Lebanon marked Army Day on August 1. On this day in 1945, France - the mandatory power over Syria and Lebanon since 1920 - handed the military units under its control in the Levant to the national government of independent Lebanon. Yet, the occasion falls this year under abnormal circumstances. One might object that independent Lebanon has rarely known "normal circumstances," which is true, but the present moment is exceptional in every respect.
To begin with, a significant part of Lebanon is under Israeli occupation. Although the Lebanese hope for positive results from the American mediation sponsoring the first formal direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel since the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, recent developments give no grounds for optimism rooted in logic or reality.
The negotiations are unfolding against the backdrop of an invasion and occupation that have caused and go on causing the displacement of residents, the demolition of homes, and the destruction of infrastructure. At the same time, every official Israeli statement and threat signals neither the desire nor the intention to withdraw from the occupied territories. It would be naïve to think Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is prepared to make any withdrawal while the countdown to the next Israeli elections is underway.
When we weigh the scale of the displacement tragedy, we should recall that more than 4,000 Lebanese have been killed and 1.6 million people uprooted or displaced within a short span - nearly one-fifth of the country's population.
According to reports, the displaced, including some 370,000 children, face difficult conditions amid a persistent economic crisis and severe overcrowding in collective shelters. More than 136,000 displaced people, some 35,000 families, are housed in 375 shelters, while roughly 85 percent are staying with relatives or host families, or lodging temporarily in homes or tents.
To return to the general atmosphere around the "negotiating" process - assuming it can be called that, just as a prudent observer might ask whether Washington's role here truly amounts to mediation or sponsorship - the Lebanese authorities are focused on two things:
First, an Israeli commitment to a permanent ceasefire.
Second, a complete Israeli withdrawal that would let the displaced return to their cities and villages.
This Lebanese position is not merely humanitarian; it is also political, seeking to protect the domestic front against sectarian strife. Such strife, which deliberate displacement helps to inflame, is well-known as a long-standing and renewed Israeli strategic aim, and it is no longer confined to Lebanon: its traces are visible today in Syria and Iraq as well.
The Israeli negotiator, by contrast, argues - with Washington's backing - that the occupation cannot end before Hezbollah is disarmed and its infrastructure wholly destroyed, as a guarantee of security for northern Israel. Here, the visions of Israel and the US converge on the war the two are now waging against Iran. There is no doubt that the Israeli leadership's determination to escalate across the region is reinforced by its belief that Iran's retreat is an important factor tipping the balance in its favor in the contest for regional influence against any rival power, whether it is Iran, Türkiye, or any Arab state.
Israel has indeed exploited the Gaza war, and then developments in the West Bank, to eliminate Hamas's presence. It has taken an increasingly hard line in Lebanon after degrading Hezbollah's capabilities and killing its most prominent leaders. More than that, it has become clear that Tel Aviv's ties to parts of the "Lebanese lobby" in Washington have grown strong enough to surface publicly, as figures associated with it attempt to impose its conditions on Lebanon's political and military institutions.
Here we recall clearly how late Senator Lindsey Graham, one of Israel's most prominent friends in the US Senate, was displeased by his meeting last February with Lebanese Army Commander Rodolphe Haykal. Determined to preserve the unity of the military institution, he refused to thrust the army into direct confrontation with Hezbollah.
In any event, this year's Army Day is not an entirely happy occasion. Falling as it does in a decisive election year for the two hardline right-wing leaderships in Israel and the United States, it seems to me highly unlikely that either will move toward moderation or accommodation.
What Israel's political and military leaders openly declare is perfectly clear: there will be neither a comprehensive withdrawal nor a genuine truce. Israel's current government, together with its hardline military command, believes it now holds a historic opportunity to create a new reality on the ground. It aims to move from imposing complete control over Palestine and effective control over Lebanon and Syria, and, of course, eliminating the "Iranian threat", to focusing on other targets, such as Türkiye and Egypt, in Netanyahu's own words.
As for Washington, though domestic concerns dominate the attention of American citizens, its current regional war with Iran is likely to widen the scope of regional confrontation. This has already begun to show, as the Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz, is no longer the sole focus. What Washington once regarded as "Tehran's arms" in the Middle East have, one way or another, whether by choice or against their will, become part of a confrontation expanding in both space and time, driven by a political program whose principal elements Washington does not control alone.
In my view, and I may be mistaken, a war on Sunni political Islam, such as Netanyahu desires following the destruction of Shiite political Islam, is not necessarily at the top of Washington's priorities.
