It seems that the Syrian and Lebanese people’s way out of their ordeal is of two phases. The first, which is now nearing its end, is the phase of foreign (Iranian and, in Syria’s case, Russia as well) hegemony. If it is true that this hegemony had been reliant on domestic foundations and maintains strong bridges to them- Turkiye's desire to subjugate Syrian Kurds, and the weapons of Hezbollah, whose ability to keep them hinges on Iran's success in maintaining what remains of its influence- it is equally true that dismantling foreign hegemony was a key prerequisite for ending the previous status quo in Syria and Lebanon. At the end of the day, however, this liberation, for which immense sacrifices were made, especially by Syrians but also by the Lebanese, was the result of external elements, just as that hegemony had been an external element. One could rightly argue that toppling extremely repressive and violent regimes is nearly impossible without extrinsic counter elements, especially when the forces that hold the weapons show no regard for peaceful protest and do not see it as a factor worth considering. Further, it could also be said none of the changes we have undergone in our Arab region would have happened if it had not been for foreign intervention that breaks the stalemate. For instance, Iraq's Baath regime remained in place from 1968 to 2003, when a major US intervention (that morphed into occupation) brought it down. Similarly, Gaddafi remained in power from 1969 until 2011, when NATO's support for the Libyan revolution topped him. On the other hand, Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria did not fall in 2013, when the US and NATO refrained from intervening, but it did, afterward, as a result of foreign factors: the repercussions of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation in Gaza and Israel.
It seems that the conclusion of the foreign phase, in its hostile form, leaves us in the second, domestic and local, phase. While the two crises and threats are not of the same magnitude, Syria must grapple with questions regarding how to manage relations between its sects and communities, and thus how to build a political regime that ensures peaceful coexistence, equality, and justice. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s transition to a new order raises complex and difficult challenges on a daily basis: the formation of an alternative government, ending Israeli occupation, and reformulating the relationship between its sects and communities. While the Lebanese have made progress in overcoming their domestic challenges with the election of a president and the appointment of a prime minister, these steps in the right direction have also left them facing a predicament that cannot convincingly be attributed to extrinsic factors. The responsibility of local actors to resolve this has become more pronounced. That is, if being free of foreign influence is a necessary but insufficient condition, the second phase presents the challenge of building society and politics- a task that Syrians and Lebanese must undertake themselves.
It has been said that the two countries have "become themselves again" after Hezbollah was harshly weakened and Assad was toppled, and most people in both countries rightly celebrated this shift. However, what is to be done when the "self" they have returned to is, in fact, "multiple selves?” To give one of many examples, the Lebanese seem less enthusiastic about forming a government and implementing reforms than the "Quintet" countries. In Syria, the situation is even more dire: the Assad regime has withered and vanished- an exceptional gift to a new regime. Yet, society has not given signals that reassure us of its coherence or suggest that this new phase will be one of stability, even though Arab and international actors are supporting and fostering both shifts.
Thus, there is reason to assume that our societies are transitioning from the phase of foreign belligerence that we underwent when Iran called the shots- a phase defined by militias, arms, and entanglements in countless conflicts- into a phase of domestic crisis. That might be the reason we are now seeing a perpetuation of the foreign phase, albeit one that is not fully hostile to our interests, with the aim of circumventing our domestic crisis, solving our problems, and promising reconstruction. However, the perpetuation of the foreign phase could manifest in other, worrisome and harmful, forms. For instance, Turkiye might exploit instability in Syria to settle the score with the Kurds, and Lebanon’s domestic gridlock could be made to remain tied to developments in the US/Israeli-Iranian front. So, we find ourselves stuck in a foreign phase that has both beneficial and harmful aspects to it, but the domestic phase will certainly remain in crisis, and perhaps even deadlocked, for a long time. Who knows, it might be useful to temper the optimism that emerged after the fall of the regimes that had governed Syria and Lebanon with some reflection about these very political entities themselves and about whether these entities, with these profound schisms, can ever be home to a transition toward a constructive domestic phase. Indeed, there is a mountain of evidence to suggest that our post-Ottoman era has failed to develop genuine national loyalties that go beyond local communities and are translated into nation-states that enjoy an acceptable degree of consensus. For the millionth time, the people of Syria and Lebanon are compelled to rethink their political frameworks, after that the Iran-backed regimes had made thinking easier on us.
