Mamdouh al-Muhainy
Mamdouh al-Muhainy is the General Manager of Al Arabiya and Al Hadath.
TT

Iran Is More of the Enemy of the Arabs Than the Gulf

Some intellectuals and commentators argue that while the Iranian regime is waging a war against the Gulf states, it is not necessarily an enemy of the Arab world. They claim that Gulf states seek to drag other Arab states into needless hostilities with Iran. In reality, however, Tehran is more of an enemy of Arab countries than even to the Gulf states themselves. It has done far greater harm to other non-Gulf Arab states than it has to the Gulf. There are two reasons for this:

First: the Iranian regime has exploited the fragility of certain Arab states, penetrated them, and effectively occupied them. That has not happened in the Gulf.

Second: Tehran has succeeded in weakening these countries’ national identity, investing in sectarian identities, and creating schism among citizens in other Arab states, but failed to do so in the Gulf.

On the first point: several Arab countries have suffered far more at the hands of the Iranian regime than the Gulf states have from Iran’s missiles and drones, as the latter has only caused temporary material damage that can be repaired. The war has demonstrated the effectiveness of Gulf states’ advanced air defenses and their ability to protect their territories. They will emerge victorious from this confrontation, while the Iranian regime will be weakened and devastated.

Gulf states have remained resistant to Iranian infiltration despite Tehran’s attempts to build cells and carry out terrorist operations across the Gulf. For decades, Iran’s hostility toward the Gulf has been a source of concern, but the Gulf has remained resilient and has never been paralyzed economically nor seen their policy-making hijacked. Other Arab countries have been deeply affected by Iran.

Take Iraq, for example. Iraq has great potential, human capital, and a rich history, and Iranian interference has severely weakened the country. After 2003, Tehran exploited a political and security vacuum in Iraq and built a deep network of influence within the state. It created proxy militias and pulled the strings. Iraqi national figures were forced into silence or exile when they objected to Iran’s dominance over their country.

Iran’s hostility toward Iraq appears to have had far more destructive consequences than it has on Gulf states, which are capable of protecting themselves. The result is that this country with vast resources has had its sovereignty and independence undermined.

Lebanon offers another example. Mass destruction has been wreaked on the country due to the Iranian regime. Hezbollah has tied Lebanese politics to Iran’s regional project, with clear consequences: paralysis of state institutions, economic collapse, and international isolation.

Syria continues to suffer from the repercussions of Iranian dominance. Elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps have intervened there directly, and Syrian territory hosted sectarian militias from a variety of places. Syrians have paid enormous human and material costs as a result of this intervention.

Palestine and Yemen are other examples. Iran’s role has been more damaging there than in the Gulf, which has preserved its sovereignty and resources.

The second reason is its exploitation of sectarian identity at the expense of national identity. Tehran has weakened the national consciousness of several Arab countries while strengthening sectarian loyalties. We have seen citizens of some Arab countries show stronger allegiance to Ali Khamenei, Hassan Nasrallah, or Qassem Soleimani than to their own states.

Tehran has managed to build parallel systems within these countries, such as schools, media, and social institutions, creating a “state within a state” and a “society within a society.” It has tied communities to an ideological doctrine of sacrifice and martyrdom in service of its project. The result has been catastrophic, with citizens of the same country becoming enemies.

This has not occurred in the Gulf states, which have fought extremists linked to Iran’s project and reinforced their national identity. Moreover, strong state institutions and economic development in the Gulf continues to present a bulwark to transnational loyalties.

When I speak of the Gulf, I do not mean only its citizens, but everyone who lives on its soil, including Arab, foreign, and even Iranian nationals. Ultimately, the Gulf presents a model of civilization that is not tied to a narrow identity; it is built on strong statehood, economic success, religious tolerance, social openness, and integration into the modern world that accommodates all.

I oppose chauvinistic division. The irony, however, is that the same intellectuals and commentators who embrace bigotry align themselves with Iran despite how evident it is that the Iranian regime’s hostility for Arab states is broader, harsher, and more dangerous than its hostility toward the Gulf. So why do they celebrate it?