Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa has introduced a different dimension to Syria's relationship with Lebanon compared to all those who preceded him in ruling Damascus. His approach to the dynamics and durability of relations between the two states and the two peoples marks a complete break with previous approaches, which, at most stages, reflected a Syrian tendency to override the very idea of Lebanon's independence.
In practice, al-Sharaa has broken with the legacy of the Syrian right in nearly all its forms, from the political bourgeoisie to the military establishment, and ultimately the ideological force represented at its height by the Socialist Baath Party.
Al-Sharaa settled the matter by defining the relationship as one between state and state. He imposed a clear distinction between the Lebanese state and its sectarian communities, between those communities and their ruling parties, and between the ruling and armed parties and their ideological nature, along with their domestic and external projects, which have become a liability at home and an obstacle in their relations with the outside world.
Here, President al-Sharaa drew a political and social distinction between the Shiite community as a religious sect and Hezbollah as a political, military, and ideological actor. In doing so, he opened the door to reconciliation with Lebanon's Shiites while keeping relations with Hezbollah within the framework of a conditional settlement—or conditional de-escalation—rather than full reconciliation.
In his interview with Tony Khalifeh on Al Mashhad, al-Sharaa defined the dividing line between settlement and reconciliation. While reconciliation carries a particular significance for the Shiite community, his call for normal relations and reconciliation with them was clear, going beyond merely ending hostility to dispelling mutual apprehensions and opening a new chapter. As for Hezbollah, his approach remained confined to settlement: regulating the relationship and avoiding an open conflict, making it closer to de-escalation than reconciliation.
The rules of settlement are clear: Damascus rejects any intervention in Lebanon. This is a political and moral precedent for which al-Sharaa deserves credit at a sensitive regional and international moment. By ruling out any Syrian intention to intervene in Lebanon or against Hezbollah, al-Sharaa recalls what Hafez al-Assad did in 1976, when he entered Lebanon on two missions: the first, an Israeli one, to crush the Palestinian resistance, and the second, an American one, to crush the Lebanese National Movement. Fifty years after Assad senior's intervention, and amid an Israeli-American war on the region, Ahmad al-Sharaa refused to do what Hafez al-Assad had done in the service of Israel and the United States, despite Syria's wounds and despite what this Axis had inflicted upon his revolution and his people.
This foundational position toward Lebanon and the Shiite community places an obligation on Hezbollah to undertake a genuine reassessment of its position and role in Syria. Acknowledging one's mistakes is a virtue.
Historically, since the independence of the two countries, Syrians have misunderstood Lebanon as both a state and a people. Conversely, the Lebanese have misjudged their relationship with Syria as a state and with its sectarian and political communities. Following the revolution, Hezbollah's intervention against it created a painful legacy that will require decades to overcome. Healing the collective memory must necessarily precede sitting down at the negotiating table in order to prevent the mistakes of the past from being repeated.
Accordingly, reconciliation does not necessarily require a settlement, just as not every settlement leads to reconciliation. A settlement may stop a war, but it does not end the crisis. Reconciliation, by contrast, seeks to erase its consequences and build a new relationship between the parties, and that requires a long-term effort.
