A wave of analyses and interpretations has flooded the Sudanese online space. Some have gone so far as to speak of an imminent peace agreement within the framework of the Quad. A timetable for reciprocal withdrawals by the army and the Rapid Support Forces has even been circulated, with the cities and regions and mechanism for implementation also mentioned. These reports have raised expectations of a major breakthrough this month.
Some commentators have read too much in US Presidential Advisor Massad Boulos statements during a fundraiser in Washington to support Sudan humanitarian relief efforts. At times, they have read them with discretion and chosen only some quotations to suggest the announcement of peace is imminent.
In reality, Boulos’s statements were far more reserved. He said, “We've been working on this comprehensive peace plan for at least three months now that should be acceptable to both sides,” noting that the challenge lies in its implementation. He added that the proposed plan is underpinned by several main pillars: first, the humanitarian dimension; second, the protection of civilians and ensuring their safe return; third, a permanent ceasefire; and a fourth pillar, which he described as extremely important, a political process and a transition to civilian governance.
The man did not say that there was a conclusive final agreement. Rather, he said that the text is “should” to be acceptable to both parties, meaning that there is still work to be done before reaching an actual agreement, not only among the Sudanese parties, but even among the members of the Quad themselves- indeed, consultations and contacts are still ongoing. The website “Middle East Eye quoted” the Egyptian ambassador in Washington, who participated in the meeting the day before yesterday, as saying “We need to see eye to eye much, much clearer,” when he was asked how far the peace plan had progressed, meaning that matters are far from settled.
It is understandable that Mr Boulos would like to achieve a breakthrough at some point and to take it to the Board of Peace chaired by President Trump, adding Sudan the countries where the latter has overseen a peace agreement. However, the chasm between political will and the complex realities of ending the war remains. There is indeed a great deal of movement and effort toward ensuring peace in Sudan, but that does not justify excessive optimism nor overstating the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement.
From what I have heard from two Western sources, a truce does not appear imminent. On the contrary, the rapidly evolving military situation on the ground is complicating the process, and the Sudanese army believes that it currently has the upper hand. Their reading seems closer to reality given the recent statements of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. When the siege of Kadugli (the capital of South Kordofan State) was lifted the day before yesterday, he stressed that “there will be no truce or ceasefire so long as the militias occupy cities.” Although he did not close the door to engaging with calls for peace and an end to the war, he stipulated that peace should not be “strengthen the militia.”
Massad Boulos has not said anything that had not been mentioned in the statement that the Quad issued 12 September last year, which called for a three-month humanitarian truce leading to a permanent ceasefire, the launch of a comprehensive transitional process to be concluded within nine months, and the formation of an independent civilian government. Obviously, none of that materialised; on the contrary, things have become complicated after the fall of El Fasher and the atrocities witnessed by the entire world. Since then, the Sudanese army and its allies have launched wide-ranging military operations, recapturing important cities and vital routes in Kordofan.
Regionally, the picture also looks different than it did last September: new alignments, rapid developments in the Red Sea, tensions around Iran, and complications in Gaza. All of this has implications for Sudan, which is part of a broader regional security equation. There is certainly a different reading of what is unfolding in Sudan and its repercussions for regional security. It is reflected in many of the statements issued by influential regional actors stressing the importance of Sudan’s unity and sovereignty, the preservation of state institutions, and the rejection of parallel governments.
With all of that in mind, any talk of a truce, a vague roadmap, or hurried initiatives will not bring a solution for Sudan. It only adds complications to its crisis. The knot that must be untied is the future of the Rapid Support Forces: their continued existence as an auxiliary force is no longer a possible or acceptable option. Any agreement that does not fundamentally address this issue will neither end the war nor open the way to a comprehensive and sustainable peace worthy of the heavy price Sudanese people have paid in this war.
