Just before the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was officially inaugurated two days ago, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reiterated controversial statements about his country’s need for access to the sea. He insisted that Ethiopia is determined to regain a presence on the Red Sea and “correct the mistakes of the past.”
Is there a link between the two?
There are many reasons to believe that Abiy Ahmed’s government does not merely see the dam as a hydroelectric project. In their minds, the dam is a step toward turning Ethiopia into a regional power with ambitions it can pursue unilaterally. The rhetoric of Abiy Ahmed and other Ethiopian officials about “historic” and “water rights,” be it with regard to the Blue Nile or the Red Sea, reinforces this assessment. Their discourse indicates that Addis Ababa intends to reshape the regional order and as part of a push framed as the pursuit of “historic rights” and "existential needs.”
On the eve of the dam’s inauguration, Abiy Ahmed told an interviewer that the ceremony inaugurated a new beginning for Ethiopia’s geopolitical trajectory; the GERD is only the beginning, as Ethiopia is capable of building more dams and implementing additional projects to generate energy. He stressed that such initiatives are not crimes and that Ethiopia has a legitimate right to carry them out. In the same interview, he went on to underline his country’s determination to reclaim access to the Red Sea after losing it following Eritrea’s independence, calling the loss of the Assab port a “mistake” that had been made three decades ago and “will be corrected tomorrow.”
Such remarks plainly illustrate the link between the GERD and Abiy Ahmed’s regional ambitions. His government is becoming increasingly convinced that it can move forward with its plans regardless of external pressures. It believes it can shift from a defensive posture (preoccupation with civil wars, ethnic strife, and poverty) to go on the offensive, consolidating nationalist sentiment to entrench Ethiopia’s status as a rising power.
This approach will inevitably fuel tensions with Sudan and Egypt- the two countries most directly concerned by projects on the Blue Nile, which provides around 80 percent of the Nile’s water. It also raises the spectre of conflict with neighbors such as Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti, who are alarmed by Ethiopia’s uncompromising rhetoric about obtaining a seaport, even if that means seizing it through force.
Ethiopia may speak of cooperation and mutual benefit, but its policies do not achieve it. Indeed, these policies are heightening tensions and deepening regional suspicions. In the case of the GERD, Addis Ababa chose a unilateral path, proceeding with the project without accommodating Egypt and Sudan’s concerns over filling, operation, and technical monitoring. It did not sufficiently engage with regional or international mediators to secure compromises or a binding legal agreement either.
Now that the dam is a fait accompli, there are only two potential paths forward. The first is cooperation: committing to the principle that negotiations are the means for resolving disputes and reaching consensual solutions. This would culminate in a binding agreement consistent with international law governing shared rivers and that respects the interests and rights of all parties concerned, which entails agreeing to guarantees regarding operation, technical monitoring, and data-sharing. Should this be achieved, the door would open to economic integration, with the dam becoming a collective benefit rather than a catalyst for a conflict fraught with risks.
The second path is for Ethiopia to conclude that it can impose its regional ambitions and achieve its objectives without concessions or real costs. The resulting trajectory would escalate regional tensions and possibly engender military clashes. Disputes over Nile waters with Egypt and Sudan could intersect with tensions with Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti as Ethiopia insists that it will retain maritime access “by any means necessary, including the use of force.” In this case, Ethiopia could find itself confronting a coalition of aggrieved neighbors, risking a broader regional struggle that could spiral into a military conflict.
The GERD is not just a hydroelectric project. It is a turning point in the struggle for influence and resources in the region. Ethiopia sees the dam as a symbol of its rising ambitions and projection of new strength. Given its nationalist discourse and recent assertions about the country’s need for access to the sea, it is clear that Addis Ababa is willing to challenge the existing regional order and seize what it deems its “legitimate rights,” regardless of the risks. The cause for alarm is that, unless these pursuits are tempered by flexible diplomacy and a recognition that negotiations are the sole path to consensual solutions, this push could ignite conflicts that destabilize a region already plagued by chronic unrest that is exploited by foreign powers eager to exploit and inflame its divisions.
