In theory, at least, the Arab majority is expected to take a clear stance against Iran over its aggression toward eight Arab countries – six in the Gulf – in addition to Iraq and Jordan. But reality is more complex and far less cohesive. We see some voices and movements not merely remaining silent but actively justifying or even supporting Tehran’s attacks.
In truth, the countries under attack do not need more than a moral and ethical position, especially given that every other Arab state is already grappling with its own security, political, and economic challenges, without taking on additional burdens.
The support shown by these groups for Iran’s targeting of Gulf states is not an exception but rather an extension of a recurring pattern of justification. For three decades, Lebanon has endured cycles of collapse and destruction under the influence of Iran’s project and its instruments, foremost among them Hezbollah. Yet segments of the Arab world have continued to view Lebanon not as a country and a people, but as a camp, granting this reality cover under the banner of “resistance.” What is happening in the Gulf today reproduces the same scene: Iran’s targeting of Israel is used to justify its aggression against the Gulf.
This is not new in the Arab collective memory. Similar rhetoric was used to justify Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990, reframing aggression against Gulf states as a form of “balance” against an enemy. These narratives do not disappear; they replicate across generations. The problem lies in a cultural structure that reinterprets events through ready-made frameworks and conspiracy theories about expansion, liquidation of causes, and other justifications for aggression.
This simplification may seem comforting to a public that is conditioned to reduce complex realities into easy narratives and theories, such as an “Israeli expansionist project” or the imposition of a “new Middle East.” But there is a fundamental difference between those sitting in the audience as spectators and the victims who find themselves on the stage of events.
In times of major crises, conflict is not only military but also unfolds on parallel intellectual and cultural fronts. Each current reinterprets the war through its pre-existing worldview, long shaped by inflammatory rhetoric and perceptions. Over time, these frameworks become a burden that obstructs understanding and adaptation.
Arabs who do not neighbor Iran do not feel its direct threat, nor do they see its proxies – such as the Houthis and Hezbollah – as an issue. In their thinking, the world is divided into black and white, reduced to Palestine and Israel. This may not necessarily reflect a desire to harm the countries that are victims of Iranian expansion, but rather the result of a political and cultural discourse that justifies aggression.
Only those who border Iran truly feel its danger and understand its vast military project, including missile capabilities, proxy networks, and ongoing security threats. This is not theoretical; it is grounded in a long history of attacks on these countries since the 1980s, unrelated to Palestine or the West. Others neither feel nor prioritize this threat, and many even deny its existence, simplifying the world into positions for or against Israel. This, however, does not in any way negate the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause or the suffering of its people.
The same moral dilemma was evident during the Syrian crisis, where Arab political and popular forces supported the al-Assad regime simply because of its declared stance against Israel, framing the uprising as an Israeli conspiracy. Half a million people were unjustly killed at the hands of al-Assad’s forces and Qassem Soleimani, yet this did not prompt a reassessment among these groups. The situation later shifted, with the new Syrian leadership itself becoming a target of Israeli attacks, and President Ahmed al-Sharaa also adopting rhetoric against Israel. Still, this did not translate into any retrospective shift against Iran.
Ironically, this confusion is not limited to countries geographically distant from Iran’s missiles and drones; it is also present within the Gulf states themselves. This is not because some Gulf citizens are unaware, but because they are part of an audience shaped by decades of media and cultural narratives portraying Iran as a victim of the West and Hezbollah as a resistance movement. Even within the very heart of the “frontline states against Iran,” these beliefs are circulated and entrenched.
There was a period that unsettled these narratives, particularly the images from the Syrian uprising that exposed Iran’s role and the scale of atrocities committed. Yet even then, these narratives reasserted themselves through conspiracy theories that continue to justify Iran’s aggression.
What we are facing is not merely a disagreement over a current event, namely Iran’s aggression. It is something deeper: a broad cultural crisis that few are willing to confront.
