Amr el-Shobaki
TT

Regional Alliances Confronting the Iranian Narrative

Tehran has often stated that it wants the Middle East to be free of any military presence by major powers, particularly the United States, and has called on Washington not to interfere in the region’s affairs, arguing that Middle Eastern countries are better able to resolve their own problems.

Paradoxically, the countries of the region have put this vision into practice without Iran. They have relied, first, on their own capabilities for protection and, second, on the umbrella of a regional alliance, as Saudi Arabia did through the Makkah Agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan.

The agreement laid the foundation for an emerging regional alliance capable of playing a key role in deterring Houthi attacks, which have made no distinction between people and infrastructure.

The Makkah Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan on August 7, included several provisions, most notably “collective defense and joint deterrence.” It stipulated that an attack on any one of the three countries would be considered an attack on all three. In principle, this is what makes the agreement similar to the concept underpinning Article 5 of NATO.

The agreement was further strengthened at a meeting in Istanbul on August 31, with the establishment of a general secretariat to institutionalize cooperation among the three countries. More recently, two meetings were held in Riyadh, the first on September 26 and the second on October 5, following an escalation in Houthi attacks that culminated in the targeting of civilian airports inside the Kingdom.

Despite declarations by the United States and countries around the world expressing support for Saudi Arabia and confidence in its ability to defend itself, US military intervention against the Houthis has been governed by American priorities.

The United States had previously carried out heavy strikes against Houthi positions in Sanaa and elsewhere based on US-Israeli calculations rather than those of the countries of the region. This made a regional agreement among the three countries almost inevitable, particularly as their deterrent capabilities became apparent amid the new challenges created by the situation in Yemen.

The strength of this regional agreement lies, first, in the capabilities of the three countries and the diversity of their sources of power, which make them appear complementary.
Saudi Arabia possesses considerable financial strength alongside its military capabilities. It also wields influence in the Arab world and the Gulf and carries profound symbolic and religious significance across the Islamic world.

Türkiye, meanwhile, is a major military power with an advanced defense industry. It has developed a presence and influence across virtually every major regional issue, from Libya to Sudan and from Syria to Gaza. Its armed forces are NATO’s second largest in terms of personnel after those of the United States. Many see Türkiye as a defensive bulwark, or deterrent force, vis-à-vis Israel and Iran, compelling both to calculate carefully before expanding their attacks against countries in the region.

Pakistan, despite its economic difficulties and the financial assistance it has received from Saudi Arabia on more than one occasion, has succeeded in building formidable military and nuclear capabilities, which demonstrated their effectiveness in its most recent confrontation with India. Pakistan has also played a key role in mediating between the United States and Iran and has kept its channels of communication with Tehran open to this day.

The second, and perhaps more important, dimension is that the Makkah Agreement, or the broader model of regional alliances, is not merely a military defense arrangement. It also sends a message that the countries of the region can agree on an alliance outside the framework of the great powers and independently of Iran, even if all three countries are allies of the United States.

Their calculations regarding the defense of their national security differ from those of Washington, whose decisions on whether to reach agreements with Iran or wage war against it are governed by its own considerations.

The Iranian narrative, which has long advocated a system of joint regional defense, has thus found itself confronted by a rival regional alliance that exists outside its own narrative and stands against its proxies. Yet this alliance consists of countries that do not seek Iran’s destruction.

At no stage, even at the height of Iranian hostility, have they said that they wanted to destroy Iran or would participate in an attack against it. Rather, they have sought, and continue to seek, to see Iran become a normal state without regional proxies that it uses to attack other countries.

It is therefore important to view the Makkah Agreement not merely as a military defense pact, but as a voluntary choice by some of the region’s most prominent states to ally with one another and put into practice the principle that “the countries of the region are better able to solve their own problems.”