Operation Dawn of Yemen, launched last week by Yemeni government forces with air support from the Saudi-led coalition, aims to recover the institutions of the state and end Houthi control of Sanaa. It raises a question that goes beyond military confrontation to the capacity of international and Arab parties to build a common position toward the threat posed by the group and by Iran behind it. The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and on navigation through Bab al-Mandab reveal a predicament that reaches the whole world: an armed insurgent group, tied to the Revolutionary Guard, is able to press on the security of its neighborhood and on wide commercial interests, while the approaches to confronting it diverge. Between those who give priority to direct deterrence, those who wager on mediation, and those who seek to insulate their own interests, the question arises of how to prevent these divergences from becoming a gateway to expanding Iranian influence. The problem has as much to do with the dispersion in identifying the source of the threat and the terms for dealing with it as with the instruments of protection.
Dispersion does not mean the absence of action, just as joint work does not presuppose identical interests among states. Geography, capabilities, and foreign relations make the cost of confrontation different in each case, and explain the variety of options. But each state's particular position should not prevent agreement on a basic political rule: no armed group has the right to use the Yemeni coast to threaten its neighbors or to impose conditions on navigation. The means of applying that rule may be disputed, without any indulgence toward the rule itself, and without treating the Houthis' capacity to do harm as a source of legitimate authority.
The group benefits from the divergence of approaches when it deals with states one at a time, or grants some of them a de-escalation while maintaining pressure on others. Not every separate understanding is harmful; it may reduce escalation and open a path to a wider settlement. But its value is tested by its effect on common security and by how far it prevents the threat from being transferred to the neighbors. If protecting national interests becomes the sole aim, the incentives for cooperation may recede, and the Houthis' ability to control the rhythm of escalation will remain intact, allowing them to widen their influence and exploit the differences.
Saudi Arabia occupies a pivotal position in overcoming this predicament, and it faces direct Houthi attacks on its security and its facilities. Its political and economic weight and its Arab and international relations allow it to push toward a consensus linking the protection of navigation to the security of states and to Yemeni sovereignty. But the success of that role requires turning the confrontation with the threat from a burden the Kingdom bears into a shared responsibility. Targeting Saudi Arabia also touches the stability of energy, investment, and trade, and cannot be reduced to a confrontation that concerns it alone.
This calls for a Saudi initiative for consultation on defined objectives- which may already have begun- met by an Arab response that takes part in shaping the priorities and sharing the responsibilities. Joint work does not require everyone to engage in military operations; it requires a distribution of roles linking mediation to diplomatic pressure, protection, and support for Yemeni institutions. States that maintain channels of communication with the Houthis or with Iran can put them to use in the service of agreed objectives. But if those channels turn into arrangements separate from the interests of the partners, the multiplicity of roles becomes a factor weakening the Arab position rather than strengthening it.
Here the importance of defining the relationship with Iran stands out. Diplomatic openness and the reduction of tension do not preclude demanding that it halt the military and financial support used in the attacks carried out by groups tied to it, nor do they justify separating bilateral relations with Tehran from the effects of its regional policies. What is required is a position that makes respect for the security of states an element in assessing the relationship with Tehran, because Arab cooperation cannot hold if one state bears the consequences of the threat alone.
Disruption to navigation makes the region's development resources and economies hostage to the decisions of an armed group, which calls for cooperation to protect the sea lanes that goes beyond commercial and investment competition, since alternative ports and overland corridors are not enough to remove the threat or to guarantee their own security. Nor is the security of the waterways separable from Yemen's future. Supporting the Yemeni state and reaching a political settlement that preserves the rights of its citizens strengthen its sovereignty and limit the use of its territory in the service of outside conflicts and interests. This does not mean holding Yemenis responsible for the Houthis' choices, or reducing their country's settlement to the security of its neighbors. It means refusing to grant the group a monopoly over military decision-making, and tying stability to a legitimate authority and to institutions capable of protecting the population, the coast, and the ports.
What is required is not the abolition or erasure of particular positions, but preventing them from turning into a contradiction that undermines everyone's security. Saudi Arabia is able to lead this course, but its effectiveness depends on its partners' readiness to turn interdependent interests into mutual commitments, and on international partnerships, American above all, that support Arab priorities and strengthen the capacity to protect navigation. When the instruments of protection, mediation, and pressure are integrated within a strategic vision and a clear political position, armed groups' ability to exploit differences recedes. If the confrontation remains divided among separate responses, these groups can exploit the absence of a compass to impose their terms on the region's security and on the interests of its states- indeed on the states of the world as a whole.
