How can we understand the delay and constant revisions to this document, the “Iranian-American memorandum of understanding”, that is said to have been largely completed? Political negotiations are often viewed as a compromise between demands and concessions of two opposing parties. Yet historical experience shows that reality is more complex.
The negotiating table often turns into an arena where the interests of other parties intersect, and where the issues on the table become bigger than the direct dispute that had led the parties to sit for talks in the first place. At the present moment, four interconnected issues can be observed, each affecting the others, in the attempt to reach that document: one party’s condition, namely Iran’s, that the other party exert influence over a third state or actor; the limits of the United States’ ability to impose its will on Israel; the effect of time on the Iranian negotiators amid mounting domestic pressure; and finally, the place of Iran’s regional proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen in the American calculus.
The first issue is this: political history offers many examples showing that states do not negotiate only over their direct disputes but also over their influence. A number of international agreements forced the state sitting at the table to change its own behavior, but to use its influence to change the behavior of its allies. The reason is that political power is not only assessed through a state’s military capabilities but also by its ability to influence others.
From here, the concept of influence becomes essential to any major negotiation. If a state claims to possess influence over other groups or countries, the opposing side tests that influence and turn it into practical commitments. If it becomes clear that this influence is not as robust as it had claimed, then the value of the card itself declines.
In this context, the recurring question revolves around the United States’ ability to impose its will on Israel. The answer is neither an absolute yes nor an absolute no. The US is the international power with the greatest influence over Israel. History has shown, from the Suez Crisis in 1956 to later episodes, that Washington is capable of exerting effective pressure when it believes this serves its strategic interests.
Influence does not mean complete control, however. Israel has its own institutions, as well as its domestic security and political considerations. At various stages, Israel has resisted American pressure or sought to modify it. Is Washington capable of exerting full influence? This remains an open question, one that can be answered by either yes or no.
This brings us to the second issue: time. Negotiations are not merely an exchange of documents; they are also a race in which each seeks to convince the other that time is working in its favor. For years, Iran has bet that strategic patience could improve its negotiating terms. At times it delays intentionally; at others it raises the ceiling of its demands and used its regional arms in the hope that regional or international circumstances will change.
This wager is now facing growing challenges. Economic and social indicators inside Iran do not appear reassuring. The protest movements of recent years have revealed that domestic pressures are no longer a passing event that can be ignored. Economic conditions are also imposing increasing burdens on the Iranian citizen, making Iran more sensitive to time than it was in previous stages.
As for the fourth issue, the one most closely tied to the current negotiations, it lies in the United States’ view of Iranian influence in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Washington does not appear to be concerned only with the nuclear file, the Strait of Hormuz, or the bilateral relationship with Tehran. Rather, it views the whole of Iranian influence in the region as part of any future settlement. From this perspective emerges the American belief that Iran must use its influence to reduce tensions and contain its regional allies and partners if it wishes to obtain political and economic gains from negotiation.
This view stems from an American conviction that the influence built up over decades must be matched by a degree of political responsibility. If Tehran insists that it is a major player in the region, then Washington is asking, directly or indirectly: can it translate this influence into stability? Or is its influence limited to expanding the space for disruption without bearing the consequences?
Iran, by contrast, views this regional network as one of the most important elements of its negotiating strength. Giving it up, or reducing its role, is not seen in Tehran as a technical or secondary step, but as a matter that touches Iran’s regional status and strategic position. Here lies the real dilemma: what Washington considers part of the solution, Tehran may consider part of its strength.
When these four issues are connected, a more comprehensive picture emerges. The current negotiations are not addressing only centrifuges or economic sanctions, but also influence, the ability to affect others, political will, and timing. The question facing all parties is not who holds more cards, but who can turn those cards into lasting gains before the cards themselves become a burden.
A day may come when countries discover that the hardest part of building influence is not expanding it, but bearing its cost.
