Whenever the Sudanese army makes an advance that brings the prospect of ending the war into view, a new front opens, expanding the conflict and perpetuating it.
From the early stages, arms have been flowing in from abroad across the borders of several neighboring countries. Recruits and mercenaries joined the fray, while some border regions were turned into key hubs for supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and supplied them with weapons and everything the war required.
When certain countries became neutral, whether through domestic pressure (as in Chad) or external pressure (as with other neighboring parties), new fronts opened along the borders with Ethiopia and South Sudan.
The recent escalation in Blue Nile State should therefore come as no surprise. Movements from South Sudan had been observed for some time, alongside a noticeable increase in southern mercenaries joining RSF ranks. Some areas in the south also became treatment centers for wounded RSF fighters. Documented reports confirm that a large camp has been set up for training and supplying RSF forces in Ethiopia; the French newspaper “Le Monde” has published an investigation into flights- 36 over four months, from late last year to early this year- transporting weapons through Ethiopian territory.
The Sudanese army had publicly warned Ethiopia against this course of action, and the latter continues to deny any involvement in these developments. The battles that erupted in Kurmuk (in the Blue Nile region of southeastern Sudan) have, along with drone attacks on other cities near the Ethiopian border, nonetheless confirmed that foreign actors were attempting to open new fronts aimed at dispersing the army's forces and obstructing an anticipated offensive against the RSF in Darfur.
The escalation in Kurmuk will not be the last instance of this strategy to "stretch the peripheries" designed to wrong-foot the Sudanese army, disrupt its plans, and relieve pressure on RSF forces retreating on western fronts, particularly in Kordofan. The Le Monde investigation indicates that the RSF's backers have recently activated alternative corridors to funnel arms through the Central African Republic and Ethiopia. It noted that nine flights were recorded in the past month alone, all of them carrying weapons and equipment through both countries in what were described as efforts to supply the RSF and allow it operate on a southeastern front.
This strategy of stretching the peripheries is not new. It began with the outbreak of the war and has steadily intensified; in fact, early indicators suggest that this war is part of a broader, longer-standing scheme against Sudan.
In 1996, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s book “Fighting Terrorism” was published in English. In it, he laid out his vision for confronting what he described as the ideology of terrorism. His approach rested on the principle that “prevention is better than treatment,” arguing for action to weaken and isolate states he deemed sponsors of terrorism through sanctions and, when necessary, military action. Sudan was among the countries he mentioned. It also appeared on a list made by Avi Dichter, Israel's former Minister of Public Security, in a 2008 lecture at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, "The Dimensions of Israel's Next Strategic Movement In The Regional Environment." Dichter explained that since the 1950s, Israel has viewed Sudan- with its resources, vast territory, and population- as a potential major regional power, which called for early intervention to weaken it. In his account, this effort encompassed involvement in the South Sudan war through to secession, and later in Darfur, which Israel had hoped to push toward secession as well.
The Sudanese army faces more the capabilities of the RSF alone in this war. The RSF is receiving immense supplies and advanced weapons through foreign interventions by actors that have sought to encircle Sudan by turning its neighbors against it and turning these countries into conduits for arms- and at times as launch points for strategic drone strikes.
In this context, the war is no longer merely a domestic conflict. It has become part of a broader regional struggle in which militias serve as proxies, allowing the powers behind them to avoid direct involvement and the complications it would entail. Despite this, many prefer to ignore the war's strategic dimensions, clinging to simplistic narratives like that of the "war of the two generals" or "the Islamists' war," refusing to acknowledge the deeper nature of the conflict: an existential war against Sudan itself that constitutes part of an ongoing plan to destabilize the region.
