Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a writer who approaches Gulf affairs with balance and clear judgment. Writing about this issue differs from writing about almost any other as relations among the Gulf states are governed not by slogans, but by precise calculations that combine politics with the bonds of history, geography, and shared destiny. Anyone who goes against this wisdom leaves resentment among large numbers of citizens.
For this reason, many sensitive issues are best discussed behind closed doors. The present moment, however, calls for a greater measure of responsible public debate that helps draw the broad outlines of the future.
Al-Rashed's article, published here on July 2, under the title "The Need to Restore the Gulf Front," therefore deserves to be discussed and reflected upon. It broadens the perspective so that it does not remain a mere "shot in the dark." A hallmark of mature intellectual societies is that writers engage one another’s ideas rather than personal attacks, with each building upon what others have put forward. This tradition remains limited in the Gulf because of our cultural inheritance, despite the urgent need for an accumulated body of thought that can help decision-makers on the one hand, and public opinion on the other, understand the great shifts taking place around us and the visions the Gulf citizen seeks in order to ward off danger.
The Gulf of today is not the Gulf of the 1960s, when Britain held the keys to its security, nor the Gulf of the 1990s, which relied on the American security umbrella through the liberation of Kuwait from occupation. Nor is it a society sustained by pearls and fishing, isolated from the clamor and crises of the wider world. Today, it is a global energy, finance, investment, and logistics hub. A significant share of global trade passes through its waters; it possesses highly advanced media institutions and generations of educated citizens... It has therefore become part of both international and regional calculations.
This position has made the Gulf a target for competing projects of influence. Foremost among them, though by no means the only one, Iran's appetite for domination. Iran does not see the Gulf merely as its neighborhood, but as "the potential spoils": an arena that could give it greater political and economic weight. The Strait of Hormuz, proxy forces, and indirect pressure have remained recurring instruments in its designs on the Gulf, even when the faces change or when Tehran enters negotiations with the major powers. This revives the old notion of Iran as "the policeman of the Gulf."
At the same time, American policy is changing. The United States is not withdrawing from the region altogether, but, as its published documents make clear, it is no longer willing to shoulder the same burdens it carried over previous decades. This does not mean the end of the alliance. It means that the ally now expects its partners to develop a greater capacity to protect their own interests and to assume a collective responsibility.
This is where the self-reliance advocated by Al-Rashed, which broadly reflects the considered view of the Gulf's informed elites, becomes a strategic necessity rather than a political slogan. That does not entail doing away with alliances. It means building strength that makes those alliances more balanced and effective. International relations are governed by interests, and interests are better served by capable actors - more than those who are more or less dependent on others.
The Gulf has genuine assets: a large economy, institutional stability, accumulated experience, a broad network of relationships, and a cooperation council that has proved to be one of the most successful institutions of joint Arab action. This phase, however, demands a shift from coordination to integration in defense, cybersecurity, military industries, the security of maritime corridors, scientific research, and information sharing.
"Security" is no longer an exclusively military concept. It now encompasses technology, food security, energy, education, the capacity to produce knowledge, and coordination in foreign policy on matters that affect the group as a whole. States that invest in their people and institutions are best placed to withstand major international shifts of the kind we are experiencing today.
Successive crises have shown that differences among the Gulf states recede whenever outside threats grow. It may therefore be better to turn this awareness into permanent institutional policy rather than a fleeting reaction to crises; collective action costs less than managing risks individually.
Perhaps the clearest indication of unease over greater Gulf coordination is the reaction of the Iranian regime itself. In 2017, when the Gulf Cooperation Council tasked one of the member states' foreign ministers with conveying a unified Gulf position to Iran, the Iranian side refused to engage with the bloc collectively and preferred bilateral dealings. This has happened on several occasions.
Al-Rashed is right when he writes: "We face security and existential challenges greater than anything we have experienced before," and that "the Iranian threats will not end when the war ends." He concludes: "There will be no way to compel Tehran to fulfill its commitments other than through counter-force.”
Al-Rashed has dotted the i's and crossed the t's. That is why, when I shared this important article on my account on X, I described it as essential reading. I continue to believe that it outlined the threats we face. What remains is for this issue to become the subject of sustained discussion among those concerned, in the hope that the combined weight of their views may produce practical action on the ground.
A final word: This is a historic opportunity for the Gulf states to move from managing crises to shaping the future.
