Mamoun Fandy
TT

Have We Moved from Epic War to Local War?

In two important statements, US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio said that the battle of the Operation Epic Fury had ended and achieved its objectives. As for the developments that followed the ceasefire, President Donald Trump said that the Iranians “messed with us today and we crushed them." He said they “trifled” and that the whole thing is not worth dwelling on.

Does this mean America has now achieved its mission and that we have entered the day after the epic war? Or was it merely a psychological withdrawal from the scene, with the weapons and military hardware still in place and an explosion possible at any moment? And why this position, at least at the rhetorical level? Is the aim to ensure a peaceful climate for the World Cup that the United States is hosting alongside Canada and Mexico? Or does it reflect fears of a shift in American public opinion that could cost the Republicans in the Midterms and deprive them of control over both the Senate and the House?

Wars generally end either with a political settlement or the collapse of one of the parties. So what is happening exactly? What happens if the US leaves the Middle East mired in a war with no end in sight? Why is the US behaving this way? Is it the World Cup that begins in a month, the midterm elections in November, or both? Or is it simply down to President Trump's "transactional politics" and the politics of deals?

It is perhaps a mix of all these factors. Trump administrations, as we have seen over two terms, do not pursue long-term strategic foreign policy projects, preferring a series of temporary deals because they believe that long term outcomes are an accumulation of short-term phases, each of which must produce a direct and rapid return.

With this mindset, the war becomes a tool to exert pressure rather than a project for reshaping the region. Here, Trump's vision diverges from Netanyahu's. The latter wants to change the face of the Middle East. Ending the war, therefore, becomes more important than a decisive victory. Total victory requires time, money, and a long-term commitment that Washington wants to avoid at this stage and that does not align with President Trump's governing approach. Trump is the real actor in this war; or, to be fair, Trump and the market are.

This shift in rhetoric, from both the president and his secretary of state and national security adviser, show that Washington may no longer be bent on achieving a historic victory. It now seeks to avoid being bogged down in a new Middle Eastern quagmire like those of Iraq or Afghanistan. It seems to be saying: we carried out this punitive mission, and that is the end of it; managing the day after is the responsibility of the region.

The problem of the Strait of Hormuz remains. Contrary to what some believe, it actually boosts American oil and gas. Yes, closing the strait hurts the global market and the broader global economy, but its direct impact on the American treasury is decidedly positive and symbolically advantageous.

Nonetheless, the prestige of the great powers that shape the balance of power in the region and the world still matters. The problem is that the Middle East cannot tolerate a vacuum. If the major power withdraws before reaching a real political settlement, regional powers quickly find themselves managing open-ended conflicts waged through local proxies. That is precisely what makes "local war" so dangerous: it continues because the regional actors have their own reasons for perpetuating it and the major powers lack the will to bring it to an end.

Current indications suggest that this is a highly probable outcome. Israel does not appear prepared to return to the prewar status quo, Iran cannot behave as though nothing had happened, and the Gulf states could once again find themselves hostages to geography.

Here lies the real concern: the US may have ended its "great epic," but in doing so, it could leave behind a Middle East of small wars with no end in sight.