Talk of restoring the shah’s monarchy has surged since the start of the current war, more than at any time since the fall of the Pahlavi regime in the late 1970s. Support for the return of Reza Pahlavi, the shah’s son, has been estimated at around one third of Iranians, though such figures are debated. Some believe the real number may be even higher, driven by the failure of the current religious system.
Yet Iran may instead be heading toward a different form of hereditary rule. The son of the late supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has reportedly been chosen over other religious figures. The rise of “Khamenei II” leads to a similar outcome: it may not be a monarchy, but it is still hereditary rule, one that lacks the traditional legitimacy associated with dynastic succession.
Most likely, this is an attempt to resolve the crisis facing Iran’s institutional religious system, which suffers from multiple competing centers of decision-making and overlapping authority. The state is governed by several bodies that emerged during different stages of the regime’s development. These include the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Supreme Council of the Religious Seminaries, and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. Alongside them stand powerful decision-making centers such as the Office of the Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council. Above all is the most influential force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has evolved from merely implementing decisions into a partner in shaping them.
The accumulation of these institutions has marginalized bodies considered “legitimate” under the constitution, such as the presidency and the government. Over time, other countries came to realize that presidents like Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani gradually became little more than public faces for other forces that truly govern this large, influential, and potentially dangerous state in the region.
These competing centers of power and internal political struggles had long threatened dangerous divisions that could endanger the republic, posing risks no less serious than the threat posed by war itself to the regime’s survival. Within less than a decade, several key pillars of the system have disappeared or been sidelined. Karroubi and Mousavi remain under house arrest after playing roles in street protests against the late supreme leader. Rafsanjani died, with his family insisting he was poisoned. Ahmadinejad, said to be highly popular among the public, was punished and marginalized, as was Rouhani. Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash, and before him the rising star Qassem Soleimani was killed. In addition, a long list of military leaders has vanished from the scene following last year’s war and the current conflict.
If hereditary leadership within the religious establishment continues and the new supreme leader survives Israeli targeting, Iran may shift the concept of velayat-e faqih toward a different system of rule centered largely on the personality of the leader. Non-monarchical hereditary rule is not unique in the world. North Korea has been ruled by three members of the Kim family for more than seven decades, and Cuba was governed for years by the Castro family.
In Tehran, the ruling religious establishment appears to have reached this conclusion because it has arrived at a dead end and finds itself increasingly pressured by public discontent. The rise of Khamenei II may become the rope that saves the regime from the brink, if it chooses to transform into a peaceful civilian system. At present, however, the system remains both religious and military in nature.
It is widely rumored that Mojtaba is more hardline than his father, and the region may need to prepare for a more turbulent and chaotic era. But this may be little more than speculation. We should not rely solely on the brief biography of a largely unknown figure to judge him. The region itself is also changing compared with the era of his father, especially after the wars fought last year and the current conflict.
In fact, Khamenei himself was more hardline than his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, despite claims to the contrary. It was Khamenei who built Iran’s modern system of extremism. During his rule, the Revolutionary Guard expanded into vast military and economic institutions with extensive external networks. The concept of regional proxy forces emerged, turning groups such as Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, the Fatemiyoun Brigade, and the Houthis into forward military arms of the republic. Iran’s nuclear program also took shape during his tenure.
Khamenei was known for his rigidity. Khomeini, by contrast, agreed to end the war with Saddam Hussein and famously described the decision as “drinking poison,” reflecting his sense of political realism. Khamenei, however, insisted on pressing ahead with all of his projects despite their failure to achieve their intended goals. This continued until the events of October 7, which became the final straw, as he pushed forward with confrontation against the Trump administration despite the massive US military buildup off Iran’s shores.
Does this mean that Khamenei II will follow exactly in his father’s footsteps? Both possibilities remain open, given that he lived and worked at the center of power. But that does not necessarily mean he will simply replicate his father, especially in light of the new conditions created by war and the shifts that preceded it in Iranian public sentiment.
