A year into US President Donald Trump’s second term, it has become clear his victory was a fleeting anomaly, but a stark reflection of extreme grievances against traditional institutions. With a solid majority in Congress, President Trump has a mandate that few of his predecessors had enjoyed, making it easier for him to make decisions that, on the surface, seem to break with established norms but effectively serve deep-seated interests within the American establishment.
It seems that, whether he is aware of it or not, Trump has taken the role of a leader acceptable to the deep state power brokers: a man who can address issues that others would not dare to approach, taking action to deal with accumulated historical burdens that had long awaited someone with the audacity to break the inertia. The scenes the world witnessed during the first year of Trump’s presidency, which was crowned by the surprise operation that ended with Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro being taken from his palace to US territory, as well as a return to talk of annexing Greenland despite European resistance, suggest that we his administration fits into a pattern we often see in large institutions, whether commercial or academic.
In moments of structural crisis, an executive with exceptional powers is brought in to carry out a timed mission: purges in the administration, shattering old power centers, and canceling contracts with longstanding partners, thereby removing these burdens from the path of his successor. State institutions’ tacit consent to such harsh steps reflects a desire to achieve strategic outcomes, allowing the fluctuations of the president’s mood and political temperament to determine the moral and political repercussions.
With regard to the grand promises Trump had made to end wars, the events of the first year have shown that international politics is far more difficult to shape than deals and electoral pledges. Events in Ukraine, and the way Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has been engaged with behind the scenes, demonstrate that disengaging from complex conflicts requires more than an executive order.
Prudent states understand how to deal with Washington’s fluctuations, and the Saudi model stands out in this regard. The Kingdom has consistently insisted on institutionalizing agreements and ensuring that they pass through legislative channels in Congress, which provides a real guarantee, granting strategic relations autonomy from volatile executive orders that can be reversed once someone new comes into the White House.
Looking closer ahead, this year’s midterm elections will serve as a popular referendum on this Republican moment and on the degree to which Americans feel tangible improvements since the Democrats left the scene in the minority. This electoral milestone will determine the course of the remaining three years, and the results will draw the early contours of the race in 2028.
At that point, both the Democratic and Republican parties will find themselves compelled to think of alternatives suited to the new America that Trump has shaped, whether through executive decisions or by changing the rules of the political game that had governed Washington for decades.
