The Israeli war on Lebanon has entered its third month. The “pretext” for this war was, of course, a response to Hezbollah’s strategy of “unity of arenas,” or “unity of tracks,” which the group pursued first in the name of solidarity with Gaza, and then in solidarity with Iran after the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
That does not mean, of course, that Israel is not an enemy state, or that Lebanon is not “in a state of war with it.” The 1949 Armistice Agreement is supposed to regulate the situation between the two countries in the absence of peace.
The strategy we have referred to brought down the calm that had prevailed since 2006, except for a few incidents that were quickly contained. That calm was reinforced by a de facto understanding on the ground between the two sides of the conflict, within the framework of the role played by UNIFIL, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, whose mandate is due to end at the close of this year. This raises the question of what international force or mechanism should replace the UN peacekeeping force in the not-too-distant future.
Such a force remains more than necessary, given the current realities on the ground, as well as what is to come, amid indicators that do little to encourage optimism about a fundamental shift in the course of the conflict. Lebanon’s official position has been to uphold the diplomatic option, meaning negotiations as a realistic path out of the current situation, which will be destructive for Lebanon, both as a state and a society, if it continues as it is.
US sponsorship of the upcoming negotiations is, of course, necessary. We hope it will not remain the only sponsorship, as Washington currently insists, but will include other countries with weight and influence in the region and internationally, countries capable of providing the support, sponsorship and necessary follow-up once negotiations actually begin.
The US approach began with an attempt to impose basic principles and practical, realistic rules on the negotiations. But negotiations do not begin, as Washington tried to suggest, with a call for a trilateral American, Lebanese and Israeli summit.
Lebanon rejected that call entirely, considering that summits of this kind do not come at the beginning of negotiations in conflicts of this nature. Rather, negotiations begin by focusing on the causes of the dispute and working to find solutions and settlements for them.
Ignoring or marginalizing the various causes of the conflict, dealing with them lightly, oversimplifying them, or attempting to bypass them by speaking, as we have heard from more than one US official, about beginning with peace and addressing the causes of the conflict afterward, is like putting the cart before the horse.
This logic is far removed from realism when compared with the experiences of peacemaking between warring nations and the paths usually followed by processes of this kind. Netanyahu needs such a summit for electoral reasons. This is happening as Israel works to establish and consolidate the yellow line to create a buffer zone, or security belt.
The total destruction of a large number of villages within this strip is aimed at preventing residents from returning to them and at establishing full control over them. It is a security belt that reaches up to 12 kilometers wide along the Lebanese border. Add to this what Israel describes as retaining a form of security sovereignty over the area south of the Litani River, by keeping the right to monitor, wage war, intervene and carry out military operations in this area if it believes, even preemptively or preventively, that its security is at risk.
In short, all of this amounts to a kind of legitimization of Israel’s right to military intervention whenever it wants.
Realistic negotiations begin with the formulation of a road map based first on halting Israeli attacks, releasing prisoners, fully withdrawing from occupied Lebanese territory within a specific timetable, and reaching a comprehensive security agreement before discussing any form of political agreement.
Such an agreement should be based on the 1949 Armistice Agreement, which can be strengthened to take into account the different realities that have emerged since that agreement, which remains legally in force.
It is natural that an agreement of this kind should be based on the internationally recognized Lebanese-Israeli border, the border along which the armistice line was drawn, with some disputed points that can be settled, thereby consolidating that border.
A security agreement can be formulated on the basis of the Armistice Agreement, with US and international guarantees to end the state of war, as long as it is based on Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders.
The claim by some that settling the situation in south Lebanon falls within the framework of US-Iranian negotiations is unrealistic and unacceptable. It is true that reaching a settlement in those negotiations, if a stable and firm agreement is reached, would undoubtedly help reduce tensions in many of the region’s hot spots, most importantly Lebanon.
But that takes us back to the logic of understandings, even if the parties to them change. Such understandings last only as long as the circumstances that produced them remain in place, and they collapse when the priorities of one party shift in the game of conflict and proxy influence. Arrangements of this kind, as past experiences have taught us, remain temporary truces, whether short or long, or what some call extended truces. But they do not provide stable and lasting solutions to these conflicts.
It goes without saying that Lebanon is tired and exhausted from playing the role of mailbox and battlefield for others. The time has come for it to move from being the playing field to becoming a player. That is the only way to provide stability and settle conflicts, rather than merely manage them while waiting for them to explode again.
As for peace, Lebanon’s position is clear. After reaching the comprehensive security agreement referred to above, on the basis of the Armistice Agreement, it would be possible to enter peace negotiations based on the Arab Peace Initiative adopted at the Arab summit in Beirut in 2002.
The bottom line is that the priorities of the negotiating track cannot be chosen selectively, or in a way that runs counter to the nature, structure, features and influences of the conflict. That would be enough to lead us into a process with no prospect of completion or success. It is a game of buying time while waiting for further complications.
