One can confidently say this that year was the autumn of illegal arms. The trade in illusions and lies of the hollow “resistance” of Hezbollah was exposed. Non-state actors’ failures have shown that they neither deter nor protect. Their arms could not even protect the men who carry them, let alone their countries’ territorial integrity and national dignity. The narratives of what was called the “society of resistance” and the victories it proclaimed have collapsed in the face of hard realities. Factional arms have done nothing in the face of daily Zionist attacks, and they have become a useful pretext for the persistence and expansion of the occupation, displacement, and mass destruction.
This hollow “resistance” turned a blind eye to the suffering of their own “society,” leaving their people to their fate because of illusions that Lebanon could remain a bargaining chip for Iran’s regional project. Refusing to surrender its arms, Hezbollah has pushed a narrative that the restriction of armament applies only South of the Litani. That is the most dangerous direction the country could go in- not only does it defy the cabinet’s decision to confine armament to state forces across Lebanon, but also because it would squander a real opportunity to rebuild the state out of denial and a refusal to recognize the costs imposed by the crime of “support.”
The proponents of such arguments have exploited headless political laxity that disregards warnings about the repercussions of non-compliance with the “cessation of hostilities.” The authorities have shown troubling lethargy in engaging with proposals that could spare the country a devastating defeat. At times, it has seemed as though some official parties have forgotten that the ceasefire agreement stipulated total and final of disarmament, and the enemy exploited what it described as foot-dragging in implementation to widen the scope of its aggression, framing its ongoing assaults over the past 13 months as an effort to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its capabilities.
It was at this moment that Nawaf Salam announced that the mission to confine armament south of the Litani was only days away, stressing that it would implement the August 5 cabinet decision to confiscate weapons across all Lebanese territory. He added that the army is about to launch the second phase, which entails removing weapons between the Litani and Awali rivers (north of Sidon), turning all of the South into an operational area for the army and prohibiting the transfer of weapons in the remaining regions. Salam reaffirmed that the state makes decisions of war and peace and that the army alone is responsible for defending Lebanon and the Lebanese, including members of Hezbollah who are being eliminated on a daily basis as a result of reckless decisions that do not give any weight to citizens’ lives. Salam’s refuted the empty claims Hezbollah has long promoted claims that the agreement applies only to south of the Litani, and that it will keep its weapons continue to the role and function it was created to undertake.
13 months into the ceasefire agreement, 13 months of lethal assaults, Hezbollah has totally failed to retaliate, repeating the hollow calls of “resistance” about “readiness” as it fails to repel the attacks it is provoking. Insisting that its weapons are a “red line” and denying the consequences of the resistance’s trajectory- its failure despite arms and funding- has become an existential threat. One cannot ignore the rapid shifts unfolding across the region, foremost among them that the new Syrian authorities have expelled Iran after dismantling its militias. The clock cannot be turned back, and the militia-state is not coming back.
Given that Lebanon does not have the luxury of time, and that it is being threatened with a war it had not chosen that could breach all limits and threaten the survival of the Lebanese entity, some measures and decisions that cannot be postponed. First among them is that the agenda must include dismantling the military structures that hide behind scout uniforms. This step is no longer a choice but a necessity for breaking the foundations of the militia that shattered the state. It is precisely what Lebanon’s negotiator, Nabih Berri, agreed to. Naim Qassem approved the agreement, which requires, in Article 7, dismantling auxiliaries to the military apparatuses that built the state-let. This includes the institutions of the “parallel economy,” notably al-Qard al-Hassan.
Secondly, the narrative that disarmament weakens Lebanon has been discredited. Accordingly, the government must, after having chosen diplomacy as the route to liberating the land and recovering prisoners in its ministerial statement, unequivocally affirm that no attacks on Israel will be launched from Lebanon against the Israeli entity. This would open a window for returning to the armistice agreement, which could be leveraged to recover all of Lebanon’s territory. Since emphasizing political confrontation removes Lebanon from Iran’s orbit, initiating the second phase of disarmament (north of the Litani) would negate the enemy’s pretexts and empower Lebanese negotiators. Tangible progress in dismantling militias’ military structures, Lebanese and Palestinian alike, is necessary for retaining sovereignty. Only then can the reconstruction of what the Israeli enemy destroyed during the “support” war (initiated by Hezbollah) begin, and only then can the displaced return.
The current situation is frightening and troubling. The country is in ruins, and denial and persistence reflect disregard for the threat of another catastrophe.
The fear is real and immense. Hezbollah’s actions are facilitating Zionist brutality. The Syrian earthquake has shattered the militias, prompting them to hastily “pack up” their things in Iraq. According to the adviser to the Iraqi prime minister, al-Sudani, they can either voluntarily dissolve themselves or they will be forced into dissolution, stressing that the priority is to spare Iraq from Israeli strikes like those that have hit the Houthi militia. Enough: the enemy’s tanks are in the heart of Wadi al-Hujeir, advancing toward Adsheet and al-Qantara; the residents who had returned fled to Deir Sirian and al-Qusayr, and they then fled both along with the village locals.
