It could be said, until further notice, that in the event of a resumption of the American-Israeli war with Iran, whatever form it takes, an American victory would be difficult and an Iranian victory would be impossible.
Disregarding wishful thinking and the marketing of rosy narratives, we find extensive explanations of why an American victory is difficult presented in Western commentary. Among the reasons are the improvised planning for this war and the extent of the United States’ economic and electoral pain tolerance, to say nothing of what the Iranians call “steadfastness,” which is sustained by smuggling networks and Russian and Chinese assistance, that also raises the costs of defeating Tehran. Accordingly, the distance between American-Israeli military successes and their translation into political gains is unlikely to be short, while Iran’s unyielding intransigence does not suggest the contrary.
Nonetheless, the theory that bestows victory on Iran is far more misguided than the theory that is optimistic about an easy American victory. Those making this claim insist on their view despite the catastrophic military blows that Iran has been dealt and the destruction these attacks have left, in addition to the enormous economic setbacks Iran has suffered, the difficulties it now faces in exporting oil and, consequently, obtaining hard currency to finance imports, as well as the death of its military and political top brass, along with its scientists, the obscure conditions of its Supreme Leader, and the near-confirmed reports of infighting among competing and conflicting factions of the ruling establishment.
Even if the Iranian regime were to “win”- in the sense that it manages to remain “steadfast” and survives the war, or according to the principle that America’s failure to achieve a decisive victory amounts to a crushing defeat- Iran would not be able to sustain this victory after the war.
In light of the remarkable extent to which the regime’s conditions have deteriorated, feeding ninety million people, meeting their most basic needs, and surviving predictable questions and demands for accountability by the public would become challenges that the regime will not manage to confront.
The regime’s handling of recent popular protests adds credence to the assumption that the challenges will intensify in the postwar period. Despite the closed nature of its political system, internet shutdowns, and Iran’s tendency to deny reality, its government acknowledged on January 2, through state media and statements attributed to institutions for martyrs, veterans, and others, that 3,117 people had been killed in a few days between the end of 2025 and the start of 2026. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported last April that Iran had executed 21 people and arrested more than four thousand. Reports by groups linked to the Iranian opposition, meanwhile, have spoken of between five thousand and seven thousand deaths and the detention of over 26,000.
Under these circumstances, it does not help to draw parallels between the war in Iran and the 1956 war in Egypt, when Gamal Abdel Nasser suffered military defeat but attained a political victory. At the time, both the United States and the Soviet Union firmly backed Cairo; China and Russia are not providing comparable support today, be it in terms of relative power and influence or how far they are willing to go in support of Iran. For his part, Nasser was part of a movement that had been in the ascension within the broader context of decolonization after the end of WW2, and that does not apply to Iran.
Whichever way one looks at current global conditions, with the alliances and military and political balances that ensue from them, the factors that had once allowed exhausted, occupied, divided, or near-collapsed states to emerge victorious (Vietnam in its struggle against France and later the United States, of China in its second war against Japan, and of Afghanistan in the face of the Soviet invasion) are simply not there anymore.
Moreover, the indications that Iranian victory is impossible have already begun to appear outside the country, in the wider region where victories and defeats are ultimately translated.
In Lebanon, despite all the yelling and the furious insistence on relying on Tehran to negotiate on behalf of the Lebanese, the Lebanese have proceeded with direct negotiations with Israel in the United States, breaking a longstanding taboo.
With the formation of the government led by Ali al-Zaidi, who also emphasizes the need to “restrict armament to the hands of the state,” the factions in Iraq loyal to Tehran seem to have been the biggest losers, with Nouri al-Maliki seeming to have been the biggest of the big losers after parliament withheld confidence from his “State of Law Coalition” candidates for the Interior and Education ministries. Maliki himself had previously failed to return to the premiership, and the “Coordination Framework” now seems set to fall apart after the maestro of the orchestra that had distributed “shares” within the state was weakened.
Esmail Qaani’s visit to Baghdad during the negotiations on the government formation failed to prevent these setbacks, despite that, as commander of the Quds Force, he is the successor to Qasem Soleimani whose demands were never defied.
Meanwhile, American security units arrested Mohammed Baqer al-Saadi, a commander of Kataib Hezbollah whom Washington accuses of having planned attacks against American and Jewish targets in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Through the operation, the United States effectively introduced Iraq into the hunt for such leaders- a “game” of war that Israelis have become famous for.
Some would also add the marked decline in the military activity of Yemen’s Houthis. And all of this follows the elimination of Iran’s ability to project influence from Syria with the fall of Bashar al-Assad.
How can there be victory without an imperial sphere of influence?
