Sudanese people never tire of debating politics, nor do they stop doing so. This may well be one of the afflictions of political life - if not one of its curses. The constant debate over every issue and every detail has made politics an exhausting endeavor in Sudan, complicating consensus-building to the point where wrangling has become a defining feature of political work and an obstacle to dialogue and stability.
It was therefore unsurprising to see the intense controversy surrounding the leaks related to the American proposal to end the war, the government's response to it, and the web of conflicting narratives about a meeting in Cairo between US envoy Massad Boulos and Sovereign Council member Lieutenant General Shams al-Din Kabbashi. Even after the United States denied reports that most elements of the plan had been accepted or that disagreements were limited to one or two points, the rumor continued producing new versions of events.
The government's silence undoubtedly created fertile ground for speculation. Transparency is necessary, even when the nature of negotiations requires a degree of confidentiality regarding details. Had the state simply announced that it had received the American proposals and was studying them, it could have curtailed much of the speculation.
In truth, what has been leaked about the initiative has nothing new in its broad headlines.
Most of the provisions have been previously proposed, and the American envoy himself has discussed them in media interviews. If there is anything new, it lies in certain details or in aspects of the responses to the proposals—matters that none of the parties has officially disclosed.
The central pillar of the American plan is a 90-day humanitarian ceasefire. Under this framework are proposals for mutual military withdrawals to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, protect civilians and infrastructure, and establish mechanisms for monitoring and ensuring implementation. The plan envisions using the ceasefire’s timeframe to pave the way for negotiations on a permanent ceasefire, followed by a political process and national dialogue, leading to the formation of a civilian government to oversee the transition and prepare for elections.
It is clear that the dispute does not concern the duration of the ceasefire or its broad objectives, but rather what would take place during it, specifically the arrangements for withdrawals, redeployments, and control of territory. As Massad Boulos has explained on several occasions, the American proposal calls for implementing the ceasefire first and then discussing withdrawal and redeployment arrangements during the truce. The Sudanese position, however, as articulated by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and reflected in the government's peace plan, insists that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) must first withdraw from all cities and locations they occupied after the Jeddah Platform of May 2023. These forces would then be concentrated in designated areas to prevent the ceasefire from becoming an opportunity for them to consolidate their positions, receive new supplies, and reorganize their ranks.
For its part, the RSF, while accepting most elements of the plan, appears determined to reject any withdrawal from its current positions, viewing its presence on the ground as the key guarantee of a role in any future arrangements.
How does the American plan differ from the Quad initiative?
Although US efforts have dominated the spotlight, the proposed plan appears more an extension of the Quad's initiative than a separate undertaking. The United States led the drafting of the proposal and conducted direct negotiations with the Sudanese parties, but it has continued to coordinate closely with the other members of the Quad. As a result, the general principles have remained the same, while US efforts have focused on refining the details and attempting to bridge differences.
What are the chances of success?
Four scenarios can be envisioned.
The first scenario is that developments emerge which make the current plan acceptable as it stands. This appears highly unlikely given the complexities surrounding military withdrawals, as well as the more sensitive issue of the RSF’s future and whether any role for the group could be accepted.
The second scenario involves introducing amendments that would make the plan acceptable to all sides. However, this seems akin to squaring the circle in light of the wide gap between the parties regarding military arrangements.
The third scenario is the adoption of a gradual approach, beginning with a limited ceasefire in certain conflict hotspots, such as the city of El Obeid, while opening safe corridors for humanitarian aid and implementing confidence-building measures. This scenario may be plausible given growing humanitarian and international pressure. However, it would not achieve the breakthrough Washington hopes for, and the continuation of military operations would remain a factor undermining its prospects for success.
The fourth scenario is the failure of the initiative, as happened with previous efforts. In that case, the question becomes whether the US administration possesses the desire and determination to continue mediation efforts and search for new formulas, or whether its attention will shift to other international crises and the approaching US midterm congressional elections, pushing the Sudan file lower down the list of priorities.
In any event, the future of the initiative will not be determined solely by developments in Washington. It will also depend on events on the battlefield, where military developments could reshape the balance of power and impose entirely different equations.
