The Houthi crisis and the threat to navigation through the Bab al-Mandab, alongside turmoil in the Strait of Hormuz and escalating protests in France, Italy, and other European countries, reveal a dysfunction that extends beyond the regional boundaries of each individual crisis.
What we are witnessing is an interaction between the decline of international order once maintained by the major powers, particularly the United States, and by international institutions despite their weaknesses; the rise of troubled states pursuing cross-border agendas through networks of militias and extremist organizations; and the erosion of governments’ ability to absorb the social costs of instability.
This can be described as the “globalization of chaos.” This phenomenon is also fueled by a sense of nihilism among segments of younger generations, driven by the intersection of personal and societal concerns with the overwhelming flow of content related to public affairs.
The theory of “interdependence” helps explain this transformation. Globalization has tied the stability of states to networks of trade, energy, and finance, while expanding the range of shared interests that make cooperation a necessity.
Yet interdependence does not automatically produce stability. It can become a source of pressure when a rogue state or an armed militia gains the ability to threaten a strategic chokepoint in the global economy. Here, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab provide a test of the international system’s ability to protect common interests from military and political coercion, and from the resulting price increases, disruption of the flow of goods, and uncertainty.
A comparison between the two waterways reveals different actors but a common impact. Iran exerts pressure from its position as a troubled state, while the terrorist Houthi militia does so as a group that has seized Yemen, its institutions, and its resources. Simultaneous disruption in both waterways reduces alternatives and multiplies the risks, making the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf a matter directly linked to the global economy, something that piecemeal approaches to the crisis often overlook.
These waterways were once protected within a framework that could be described as “hegemonic stability,” which links the orderly functioning of the international economy to the presence of a major power willing to bear the cost of protecting public goods, foremost among them freedom of navigation and the stability of alliances.
The theory does not imply that such an international order is necessarily just, but it does explain the need for a guarantor possessing both the capacity and the will to uphold it. In my view, the current crisis is connected to a widening gap between the US possession of the instruments of power and its declining willingness to provide the kind of stable commitment on which its allies can base their policies.
This helps explain American hesitation and withdrawal from the Middle East. This does not necessarily mean reducing the US military presence. Rather, it means relinquishing the role of guarantor that links the use of force to rules, negotiated settlements, and enduring commitments. What we have seen instead are temporary military interventions whose consequences have subsequently been treated as matters for the affected countries themselves to deal with.
These shifts did not begin with Trump. They were preceded by considerable selectivity in the application of international law, with Gaza being perhaps the clearest example. The same applies to wars that shattered states, including the Iraq War, and to contradictory approaches such as those adopted toward Iran, which helped entrench the power of armed organizations and militias.
Yet an approach based on the personalization of international relations deepens the crisis of credibility surrounding political commitments, prompting states to hedge against uncertainty, weakening collective action, and widening the opportunities available to powers seeking to test the limits of the international order.
What is happening in France and Italy is not disconnected from the turmoil in the Middle East. External pressures exacerbate domestic imbalances. The protests have their own underlying causes related to the cost of living, public services, education, and housing, but the international context has compounded the crisis and suggests that it could worsen.
The joint French-Italian statement acknowledged the connection between the energy crisis and developments in the Middle East, while the protests reflected an accumulation of diverse social grievances and failures in numerous areas, including migration.
Another major problem is the increasingly narrow room for maneuver available to European governments as they contend with rising public demands, limited resources, and the need for substantial security spending amid the war in Ukraine. This is where populist forces and opportunistic political parties step in, presenting national isolation as the solution to crises governments have failed to address.
The difference, of course, is substantial. European institutions possess mechanisms for accountability, transfers of power, and policy correction. Failed states, or states held hostage by militias, remain trapped in a permanent crisis because national loyalty is replaced by ideological allegiance.
In the Houthi case, disruption itself becomes a source of power. Having failed to offer a viable model of governance, the militia asserts its presence through domination at home, disruption of vital interests abroad, and subservience to the axis of destabilization led by Tehran.
Confronting the globalization of chaos requires supporting moderate states and their vision for protecting stability and restoring the authority of the state. Foremost among them is Saudi Arabia, which today stands at the forefront of efforts to resolve the crisis confronting the region and the wider world through Yemen. The Kingdom has taken upon itself the task of restoring Yemen’s legitimate government and its captured state, curbing the militia’s ability to blackmail everyone, and protecting international waterways from being held hostage to the Iranian project.
In short, we face today two camps, with no third alternative: the camp of militias and the camp of the state. Every hesitation in supporting the state gives militias another opportunity to consolidate their power and expand the threats they pose, making the eventual cost of confronting them still greater for everyone.
