The day the war ends will be one of jubilation for Sudan and its people. Every Sudanese awaits this day; no doubt about it. There is disagreement, however, about how to end the war: under what conditions and for what.
There are many visions for how to end the war and conditions required to achieve that. The Sudanese government has put forward a roadmap, which it submitted to the United Nations that differs from the “Quartet’s”. With these tracks somewhat stagnant, the idea of a humanitarian truce, and at times of safe zones, have become the focus of discussions abroad.
The notion that a short durable truce peace could constitute a solution is fundamentally mistaken. By definition, a truce is not a final or comprehensive solution; it is a temporary pause in the fighting that freezes movement on the ground in the hope that this will lead to agreement on military and political arrangements that end the crisis.
The Quartet’s plan proposes an "initial" humanitarian three month truce to facilitate the delivery of relief aid across Sudan, with the expectation that this truce would lead to a permanent ceasefire. It does not, however, explain the practical framework for implementation. According to its statement issued in September 2025, there would be a comprehensive nine-month transitional process, with the formation of an independent civilian government “that enjoys broad legitimacy and is subjected to accountability.”
Regardless of the fact that the durability of the Quartet has become unclear in light of recent developments in Sudan, the outline presented by this plan (even if it had progressed) was never going to lead to the desired solution given the deep complexities and entanglements of this war.
Whenever talk of a short truce resurfaces, two problems should be considered. The first is that it bets on intentions and assumes that freezing military operations will not be exploited by any party, that no party will use this pause to catch its breath, rearm, and reposition itself for subsequent attacks. Judging by the only relevant experience to date, the Rapid Support Forces has shown that it did not commit to the Jeddah platform; rather, they launched their largest attacks during this period and expanded into the central and southeastern states of Sudan. There is nothing to suggest that another short truce would not be exploited along the same lines.
The (deeper and more dangerous) second problem relates is that talk of a humanitarian truce rests, whether implicitly or explicitly, on the assumption that the Rapid Support Forces can remain part of Sudan’s political and military landscape. This assumption runs up against the categorical rejection of the army’s leadership and broad segments of Sudanese society. They have witnessed and endured horrors at the hands of these forces: the mass human rights violations they committed and the massive destruction they inflicted on the country.
In any case, a truce is one thing and peace is another. What Sudan needs is peace, not a truce, not for three months nor nine. One could even argue that a brief truce would facilitate the peace and nor a full and final end to the war. but pave the way for greater cruelty once it inevitably resumes amid an absence of trust, external interventions, and the proliferation of weapons.
As for the delivery of humanitarian aid, it can be achieved even as clashes continue if there is the will needed to deliver it, as demonstrated by the experience of El-Fasher, which received aid after it fell. This proves that the Rapid Support Forces were the primary obstacle to aid access after having consistently refused its access to the cities they besieged. Other wars confirm that aid can be delivered with a formal truce, as international humanitarian law obliges all parties to facilitate the passage of aid and refrain from obstructing it. As parties that do not abide by international law, it is difficult to argue that they would adhere to humanitarian truces.
Sustainable peace in Sudan necessarily requires dissolving the Rapid Support Forces and the integration of all armed movements into the state. All arms must be confiscated and the state must monopolize legitimate violence. The experience of armed movements has demonstrated their exorbitant cost to the state, not only in Sudan but across the entire region. The chaos generated by uncontrolled armament does not stop at state borders; it spills into neighboring regions, becoming a threat to regional security and peace, as well as an opening for interventions by actors seeking to exploit the chaos to further schemes that fuel instability.
Beyond that, Sudan needs a comprehensive peace and a clear roadmap to end this zero-sum power struggle, develop an inclusive national project that addresses governance, ensure democratic and peaceful transfers of power, balanced development, and coexistence that enriches cultural and ethnic diversity while uprooting feelings of grievance. The focus should not be one drafting fragile truce agreements that postpone the explosion without preventing it.
