Someone asked: Why do the Saudis not resolve the situation in Yemen and put an end to the Houthi group? The truth is that, after many years of following developments in Yemen, I can say that the Houthi question is a “rabbit hole.” Whenever you think you have found the truth, you discover an additional layer of tribal, regional, and political relationships and alliances.
The initial conclusion may seem simple, but it is realistic: the Houthis are a fleeting phenomenon. They are a small, armed, tribal, ideological, and extremist group. All comparable historical cases suggest that it will not endure in the end. The Houthis make up less than seven percent of Yemen’s population; yet they have succeeded in weaving broad local alliances. Those alliances have been the group’s weakness just as they have been its strength.
Yemen’s Houthis, Ansar Allah, cannot be compared to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which is larger in number and as a share of the population and which is based in its Shiite stronghold in Lebanon, not far from it as the Houthis do in Sanaa. The Houthis are a minority that infiltrated Sanaa from Saada, exploiting the unrest of the Arab Spring to occupy the city by force of arms and alliances, and seeking to revive Imamate rule. The Houthis are not Hezbollah, a group with a political future because of its substantial base.
There is also the “Houthis a thorn.” This thorn threatens not only Saudi Arabia’s stability, but even more so, Yemen’s. The small Houthi movement has managed to make itself into a player that poses a threat comparable to Iran’s. It took the lead in threatening international trade in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, as well as undermining trade in the Red Sea more broadly. The Houthis also tried to play a role that crosses borders and waters into East Africa, but they remain a small faction that becomes increasingly fragile the larger it grows and the more it expands its belligerent activities.
In geopolitical terms, the Houthis may resemble Cuba in relation to the United States. A small dot in America’s neighborhood, the communist island remained a thorn in Washington’s side for decades because of its ties to Moscow. Now Castro’s Cuba has entered its final chapter and will soon return to the American embrace.
As for how this ant lived and survived beside the American elephant, this was part of the arrangements around the Cold War. The United States decided to invade the Cuban island, Moscow’s ally. Although it tried once and failed, the Soviets became convinced that the Americans would not stop. Khrushchev offered to withdraw the missiles in exchange for Kennedy’s pledge not to invade the island, which would not become a source of threat, and for the US to remove its missiles from Türkiye, the American front line against Moscow. Both sides agreed, and Cuba remained a non-hostile communist state, while Türkiye remained a Western ally that did not threaten Moscow.
The Houthis and Hezbollah are both proxies of Iran, which uses them to impose its influence over the countries of the region, under the cover of familiar propaganda slogans. We do not yet know how Tehran will reshape its regional strategy after its ongoing war with the United States and Israel. If the question of proxies is not resolved through negotiation, these crisis-ridden territories will likely witness further rounds of conflict.
On the other hand, Yemenis are capable of keeping the Houthis busy, exhausting them, and ultimately defeating their project. At present, the group controls only one-third of the territory it had held at the height of its expansion. Its airport is closed, its ports are under blockade, and its leadership is hiding underground.
From Iran’s perspective, the Houthis are also a proxy of lower strategic value than Iraq’s militias and Hezbollah, and they would be the cheapest card on the table if Tehran decided to bargain in regional deals. That is why I see them as a fleeting phenomenon.
The challenge is that the Houthis are not known for political flexibility - unlike Hezbollah, which has previously signed agreements with Israel and responded to calls from its Lebanese rivals during past crises.
The question remains: Do Ansar Allah have a way out of this hole, which was once a palace and has now become a prison? The political solution remains: power-sharing is still on the table and could save them from annihilation. The Houthis remain a social component of Yemen; they have the right to be partners in government, not to dominate it. Participation has been offered to them several times, but they remain arrogant and continue to refuse these offers, out of a thirst for absolute power that could cost them everything.
