When Bashar al-Assad lost control of the oil-rich areas in eastern Syria, most of which came under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), he turned to Iran for oil and its derivatives to enable his forces to continue fighting and to maintain services in the areas under his rule.
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His weak economy was collapsing, and the government was in a state of bankruptcy as it waged war without any revenues. He relied on drugs and terrorism, which became the regime’s most significant exports.
Some might think this is an exaggeration or propaganda against a fallen regime incapable of defending itself. However, the regime itself did not hide this reality and even used it as leverage in negotiating its regional and international relations.
No Saudi ambassador has arrived in Damascus despite the agreement reached in May 2023. Diplomatic representation was limited to operating out of the Four Seasons Hotel, and Saudi Arabia did not send its ambassador to the Syrian capital for the first time until the entry of the new leadership and its forces. Relations slowed as the regime failed to fulfill its promises, including halting the smuggling of Captagon. Al-Assad, as usual, delayed delivering on the promised reconciliation and expected billions of dollars in compensation to stop the smuggling operations. Riyadh was not pleased with this, especially since rewarding drug traffickers for halting their activities would encourage further extortion. Assad acted like Colombia’s infamous drug lord, Pablo Escobar, earning, according to Western estimates, over $5 billion annually from Captagon sales – more than his oil revenues before the war.
I met the ousted president at least five times in direct sessions, where we talked for hours. Even so, I cannot claim to truly know him. I published most of the discussions from those meetings in Asharq Al-Awsat at the time but stopped after the assassination operations in Lebanon, as his threats began targeting journalists. I was also blacklisted from entering Lebanon. I met him again shortly before the revolution against him, in a group session, where he appeared confident and assured of his safety.
In any case, despite the horrifying revelations about him after his downfall, which added to what we already knew about his terrifying regime, he always seemed polite in person during meetings, ready to listen and respond. Rarely did he lose his composure. This was his demeanor with all his guests.
This left many puzzled about his true nature. Was there a sinister group behind the atrocities in Syria and Lebanon? Was it his brother Maher, his officer Ali Mamlouk, his wife Asma, or the Iranian Qassem Soleimani?
The truth is that he was behind it all, orchestrating and managing it – not the image he projected. He compensated for his failure to govern the state by wielding brute force. The impoverished country became even poorer, contrary to his claims of being targeted by hostile nations. The truth is, al-Assad received widespread regional and international support after assuming power. There was hope he would move Syria beyond Hafez al-Assad’s legacy toward openness and modernization. Instead, he increased the number of prisons, surpassed his father in assassinations and bombings, and hosted terrorist organizations.
Thus, the Syrian revolution against Bashar was no surprise, even though it erupted three months after Tunisia’s uprising. Having failed economically, al-Assad resorted to drug trafficking and hosting armed groups during the Iraq war in coordination with Iran, repeating the same approach during his decade-long war. I cannot recall him ever discussing economic development, modernization, or improving citizens’ livelihoods before the revolution.
Today, Syria and its new leaders need to reflect on the history of the al-Assad regime. It is no surprise that a regime collapses when a soldier guarding it or a university professor, who represents the societal elite, earns about $20 a month. The profound lesson is that the risks of economic failure are greater than those of security failure.
Economic failure preceded the war by years, as well as the “Caesar” sanctions, the freezing of state assets abroad, and the collapse of the currency. It was the result of al-Assad’s mismanagement, rampant corruption, weak governance, and the regime’s reliance on a shadow economy fueled by drugs and foreign wars.
Despite their severe hardships in the countries they sought refuge in, Syrians have achieved successes in every field they entered. Today, a great opportunity lies ahead. The government of Ahmed al-Sharaa must first bring together all Syrians in their diversity to become part of the state and open up to the world to attract investment.
