It is natural, in times of major crises like the current moment, for new ideas to emerge, or for old ones to be revived. The most prominent proposal we are now seeing is the call to establish an Arab national security force.
The best thing promoters of this idea can do, however, is to stop promoting it. It is simply not viable practically and untenable theoretically. That is why Gulf states have not adopted it despite having been subjected to direct Iranian attacks.
Those advocating this idea are burdening the Arab system with responsibilities it cannot bear and had never designed to assume. The Arab League is useful for political mobilization and ensuring legitimacy but not for building military strategies, waging wars, or forming armies.
But why does the idea of Arab national security not seem credible? The first reason is the absence of a common enemy. During World War II, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union united against an enemy: Nazism. Later, NATO was established to confront the Soviet Union. In other words, alliances are built to defend against a clearly defined threat.
In the context of the Arab world, there is no agreement on the enemy. During the liberation of Kuwait, Arab states split. Today, despite Gulf countries facing the largest attack in their history, they remain split on whether Iran is an enemy. How can joint forces be built without agreement on whom it is meant to confront?
The second reason is the fragility of several Arab states. Some are mired in civil wars; others suffer from domestic strife or foreign interference; still others face crises of legitimacy or deep economic hardship. Military alliances are not built on abstractions, but on the strength of the states within them. Take NATO, its success lies not only in its military power but also in the political cohesion of its members and their strong economic foundations. The alliance’s collective spending exceeds one trillion dollars annually, sustaining its capacity for deterrence and superiority over its adversaries.
The third reason is the population. Governments in these countries, through their political discourse and media, have incited their populations against the United States and the West through sharp ideological slogans. When crises arise, these governments fear reactions in the street.
Broad segments of the Arab public sympathize with Iran simply because it is confronting the United States and Israel, and they have no disregard for the damage suffered by Gulf states. Sometimes these sentiments go against the positions of their governments, which express solidarity with Gulf countries but cannot or are not willing to change this culture that had been shaped over decades.
The question, then, is: how can Arab national security be established if the populations themselves do not agree on the common enemy they are meant to fight? Instead of rushing to support their fellow Arab states, these governments would find themselves confronting their own enraged people.
For these reasons and others, the notion of collective Arab security remains far-fetched. Its advocates are doing little more than applying makeup to a lifeless body.
