The Arab Gulf states face security and existential challenges that may be greater than anything they have experienced before, including the Iraq-Iran War and the occupation of Kuwait. At that time, the world was clearer and more biased, whereas today, relying solely on alliances, agreements, or war technologies is not enough.
Systematic Iranian aggressions against the six Gulf states will not end with the war; they may just be the beginning. These aggressions are currently pushing for increased armament and strengthening self-reliance, alongside the emergence of new axes.
It is likely that the war with Iran will be the last American war in the region. Since achieving oil self-sufficiency, Washington has sought to withdraw, a process started by Obama, discussed by Biden, and now pursued by Trump.
Among the consequences of this vacuum is the return of competing regional alliances and axes such as Islamabad and Ankara. If the goal is to deter Iran and achieve regional balance, are they capable of doing so? The Saudi-Pakistani agreement is bilateral, not an axis, and is based on military cooperation. Türkiye is not willing to confront Iran, as it enjoys the NATO umbrella and a military relationship with the United States, and will not let its alliance draw it into a confrontation with Tehran.
If the aggressive policy of Iran - whose orientations under the new leadership cannot yet be judged – continues, it will push Gulf states towards cooperation with Israel. Let us not forget that it was the reason for the American Fifth Fleet's first arrival in the Gulf when it targeted oil tankers. Its threats are also behind the proliferation of foreign military bases and agreements.
In the war crisis since last February, there is a complex regional conflict triangle: Iran, the Gulf, and Israel. Due to Iran's continuous aggressions against the Gulf states, they, in turn, will seek to create a new deterrence system to fill the vacuum, should the United States sign a non-aggression pact with Tehran.
We cannot judge Iran's intentions until it matches its words with actions. Will it end its 'pincer movement' that threatens the security of Gulf states in the north and south? This would require it to abandon its militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.
In this war, Iran has resorted to retaliating against Gulf states – every time it fails to confront Israel in Lebanon or fears retaliation from the United States in Gulf waters. This may push the Gulf states to form alliances, even with the devil.
Iranian aggressions have contributed to rapprochement and reduced disagreements among Gulf group members, but they have not ended them. With the growing Iranian threat, which may intensify further after the war, they will find themselves forced to rebuild their front to repel the Iranian danger.
What is the motivation for this skeptical and cautious thinking? Do Gulf states fear that Iranians and Americans will reach an agreement at their expense? It is unlikely that negotiations would contain anything Washington could concede against them. More likely, Iranian negotiators will seek to reassure the Gulf that they are not targeting them at the end of the war. With the new reality, Iran will try to compensate for its significant regional losses, perhaps by adopting a compensatory policy for Lebanon and Syria.
We see this compensatory positioning in Tehran's insistence on extending its control over the Strait of Hormuz to threaten its adversaries, and in holding Gulf states hostage in every crisis with the United States and Israel. This appears to be an attempt to strengthen its leverage after also losing Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon. These areas were previously used as a means to assert its geopolitical balance. Here, its control over the Strait and the endangerment of Gulf states' security will represent a major threat, forcing the western Gulf to create another reality to confront it.
We can anticipate a 'peace' agreement with the United States, most likely based on an exchange of commitments. Washington's primary demand is for Iran to end its nuclear program, while Tehran, in turn, stipulates an American commitment not to attack it. This is the same condition with Israel, which will not accept anything less than the dismantling of Hezbollah to end the Iranian encirclement.
We cannot rule out that negotiators will agree on Iran committing not to repeat its aggression against Gulf states, but this will not prevent Iran from continuing to be a source of indirect geopolitical threat to the Gulf, retaining the weapons of the Strait and proxies.
There will be no way to compel Tehran to fulfill its commitments other than through counter-force, which will require Gulf states to move to a new phase of reconciliation and cooperation. The Council states collectively possess geographical depth, regional military agreements, and financial power, which together total more than four trillion dollars.
