Two major phenomena/catastrophes have weighed on the Levant for decades: one is military coups and security states that grew out of them- Syria and Iraq were its two theatres- and the next is militia groups whose main presence was in Lebanon. These two phenomena, although their last representatives have fallen, should be revisited time and again; we should bring them up consistently in order to draw lessons from these experiences and avoid repeating them. We cannot build a robust future on a frail reading of the past. Amnesia, sermons about forgiving past actions, or focusing solely on present concerns and turning the page on the past cannot solve this problem either, nor can climates of funeral processions- climates that put emotional wounds and sullen rhetoric on display.
With regard to the Lebanese, it remains crucial to recall notions that reaffirm the implications of this phenomenon/catastrophe for their lives.
Between Lebanon’s modern foundation and the establishment of Hezbollah, the country had been accustomed to small political bodies- some of them sectarian groups that represented a particular community and others ideological- that rarely left the margins to enter the mainstream. As for Hezbollah, in which modern organizational frameworks were fused with archaic ideas under the leadership of a charismatic leader, it was always something far bigger than the modest capacities this small country could handle. At least ten factors played a role in shaping it into a monumental political actor with an exceptional presence and readiness for destruction.
First, it is a party of perpetual armament. Hezbollah is not the first armed Lebanese faction to be established nor the first to operate in Lebanon. However, it is the first non-state actor to refuse to hand over its arms for any reason, and not to link its disarmament to a particular achievement or objective. That is, Hezbollah is absolutely antithetical to the emergence of a state with a monopoly on the means of violence. Either we have a state and Hezbollah does not maintain its arsenal, or Hezbollah keeps its weapons and we have no state.
Second, Lebanon has been home to many sectarian parties that defend, or claim to defend, their communities and these communities’ survival as a unit, without necessarily being religious actors driven by their faith. A very small number of religious parties committed to preaching their doctrine to others, without necessarily taking a sectarian approach, have also been established in the country. In Hezbollah, however, we find a party that is both religious and sectarian at the same time. Some might argue that this characterization also applies to the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya) in Lebanon, but its influence has always been extremely limited, and it never managed to leave a real political or social impact on the country.
Third, it is not satisfied with merely usurping decisions on war and peace; rather, it uses it to drag the country into existential confrontations. Even if we overlooked the minor wars of the 1990s, the 2006 and “support” wars alone unequivocally attest to this fact.
Fourth, Hezbollah is a party that has damaged Lebanon’s national fabric (and played a major role in heightening confessionalism in the Islamic world) by making others feel that the means of power are not equally available to all, and consequently that they are obliged to beg for the party’s reassurance - despite experience, most notably the 2008 invasion of Beirut, having hollowed out the argument in favor of these reassurances.
Fifth, it is a party of occupation and expansion, most notably through its intervention in Syria since the 2011 revolution, which has yet to fully end. However, this has also been manifested in its roles in other countries (Iraq, Yemen...)- interventions that were opposed by the local population, or significant segments of it.
Sixth, while other Lebanese political forces’ ties to foreign powers are not irreproachable, the party’s affiliation with Iran is something different altogether. It is not only a component of Iran’s strategy but also an instrument directly putting this strategy into action. Moreover, the support it received from a foreign actor as powerful as Iran (along with Assad’s Syria) strengthened Hezbollah to a degree, and for a duration, that no other party’s foreign ties allowed for.
Seventh, the party has created a parallel world within Lebanese society- a world that encompassed everything from the universal inculcation of a few mystical ideas, an infallible leader, promoting obsolete rituals (most of them foreign to the Lebanese tradition), to even a consolidated economic cycle and patronage network that separate from the national economic cycle.
Eighth, Hezbollah exploited the glorification of martyrdom and rendered it a pretext for glorifying death. At the same time, it mastered the normalization of violence and assassination- casually deploying these methods like they were mundane practices inherent to political life.
Ninth, it cut Lebanon off from its Arab neighbors and the broader world, reducing the country’s exports to terrorist instruments and illicit drugs. Accordingly, it seemed inevitable when support and investments eventually dried up in a country whose defining feature had become its isolation- and mind you, Lebanon’s geography, demographic makeup, and limited resources demand exactly the opposite.
Tenth, it established a division of labor with what some call the corrupt ruling clique whereby each of them protected the other. The party took on the task of suppressing movements for political change as part of this framework - a role that became particularly conspicuous during the October 17, 2019, uprising.
As for how Lebanon’s Shiites, Lebanon’s non-Shiites, and its state and society were liable for the country hitting rock bottom, and the duties thereby incumbent upon them to facilitate the recovery we hope for, that all remains of the utmost importance and demands continuous reflection and scrutiny, time and again.
