The Houthis have long played, and continue to play, the role of a war proxy and Iran’s arm in the region. What has occurred recently is essentially the implementation of a military strategy known since the time of Sun Tzu as stretching the edges. This time, however, the objective is to relieve pressure on the center rather than to exert pressure against it.
What happened in Yemen a few days ago can be viewed, without exaggeration or understatement, as a geostrategic shift in the security equation of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, one that could extend to the Mediterranean and inevitably to international waters across the oceans.
At the heart of this latest development is an attempt to shape conditions that would make the Bab al-Mandab Strait a waterway subject to the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” allowing the Houthis to consolidate their control over it. Such a scenario would be unacceptable to regional and global security and economic interests.
The Houthis' approach runs counter to international law and international maritime navigation, whose key principles include the “transit passage regime,” which guarantees the continuous and expeditious passage of ships and aircraft through straits used for international navigation without obstruction.
In their assessment of what they describe as the most dangerous phase of the Yemeni conflict, experts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in Washington argue that Houthi control of Perim Island, located at the heart of Bab al-Mandab, coupled with their expansion along Yemen’s western coast, elevates the threat to a new level.
It brings the Houthis much closer to international shipping lanes than their previous positions in Hodeidah, enabling them to employ a broader range of weapons against vessels, including artillery, tactical drones, and explosive-laden unmanned boats, in addition to the methods of intercepting and attacking ships already used during the 2023-2025 campaign.
The central question in this context is: What are the Houthis planning at the present moment, undoubtedly under directives from Iran?
The answer lies in recognizing that the idea of abruptly disrupting international navigation in the Red Sea may remain unlikely, at least for the time being. More important to them now is preparing the operational theater for future scenarios, depending on the ebb and flow of tensions between Washington and Tehran.
It can therefore be argued that the Houthis are in the process of developing scenarios for the future, foremost among them:
Conditional Passage: The Houthis may refrain from a complete closure of the strait, but they could impose conditions and establish a new security equation, effectively deciding who may pass and who may not. The objective is clear: to inflict maximum damage on the energy market as winter approaches.
A Negotiating Card: In this scenario, the waterway becomes one of Iran’s instruments of leverage in any future US-Iran negotiations. The logic is captured in British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s famous observation that you can negotiate only as far as your artillery can reach.
What is certain is that the latest development grants Iran greater influence and leverage in Bab al-Mandab, in addition to its existing position regarding the Strait of Hormuz. This effectively places global energy trade at the mercy of the mullahs’ ambitions and reveals the depth of their strategic vision for the region, not merely their tactical calculations.
Today, Iran needs only a local armed actor, driven by ideology and equipped with missiles, drones, and boats capable of threatening maritime navigation, to transform the Houthis from merely an Iran-backed militia into a force that enables Tehran to expand its influence in the Bab al-Mandab corridor alongside its presence at Hormuz.
Should this distorted and unhealthy situation be allowed to persist?
Clearly, it cannot continue in this manner. International waterways are not bargaining chips. They are the lifelines of humanity.
For this reason, it remains imperative that the UN Security Council act to guarantee freedom of international navigation and then develop a UN-backed initiative to unify the ranks of the Yemeni armed forces internally. Equally urgent is preventing the Houthis from turning Yemen’s western coast into a permanent zone of Iranian influence.
What is needed, and needed quickly, is the establishment of a military deterrence framework in Bab al-Mandab, not for the purpose of fully controlling the strait or expanding the scope of war, but rather to ensure that any attempt to close it or extort passing vessels becomes a burden whose costs and consequences are beyond the Houthis and their backers to bear.
