Sparked by Hamas's attacks on October 7, 2023, the war with Iran has been raging for over two years.
With Iran's regional proxies now significantly diminished, a fundamental question arises: what is the ultimate goal of this war?
There appears to be broad American–Israeli agreement on waging the war, but the two sides seem to have a different vision of how it should end. Israel wants to bring down the Iranian regime, while the Trump administration speaks of changing the leadership while preserving the regime's basic structure- the "Venezuelan model," so to speak- or compelling Tehran to make strategic concessions, foremost among them ending its domestic uranium enrichment.
I addressed Israel's objectives in a previous article that presented the view of Daniel Levy, who believes Israel wants to overthrow the regime and split Iran into smaller states, an outcome he argues aligns with its broader regional vision for managing large geopolitical entities.
Any serious discussion of such claims requires taking a moment to go over the foundational principle that governs relations between states, even adversaries, resting on three pillars: preserving the unity of states, respecting their borders, and refraining regime change.
The domestic complexities of Iran, like all major regional powers, renders radical change a massive regional risk. It is worth recalling that not a single shot was fired during the fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini in 1979. At the time, this was seen as a brief, peaceful transition, on the assumption that solid institutions such as the army and the civil state would remain intact. The years that followed revealed how misplaced that assumption had been: what happened in Tehran plunged the entire region into cycles of chaos and conflict.
The idea of regime change in Tehran is quietly accepted internationally to a degree, including among European countries, even as they diverge from Washington on the way it has conducted this war. Even some of Tehran's allies are uneasy with its policies. Moscow is not fully aligned with Tehran on the nuclear question and supports enrichment outside the country, while China opposes its regional conduct. Both powers, however, fear that a government friendly to Washington in Tehran or chaos could threaten their vital interests.
In theory, neighboring states might welcome the overthrow of the Iranian regime, assuming its repercussions could be contained, as happened with the fall of Saddam Hussein, after which conditions beyond Iraq's borders remained relatively stable. This analogy, however, does not hold. Iraq was controlled by some 200,000 American troops; that is obviously not an option on the table in this case. Accordingly, the risks for regional countries are considerable and could reverberate for years.
By the same token, talk of breaking Iran up and various separatist ideas being floated around may seem politically convenient and appealing to certain parties, but they carry profound risks.
Great powers taking a different approach from regional states. The United States is a superpower that is protected by geography and capable of toppling regimes and destroying states; if its project fails, it can pack up and leave. Regional countries do not have this option; they cannot escape the repercussions and consequences of crises on their doorstep.
None of this means countries should not seek to influence the domestic dynamics of Iran, which is a very different matter from pursuing direct, forcible regime-change projects.
The reason Iran finds itself targeted today is that it did not respect the rules of the regional order. It bears responsibility for what is happening to it. Tehran's hold over four Arab capitals helped drag Bashar al-Assad's regime toward its downfall, hollowed out the states of Iraq and Lebanon states, and fueled the chaos and war in Yemen. As a result of these policies, Tehran now finds itself besieged and in the most dangerous ordeal it has confronted since the founding of the republic.
Some ask: if the regime is under genuine threat, why has it adopted such a hard line in negotiations instead of folding? The answer is that it knows making concessions to foreign powers would weaken the regime domestically, expose it to divisions, and potentially lead to its collapse.
The regime has concluded that sustained "resistance" against a foreign enemy is easier than confronting domestic discontent and a potential revolution.
