The war between Lebanon and Israel has reared its head once again. This comes after the ceasefire announced on November 27 was extended to February 18. While it was in effect, Israel violated the agreement 1,500 times, and Israel's Defense Minister announced that the occupied positions in Lebanon would be turned into a buffer zone.
Assassinations of Hezbollah's military apparatus have accelerated, with several senior field commanders recently targeted. Among them was Hassan Bdeir, the deputy official in charge of Palestinian affairs in Hezbollah; an old photo of him aboard a plane with the late Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani has surfaced since he was killed. Another is Hassan Abbas Azeddine, whom the Israeli army identified as the head of the air defense system in Hezbollah's Badr Unit.
Amid this escalation, Hezbollah has turned back its hardline position on armament. “There is no such thing as disarmament,” we are now told after months of nods to openness. The fleeting flexibility shown by the party was the result of its long war with Israel, which cost the party the lives of both its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and his successor Hashem Saffiedine, in addition to the first and second line of security and military leaders.
This radical shift could be explained by the position Hezbollah now finds itself in. It is cornered on all fronts and is particularly troubled by the challenges it had not anticipated when it agreed to the ceasefire.
While Army Commander Joseph Aoun's election as president of the republic was predictable, the party had not expected Nawaf Salam to be tasked with forming a government. The approach with which he named his cabinet was a sharp break with the framework that Hezbollah had grown accustomed to in recent years, particularly since 2008. This was the party's first domestic blow, and it also reflected the new balance of political and moral power in the country.
Hezbollah's difficulties were compounded by the dramatic collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024 (just two weeks after the ceasefire was announced) and the subsequent historic rapprochement between the new Lebanon and the new Syria. The two countries have begun coordinating to cut off one of Iran's most critical supply lines.
The border control agreement between Beirut and Damascus, signed in Jeddah in March, was followed by the Lebanese Prime Minister's visit to Damascus. There, he met with Syria's transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa to discuss implementation mechanisms, tightening the noose around the strategic logistical networks that Hezbollah had relied on for decades. In tandem, the party's positions south of the Litani River are being handed over to the Lebanese Army.
On the regional level, Hezbollah now finds itself in a tough spot, particularly after Israel announced its intention to consolidate its occupation of Lebanese territory as part of a plan to turn it into a buffer zone. Meanwhile, even as the truce in Gaza has collapsed and Israel has unveiled a strategy to annex parts of the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah did not dare to revive the rhetoric of support that had dragged it into this war that permanently damaged it in the first place.
The ongoing negotiations between Tehran and Washington on Iran's nuclear program further complicate Hezbollah's calculus, especially as they are paralleled by a Washington-led global campaign to disarm the party.
Accordingly, it should be no surprise that, wounded and wary, the party is doubling down to reaffirm its independence and resist being turned into a bargaining chip in the talks. Either it is doing so in coordination with Tehran, which may be trying to send mixed signals, or Hezbollah's confidence in its regional patron has waned after it had been left to fight the war alone and received no real support as it was being pummeled.
In this context, Hezbollah's unambiguous refusal to discuss “disarmament,” insisting that the issue is not up for negotiation and that there is no compromise to be found, could be useful. Despite the threats it brings, this rhetoric strips away the mask of ambiguity that has long allowed Lebanese state institutions and many political forces to remain in the murky gray zone they exploited to normalize the status quo.
This announcement has liberated the national debate, putting an end to the spiral of excuses that had long been used to justify Hezbollah's behavior and belittle this complex dilemma. It was said that Hezbollah's arms were needed as long as Israeli occupation had not ended and that they provided a deterrent that protected Lebanon from attacks. Others argued that the state was weak and that these weapons would only be handed over once its institutions matured...
Even sectarian and political justifications were not offered: Hezbollah represents a Lebanese community and thus cannot be isolated or confronted militarily. Its arsenal was thereby rendered “our fate as a nation” - one that we must simply live with.
What has changed today is that Hezbollah has made dithering untenable: “Disarmament is not up for discussion.” With that statement, all previous justifications became obsolete. Indeed, it was preceded by the implosion of the deterrence narrative after it became evident that Israel, despite Hezbollah's weapons, could kill and occupy without paying a price.
It is now clear that this arsenal is nothing more than a shield in the hands of a militia. Hezbollah uses its arms to perpetuate its political and security existence without even pretending to have a national agenda or clearly defined goals.
Accordingly, this clarity about the nature of the confrontation should compel the Lebanese state to assume its responsibilities. The era of conniving evasion, rhetorical ambiguity, and calling things by anything other than their real names, is over.
The only way to prevent the resumption of war, the expansion of which is already being prepared, is to agree on a clear roadmap for the disarmament of Hezbollah without euphemisms and to officially declare that Lebanon is fully on board the region's political settlements.
