Ceasefires are a lifeline to those languishing under relentless bombardment, suffering displacement, and struggling to find food- with no escape from their vast prison.
Yet, the fact that discussions and negotiations for a ceasefire continue suggests that there is, as of yet, no horizon for an end to Gaza’s inferno. All concerned parties seem to be awaiting some shift that allows for a breakthrough. But what could move the situation forward, will the shift come from the Palestinians, the Iranians, the Americans, or the Israelis, or will it be a mix?
On the Palestinian side, change begins with reform and ends with containing Hamas; both are exceedingly difficult. The Palestinian Authority is institutionally fragmented. It nonetheless remains regarded as the “only legitimate partner” to a future settlement. If it manages to implement meaningful reforms, the PA could re-emerge as a viable administrator of post-war Gaza, especially under a transitional framework supported by Arab and international allies.
Hamas, for its part, is well aware that the hostages are its most consequential (and perhaps only) bargaining chip. Agreeing to any truce that leads to their release would amount to a grave strategic decision that could potentially be the end of the movement in its current form. Still, it could be willing to take this step if it could attain unforeseen political gains that allow for Hamas’s political integration.
The options for Iran seem to be: a military blow, harsher sanctions, or (and this is the most likely scenario) a stop-gap agreement that allows for additional quiet talks that allow for a broader resolution. None of this reassures Israel, which is unlikely to sit idly by in the face of these developments.
In Lebanon, Iran appears determined to keep Hezbollah operational, locally and potentially regionally, though not necessarily through military action. Statements from party leaders affirm that walking away is not an option- a position underscored by Hezbollah’s performance in the recent municipal elections in strongholds in the South and Bekaa.
That said, even Tehran, despite its pretenses of defiance, has been pragmatic. Iran’s regional and nuclear interests have compelled it to restrain itself and avoid escalation when it sees an opportunity to ease sanctions or improve its regional standing.
As for the United States, its posture is key to unlocking and resolving this crisis. It is the most likely to change its policy on Gaza, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its historic relationship with Israel. There are many reasons for this, chief among them the need to safeguard its regional interests and, paradoxically, protect Israel itself. Indeed, under Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, Israel has become a threat to its own security and to the stability of an already volatile region.
The Netanyahu government’s refusal to propose a credible plan to end the war or outline a vision for what happens after the war. It refuses to propose an alternative to Hamas. Its plan to remain in Gaza and annex the West Bank crosses a red line for Arab states seeking a viable settlement. It also undercuts Washington’s efforts to bring the war to an end and expand the Abraham Accords.
On the Israeli right, which is currently in power, there is growing disappointment with the policies Donald Trump has pursued since taking office. He has failed to meet their expectations of unconditional support, prioritizing American interests even when they clash with Israel’s. Notable examples include his decisions to: enter into direct negotiations with Hamas, open talks with Iran during Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, reach a ceasefire with the Houthis, lift sanctions on Syria without coordinating with Tel Aviv, and snub Israel during his regional visit. Only extraordinary pressure from the United States could compel Tel Aviv to reconsider its current policy and offer meaningful concessions.
In the end, breaking the stalemate in Gaza requires parallel simultaneous shifts, not a single miracle development. The stars must align before we move from temporary ceasefires toward durable solutions and political settlements: from reforming the Palestinian Authority and compelling a change in Israel’s mindset to encouraging Iranian pragmatism.
Steps from this US administration, which has been pursuing its national interests (not acting out of hostility toward Israel nor favoritism toward the Arabs), remain the most viable avenue toward a solution. It is in a position to leverage this moment, impose a swift and acceptable resolution, and advance its broader strategic goals in the region, especially as it deepens ties with the Gulf states. However, the question remains: Can the right in power in Israel, in light of the country’s complex internal dynamics, shape their policy to serve American interests?
This is a moment of converging interests, not justice. And Gaza stands at a crossroads between agony and opportunity.
