Eyad Abu Shakra
TT

The Levant Swings Between Dreams and Deals

The talk of a new Middle Eastern “deal” we have been hearing over the past few days is jarring. The agreement reportedly being cooked up sees Syria cede the Golan Heights to Israel... in return for the Lebanese city of Tripoli.

The “official” reactions of Lebanese parties, of course, mixed outrage and condemnation. However, those who understand the intentions they hold behind the scenes and see the implications of Benjamin Netanyahu shaping Washington’s vision and approach to the Middle East, will address this development with the seriousness it deserves.

Moreover, this “deal” was leaked as Israel tightened its control over Iran’s airspace and expands its list of targets inside Iran. Not only that, it coincides with the tacit alignment of Washington, Tel Aviv, and Ankara’s visions regarding all regional crises, from the Kurdish question to what remains of the Palestinian struggle.

Some observers now believe that the Washington-Tel Aviv axis has new priorities with regard to the sectarian dynamics of the Levant, at least temporarily, following the transition from Barack Obama and Joe Biden to Donald Trump. The irony, however, is this same American (Republican) and Israeli (Likud) right had originally bet on “political Shiism” in the region during the buildup to the invasion of Iraq.

Back then, it was the American “neoconservatives,” working closely alongside the Israeli right, that steered George W. Bush’s presidency through his White House advisors and Pentagon officials.

At the time, the US was also trying to overcome a trauma, that of 9/11. The neoconservatives exploited this catastrophe to occupy Iraq, which was eventually handed over to Iran. The leader of the Coalition Provisional Authority that oversaw Iraq’s transition, Paul Bremer, even boasted that his administration had “ended a thousand years of Sunni rule” in Iraq!

As the saying goes, “a lot of water has flowed under the bridge” since 2003. To begin with, despite the Democrats’ sympathy for the “Arab Spring” in several Arab countries, they and the Israeli leadership refrained from supporting the Syrian uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Later, they effectively turned a blind eye to Iran’s military intervention to rescue the Syrian regime.

Moreover, the Democratic leadership was keen on ensuring the success of the “nuclear deal” it had signed with Iran after the Muscat negotiations. As a result of this deal, and the policies pursued by the Obama and Biden administrations, Tehran felt empowered to move freely across the region. In contrast, Netanyahu and his Likud allies never forgot their apprehensions about Iran’s role in the Arab arena and continued to seek containment.

However, it is clear that Israel has been the biggest beneficiary of Iran’s role in the region. It was happy to see Iran become a “bogeyman” that frightened Arab states and compelled them to rush toward “normalization” with Israel in pursuit of protection.
Moreover, Israel has never truly been concerned by the bombastic rhetoric of the so-called “resistance” regimes and parties, so long as the borders remained secure... and the possibility of expanding them remained available.

Still, in one way or another, the events of October 7, 2023 (the Al-Aqsa Flood operation launched from the Gaza Strip) was a replay of 9/11.

That day undoubtedly marked a turning point for regional alliances, leading to a shift in priorities. Without minimizing the tragedy in Gaza, the most dangerous aspect of Israel’s political response was Netanyahu’s stated intention to “reshape the Middle East.”

In Donald Trump, Netanyahu found his long-sought prize. Trump is an “ideal partner” in drawing this map over the rubble of political entities that have never meant anything to either of them, and at the expense of peoples who have never factored into their political calculations.

Indeed, the future of Palestine has rarely seemed as bleak and hopeless since 1948. As for Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, whose borders were drawn by the Sykes-Picot Agreement (which completed what the Balfour Declaration had begun) they may now need to brace for a world in which Türkiye is the region’s second power, behind Israel.

Lebanon’s most sectarian non-Sunni hardliners likely wouldn’t object, in my view, to ceding more than half of the Sunni population and giving up Tripoli (and Akkar and Dinniyeh), if Washington and Tel Aviv guaranteed “privileges” for the Christians and Shiites. In fact, many Lebanese Christians have lost hope in the very idea of “Greater Lebanon,” which was born in 1920 and saw Tripoli and other areas added to the country.

And many Shiite extremists would be happy to secure a demographic majority by reducing the number of Sunnis in the country!

As for Syria, the Sunni majority seems well placed to strengthen its position, and to address the fears of the Alawite, Christian, Druze, and Kurdish minorities, through a deal between the US and Türkiye.

Moreover, it’s worth keeping an eye across the Syrian-Iraqi border amid the radical shifts and consequential negotiations underway in the Kurdish arena.

So, one wonders: will dreams align with the fine print of the deals? Or are we back to the mess of trial and error?