Writers of political fiction have managed to spread the idea of “Talmudic Greater Israel,” taking advantage of the current weakening of Iranian power, which is spreading fear and frustration among Iran’s allies.
In my view, we are witnessing an important historical moment: a conflict between two projects, “Greater Israel” and “Greater Iran.”
Let us agree that every nation has expansionist ambitions and threatens its neighbors, the regional order, and perhaps even the world - only to dissolve sooner or later, like sandcastles on the seashore.
In this region, two historical phenomena have developed into grand projects: Iran and Israel. Contemporary Iran succeeded, for a time, in building a regional empire stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean, drawing on its Persian and Islamic imperial legacies. It has fought expansionist wars for four decades. Indeed, Iran reached the waters of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea through its presence in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen.
This military expansion compelled regional and international powers to push back, and eventually, to destroy the project before it could consolidate itself with nuclear weapons. After this counteroffensive, Iran quickly contracted and found itself confined to its Gulf waters.
The leadership in Tehran has displayed an iron resolve, challenging the world, and after regional and international actors hesitated to confront it, believed that “Greater Iran” would endure permanently. It was an ideological, historically rooted, and hostile project that inherited the territories of former British and French influence, undermining or crushing the sovereignty of the states it dominated.
Yet “Greater Iran” collapsed at the first direct challenge. Ideology had built kingdoms of proxies that shattered in the recent wars. Perhaps the late Supreme Leader might have achieved half a success or even the full success of his expansionist project if he had been supported by officials more adept at navigating the realities of modern politics. Iran’s campaigns resembled Napoleonic expansion that swept rapidly across Europe only to collapse just as quickly.
What, then, of “Greater Israel”? Like Iran, Israel has expansionist ambitions, though grounded in a different ideological framework. Also like Iran, it succeeded in establishing a highly capable state in a hostile environment through its persistence and determination. Today, the Jewish state wields immense influence, extending from Washington to Beijing. Iranians and Israelis are alike, too, in drawing on historical and religious narratives. Yet, there are key distinctions between the two: Israel has only about five million Jews, while Iran has around 90 million people; Iran, at least in theory, possesses demographic, geographic, and sectarian extensions that Israel does not.
If Israelis were to consider territorial expansion by land, they would most likely avoid venturing beyond Sinai to the south, the Canal, western Syria, or the Litani River in Lebanon. Israel appears more attuned to geopolitical risks, however, than the clerical leadership in Tehran: the gains would be limited, while the risks would be high.
Even if we accept the conspiratorial expansionist assumption, we would speak of two hypothetical Israels: the Israel of Talmudic promise and the Israel of historical narratives. As for the latter, it includes Israelis who themselves define its borders as those of today, including the West Bank and parts of southern Lebanon. Israel has spent 50 years attempting to absorb the West Bank, and it is still struggling to digest it.
Any great state requires certain fundamentals, foremost among them population density. Israel has tried to attract Jews from around the world, who are relatively few, to immigrate, but with limited success. On the global map, Israel is among the smallest countries; Tunisia is eight times larger. As a Jewish state, it has been only governed mostly by secular prime ministers. Nor is it a homogeneous nation: Palestinians - its primary concern - number more than half the Israeli population in the occupied territories and one-fifth of Israeli citizens are Palestinian. All of this makes the idea of large-scale territorial expansion unrealistic and threatens the unity of the Israeli state rather than strengthening it.
Proponents of the “Greater Israel” conspiracy rely on two highly tenuous evidence. As though they were uncovering a secret plot, they point to an article written in 1982 and an image of a cloth patch on an Israeli soldier’s shoulder. If Israel truly intended to expand up to northern Saudi Arabia, all of Jordan, half of Iraq, and all of Sinai, it would openly declare, promote, and justify such aims, preparing the world to accept them. That is how expansions are typically managed; just look at how Donald Trump has openly spoken about Greenland and Canada.
The “Greater Israel” of Benjamin Netanyahu and others does not resemble that. Rather, it refers to completing the annexation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights - territories currently under illegal occupation.
Yes, there is a “Greater Israel” project, but it is one of influence and regional dominance rather than vast territorial expansion. In recent years, Israel has become a formidable military power that few dare to challenge. Those who have tried have been crushed. Israeli researcher Daniel Levy has addressed the notion of “Greater Israel,” the idea of expansionist conflict, and his vision of the postwar landscape.
I agree with some of what he says and disagree with other claims. He argues that Israeli policy today is to eliminate the regime in Tehran, to dismantle Iran and fragment it. He presents this as a broad regional strategy. I will return to these serious and consequential propositions later.
