In mid-1964, President Fouad Chehab was counting the days till his presidency ended. The coalition of parties that supported him had a majority of nearly two-thirds in Parliament, and these deputies visited him to explain that they intended to amend the Constitution so that he could be re-elected for a second term. Chehab listened to them defend this proposal but rejected the offer. He had lost any trust that he may have had in the sectarian political class. He called them “fromagistes” (cheese-eaters). He saw his reforms hollowed out, with the heavyweights carving out shares of the state and its institutions for themselves.
Chehabist policy reflected the vision of the IRFED mission. He introduced a wave of reforms to achieve a long list of goals: strengthening the state, creating opportunities and a competitive environment that rewarded merit, developing marginalized regions, reinforcing transparency, and enforcing accountability. He relied on a “coalition” that brought together political figures, technocrats, and officers who had earned the general’s trust during his time building the army and safeguarding the republic. To this day, it can be said that his term, which began over 60 years ago, offers a model for serious reform, despite the subsequent distortions.
Chehab, who withdrew into isolation until his death after leaving the presidency, never explained why the experiment had been left incomplete despite his foresight. The reform project had been introduced to the public before a base around which to build it had been formed. Over the decades, especially after the civil war and the Taif Agreement, segments of the political class continued to raise reformist slogans. However, they would always immediately backtrack on their promises in pursuit of more power.
However, the deliberate financial and economic collapse of 2019 that triggered the “October Revolution” exposed the mafioso alliance plundering the treasury, impoverishing the country, and starving the Lebanese people, who were stripped of their life savings. Serious reform was thereby brought back to the forefront. Demand for reform intensified after the “Axis war” that destroyed the country, renewed occupation, and highlighted the urgency of two tasks: bringing all weapons into the hands of the legitimate state and implementing reforms. It has become clear that Lebanon cannot recover without asserting full sovereignty and the state reclaiming its financial and economic authority.
Following the ceasefire agreement that was signed seven months ago (which included unequivocal provisions regarding disarmament and had been approved by the Hezbollah–Amal duo) a combination of external factors and domestic developments led to General Joseph Aoun’s election as president, turning the page on a long vacancy. Simultaneously, a “human tsunami” spurred by the “Change” deputies propelled Judge Nawaf Salam to the premiership, ending the vacuum in the executive.
The agenda and priorities were clear, as the country could no longer afford the luxury of biding its time: implementing the ceasefire agreement (grounded in the principle of seizing any weapons held by non-state actors) was crucial to allowing the country to succeed in its diplomatic campaign to liberate our occupied land. Simultaneously, political and economic reforms had to begin. These reforms cannot be disregarded if Lebanon is to secure the support needed to snatch national recovery from the claws of defeat, thereby reclaiming the state, recovering talent, and breaking the deadly cycle.
The path to recovery, and the assertion of sovereignty, runs through dismantling the grip of the sectarian forces that control public institutions and services. They are responsible for hollowing out the state. Fouad Chehab noticed this early one, in its early stages- before it deepened following the civil war, the general amnesty for war crimes, and the political elite’s monopolization of state resources. The path forward should be clear: the Taif Agreement and the Constitution must be respected, and the era of the “cheese-eaters” must end.
In practice, however, Hezbollah stuck to its old narratives of arms and resistance, even as the Israeli–Iranian war has reshaped the regional landscape, rendering these weapons obsolete. Maintaining them undermines sovereignty, fuels chaos, and offers a pretext for Israel’s violations. At the same time, administrative appointments continue to abide by sectarian quotas, maintaining the spoil-sharing mentality that has plunged the country into rock bottom.
The disarmament process has been frozen, and hesitation is hindering reform. Minister of Culture Ghassan Salameh asks: “How can we confront the forces that have filled the void left by the state?” How can the illegitimate forces that have seized control of the country’s key sectors be dismantled when “in every sector there is something like an organized criminal network running the show”?
Raising these questions is important, but the minister is expected to provide answers and solutions. Merely posing questions does not absolve him of responsibility, especially since he is fully aware that non-state actors and the sectarian quota system are the problem.
The executive authority, which quickly lost its broad popular support, is aware that serving the interests of sectarian forces and reinforcing the patronage system will prevent the country from overcoming stagnation. The message of abiding by the rules of the sectarian-quota-based spoil-sharing regime is that impunity is ensured to those who had seized control of the government and run it like a gang. Alarmingly, on the eve of general elections, these forces, foremost among them Hezbollah, are seeking to renew their grip on power and impose their political dominance over Lebanon’s suffering population.
Hopes had been revived sixty years after the Chehabist experiment. But faith in reform from above paving the way toward modernity and renewal has once again faded. Instead state-building remains paralyzed, reform distorted, rights denied, and the political, economic, and social crises deepened.
