The Geneva Negotiations for a Ceasefire in Sudan are Faltering for These Reasons

The American approach to managing the Geneva negotiations regarding the Sudanese war is bound to fail; every indication and recent development points in that direction. Success in negotiations requires adequate preparation, as well as effective communication with the parties that allows for understanding their positions and helps in overcoming the clear obstacles that could prevent the concerned parties from taking part. However, Washington, for reasons only it knows, the result of miscalculation, or an excessive belief in the capacity of pressure and arm bending to deliver the results it seeks, decided to proceed with the talks in Geneva on schedule despite the obvious obstacles.
The United State may have defined its objectives and vision for the negotiations, but it has not given enough thought to the complexities of the situation, nor was it sufficiently communicative with the Sudanese government and its military leadership. The US did not discuss how to address the reservations and demands the government is insisting on and has emphasized in every statement about potentially resuming negotiations in Jeddah.
Washington relied primarily on phone call diplomacy in communications with Sovereignty Council Chairman and Army Commander of the Army General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, citing "security reasons" for not sending its envoy to Port Sudan to meet with Sudanese officials- a weak excuse at best.
Special Envoy Tom Perriello’s only meeting with a Sudanese government delegation, in Jeddah, was certainly not enough to overcome the obstacles to a resumption of the negotiations and guarantee the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration (issued in May 2023), a key demand of the Sudanese government. They also want any new negotiations to be an extension of the Jeddah talks rather than going back to square one. They also want the same parties that took part in the last round to take part this time, with no additions.
Since it was decided that the negotiations would be moved from Jeddah to Geneva, it has been clear that Washington wants to take the lead and frame the negotiations in line with its vision. It has gone so far as to impose the participants despite being fully aware of the Sudanese government's strong reservations about bringing new parties to the table.
The Sudanese government explicitly spoke of the US envoy being misinformed about the situation in Sudan, hinting that he trusts the misleading information given to him by certain parties within "Taqadum.” Remarkably, Perriello has himself admitted that Sudanese "civilians" he has been in contact with proposed an expansion of the negotiations and the inclusion of new parties.
The problem, here, is that while no one doubts he genuinely wants to succeed, he may not have fully understood the full complexity of the conflicts in Sudan, or the extreme polarization that helped ignite the war and is now perpetuating it. Thus, relying on one side for information inevitably leads him to clash with those who have a radically different perspective, the Sudanese government side, which is precisely what happened.
In light of these circumstances, and after the postponement of the Cairo meeting between Perriello and a government delegation- in which they were supposed to discuss the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration (specifically the stipulation that the Rapid Support Forces withdraw from civilian homes, neighborhoods, and civilian and service facilities)- any remaining hopes for a breakthrough in Geneva that ends the hostility, however slim, have disappeared.
Where are the Geneva meetings headed from here?
In my estimation, the most that can be achieved is an agreement to open corridors that allow for the entry of urgently needed humanitarian aid, and commitments to continue efforts to end the war. We have already seen signs that this could happen. The Sudanese government announced that it would open the Adré corridor on the Sudanese-Chadian border for three months. This announcement was followed by statements issued by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Special Envoy Perriello about an agreement to open three corridors for the delivery of aid being imminent. The statement issued by General al-Burhan yesterday, in which it was announced that all Sudanese border crossings would be placed under the supervision of the Sovereignty Council, can also be understood within this context.
Over the next few days, we will have more details about the corridors, the implementation of the agreements, and the frameworks for monitoring and tracking aid convoys. However, the Sudanese government will likely open the corridors for brief and intermittent periods as it assesses and monitors whether the routes are being exploited to deliver more military supplies to the Rapid Support Forces, which is the primary concern of the Sudanese army.
As for the question of ending the hostilities and the resumption of direct negotiations, it will take more time. Success is contingent on three factors: first, the extent of the upcoming election’s impact on the US administration. Second, whether there is any tangible progress that translates Washington's statements about addressing the reservations raised by the Sudanese government. Third, and most importantly, developments on the ground, which will likely evolve rapidly.