The recent meeting between the United States, France, and Syria remains the subject of much speculation and debate, with much of the focus on what was actually agreed upon...
This state of affairs is neither new nor surprising, given the unusual circumstances in which the meeting was held and the prominent issues it addressed. Most notably, it was held after the violent and dangerous developments in southern Syria, which followed unrest in the Alawite-majority coastal region.
It is well known that, for several months now, international and regional powers that see themselves as directly invested in Syria’s future (especially now that Russian and Iranian influence has waned), have been closely monitoring how the new authorities in Damascus address a range of critical files, from security to the economy, and notably, minority rights.
Türkiye is particularly invested in the success of an experiment it is not only sponsoring but also expanding. Ankara believes that “managing” Syria’s mosaic in accordance with its own interests and ideological framework is a matter of Turkish national security. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, reiterated this stance recently. Before taking charge of diplomacy, he was head of the intelligence service; therefore, Fidan has extensive experience in handling some of the most sensitive and dangerous issues, whether in Syria or the broader Middle East.
Türkiye shares a border of approximately 909 kilometers with Syria, stretching from the far northeastern edge of the Jazira region at the Iraqi border to the shores of the Iskenderun district in the far northwest. Much of this border roughly follows the old Berlin–Istanbul–Baghdad railway. Moreover, all Syrian governments have refused to recognize the annexation of Iskenderun from Syrian territory in 1939, during the French Mandate. It’s worth noting that the majority of the district’s population, whose main city is Antakya, were Arab Syrians- mostly Sunni and Alawite Muslims, as well as Christians, alongside Armenians. In contrast, ethnic Turks and Turkmen made up less than 40 percent of the population, per the 1939 census.
Beyond that, a mixed population of Arabs, Kurds, Turks, and Christians has always lived on both sides of the border- from around Afrin in the west to the vicinity of Qamishli in the east. This is why Ankara is adamantly opposed to any form of partition or territorial redistribution of Syria, regardless of its scope. Türkiye sees such a development as a threat that could fuel Kurdish nationalism within its own borders, where Kurds make up around 20 percent of the population.
That sums up Ankara’s priorities, particularly regarding the status of Syria’s Kurdish minority east of the Euphrates, which is currently receiving significant attention from the United States. To the south, Syria shares a border with Jordan, which extends westward to the occupied Golan Heights (seized by Israel in 1967) and the northern region of Palestine, which was occupied in 1948.
Since the founding of Israel, the Golan Heights have been a focal point of its strategic thinking. There are two main reasons for the Jewish state’s focus on this region: first, it overlooks the northern Jordan Valley and the lakes of Tiberias and Hula; second, it is home to significant water resources.
Thus, while Syria’s “mosaic” in the north impacts Türkiye's political calculations, the southern mosaic has always been at the heart of Israel’s security and demographic concerns. For decades, and likely centuries, the Golan has been home to a diverse population made up of Druze, Christians, Sunni Arabs, Circassian Sunnis, and Turkmens, in addition to three Alawite villages. Ismailis are also present in the region.
Moreover, the Golan Heights is the highest point outside the Lebanese mountains (Mount Hermon or Jabal al-Sheikh) from which one can oversee Damascus as well as the plains of Hauran and Jaidur. To the east of Hauran rises Jabal al-Arab in Suwayda, home to the largest concentration of Druze in the region and indeed the world.
This Druze presence in the south is reinforced by Druze communities in and around Damascus, Wadi al-Ajam, and northern parts of the Golan. For Israel, however, the most significant factor is the 120,000 Druze citizens in the Galilee, and the 20,000 Druze living in the occupied Syrian Golan villages. Just as Türkiye uses domestic political and security “considerations” to justify its involvement in Syria under the pretext of containing the “Kurdish threat,” Israel bases its right to intervene in the south on the pretext of protecting the Druze.
This brings us to the Alawite and Christian questions. The Alawite issue is, in truth, no less important than the previous ones. Indeed, Syrian Alawites outnumber the Druze, and make up the majority in two provinces: Latakia and Tartus, located in the coastal mountain region traditionally known as the Alawite Mountains.
Under the Assad regime, these two provinces hosted critical Russian military facilities: the critical Russian naval base in Tartus and an important Russian airbase at Hmeimim, near the city of Jableh in Latakia. On another front, Wadi al-Nassara (Valley of the Christians) is the southern boundary of the Alawite mountain region. This area is home to a disproportionately high number of Syrian emigrants to the United States, among them politically active individuals, influential businessmen, and prominent figures with a voice in Washington.
All of these factors might help explain the reasons behind the intense, and even skeptical, international attention on developments in Syria. They could also shed light on the broad apprehensions around delays in pursuing transitional justice, building state institutions, and coherently defining the country’s minorities’ status (whether ethnic, like the Kurds, or religious, like the Christians; or sectarian, like the Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis.
