It must be acknowledged, and regrettably so, that the Land of Cedars is far from well. There is no benefit in obscuring this truth; it is better to view it calmly and realistically. It must also be acknowledged that the near-miraculous retreat of Syrian-Assadist hegemony from Lebanon in 2005, followed by the remarkable decline in the influence of the Iranian 'Axis Party' in the last two years, and the definitive downfall of the former Syrian regime, have not yet been enough to decisively settle the conflict between the Lebanese project and the regional project that the Khomeini Revolution planted in Lebanon over forty years ago.
The hope was that the Lebanese project would triumph, just as it had previously against numerous successive regional projects imposed on this land since the establishment of its first entity in 1861, as a continuation of history's own movement. But the conflict continues.
The Land of Cedars is not well for several reasons.
First, the Lebanese formula, like all political systems in the Levant, has failed to transition from a society of communities to a society of individual citizens, more than a century after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It is true that this formula was the best in its surroundings, in terms of enshrining freedoms, openness to modernity, and the significant cultural, intellectual, and lifestyle achievements and unique way of life it fostered. However, communities have not dissolved; instead, they have grown stronger and more intense, in Lebanon as in the rest of the Levant.
The second reason is that the Lebanese gamble on a system of freedoms and quality of life is situated within an oppressive security-dominated region. This gamble brought immense gains for Lebanese people, but it also made their country vulnerable to penetration from the security environment.
The catastrophe of Palestine and the establishment of Israel further complicated this situation, leaving repercussions on the Land of Cedars. Thus, Lebanon's window of freedoms became the loophole through which the Arafatist project entered, supported by the Nasserist movement to achieve the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which allowed the Fatah movement to conduct military operations from southern Lebanon.
Through that same loophole entered all the factors of the 1975 Lebanese war, with all the subsequent turmoil, collapses, migrations, occupations, liberation acts, guardianships, and raging wars that have not yet ended.
The third reason is the burdens and tribulations imposed on the Lebanese reality by the regional plan of the Khomeini Revolution, based on Wilayat al-Faqih.
Just as it did in other parts of the Arab region, under the slogan of liberating Palestine and Jerusalem, the Khomeini project entered the Lebanese entity through the door of community society, turning the sympathetic community into the base of a parallel state to the state of 'Greater Lebanon', eager to control it by all means, dividing people into first-class armed citizens and second-class ordinary citizens.
This has inflamed contradictions and animosities between Lebanese communities to the extreme. Although recent events have confirmed the absolute loyalty of the 'Axis Party' to Iran - a natural and well-known fact for forty years - the party has succeeded in dealing in various ways with most of the profoundly corrupt Lebanese political, administrative, and financial class.
It obtained political stances from them in exchange for positions and systematic seizure of state and national wealth. For decades, Lebanon was like a sinking ship, while its custodians hastened to plunder its contents mercilessly and without any moral deterrent. The 'Quadruple Alliance', the 'Mar Mikhael Agreement', the '2016 Presidential Consensus', and others are nothing but acts of cunning and manipulation to justify this quid pro quo, which pushed Lebanon into the abyss.
The fourth reason is the catastrophes, new occupation of southern territories, tragic human losses, mass displacement, and widespread destruction caused by the last two wars between the 'Axis Party' and Israel.
Then, finally, the agreement between Trump's America and Iran further deepened the ambiguity and complexity of the Lebanese issue. Israel hopes it will solidify its occupation, while the 'Axis Party' hopes to militarily and politically re-legitimize itself, albeit away from the southern borders and against the will of the state and the vast majority of Lebanese.
This fragmented picture only needed US President Donald Trump's repeated calls for Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa to intervene militarily in Lebanon to complete the labyrinth.
The fifth and final reason for the great Lebanese divide remains, where highly fanatical, ignorant, violent, and misleading voices are now rising on social media, brutally inciting Lebanese communities against each other and fueling the fire of division and discord in an unprecedented way, as if the country is on the brink of an imminent civil war.
The dangerous aspect is that these agitated voices, pushing for conflict, find no one to hold them accountable and protect people from their evil.
