmanship. We saw this in Geneva, when they refused to negotiate on the core issues, leading to a walkout. They were then surprised, despite the military deployments and threats he had made, when a furious Donald Trump triggered the war less than 48 hours later.
It would not be surprising if Iran were to seek additional negotiations and offer substantial concessions like having the nuclear enrichment done abroad or reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
If Tehran does not back down, or if Washington deems the concessions insufficient, one of two scenarios could follow, both aimed at regime change in Tehran. The first is a return to war. The second is tightening the blockade on the Strait of Hormuz.
Several more months of war are expected to break the regime through the widespread destruction of its institutions and leadership.
So why did Washington halt the war if resumption remains a possibility? Its goal was to test the intentions of Iran's new leadership and determine whether it could lean toward a new policy: relinquishing what remains of its regional expansion, such as enrichment, the missile program, the proxies, and transforming into a peaceful state.
The Trump administration decided to test this idea so that no one could later claim that Trump had chosen war although Iran was ready to change.
The Islamabad negotiations, like those in Geneva, demonstrated that a decision to resume the war would not be unjustified. Trump has given the regime an opportunity, and he gave Iran access to some of its frozen funds and ended strikes on Hezbollah targets in Beirut. Yet in Pakistan, Iran chose intransigence with its refusal to abandon nuclear enrichment - the primary cause of dispute and the war. It became clear that Khamenei's policy lives on despite his death.
The second option for the administration is to forgo war and go back to besieging Iran, tightening the squeeze to destabilize the regime and drain its finances.
Trump has threatened to prevent the passage of Iranian oil tankers - currently the sole beneficiaries of the strait that has been closed to their rivals' vessels. Washington would also go back to supporting mass protests and escalate in the hope of eroding the regime from within.
This strategy would keep the Gulf states, Iraq, and Jordan out of the line of fire, and it could potentially restore traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Countries that would suffer the ramifications of this blockade, such as China and India, would pressure Tehran to open the strait.
An economic siege may seem comforting to both sides, but it might fail to prevent a resumption of the conflict. The American administration has not taken additional strikes off the table, and Tehran, having lost several negotiating cards, may cling to closing the strait and defy the American naval forces and ignore the demands of countries around the world. This would create a spiral that leads to fresh rounds of military confrontations.
We should not forget that the Iranian regime is managing this crisis irrationally because it is fighting for survival.
